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THE COURT, THE LEGISLATURE, AND 
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY IN 
MICIDGAN 
Luke K. Cooperrider* 
I. THE ERA OF CAMPBELL AND COOLEY 
A. The Original Image of the Problem: Nonfeasance and Mere 
Neglect, Misfeasance and Trespass, Independent Public Offi-
cers, and Legislative Decisions 
IN 1961, when Justice Edwards of the Michigan supreme court said, "From this date forward the judicial doctrine of governmental 
immunity from ordinary torts no longer exists in Michigan,"1 he went 
on to say that he was eliminating from the law of Michigan "an an-
cient rule inherited from the days of absolute monarchy,"2 a "whim of 
long-dead kings."8 Justice Carr, dissenting, agreed that the doctrine 
in question "came to us as a part of the common law,"4 for which 
reason he thought it was protected by the reception clause of the 
Constitution of 1850° from the overruling action of the court. If the 
learned justices had looked more closely, they would have discovered 
that their statements were not historically accurate. The doctrine of 
"governmental immunity," as it has been known in recent years-
that is, the rule that governmental entities are immune from tort lia-
bility for the acts of their employees whenever the injury-causing 
activity is "governmental" in nature or involves the performance of a 
"governmental function"-is not, so far as the law of Michigan is 
concerned, "ancient." It did not exist in 1850 and therefore can 
scarcely "have come to us as part of the common law" or by inheri-
tance from monarchs, absolute or otherwise. Rather it was imported 
into the law of Michigan in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century by a generation of judges and lawyers who found it easier to 
read about the law in Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal corpora-
tions than to track down their own legal heritage. The instruments 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1940, Harvard University; J.D. 
1948, University of Michigan; Editorial Board, Vol. 46, Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
1. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 250, 111 N.W.2d 1, 20 (1961). 
2. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 250, 111 N.W .2d 1, 20 (1961). 
3. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 258, 111 N.W.2d 1, 28 (1961). 
4. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 240, 111 N.W .2d 1, 5 (1961). 
5. MICH. CoNsr. sched. § 1 (1850): "The common law and the statute laws now in 
force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by 
their own limitations or are altered or repealed by the legislature." 
[ 187] 
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with which the justices of the Michigan supreme court in its salad 
days operated upon problems of municipal tort liability were prod-
ucts of their mvn environment and experience, bore little resem-
blance to the blunt instrument of later years-"govemmental func-
tion"-and had almost nothing to do with the divine right of kings. 
In the early days, the Savoyard Creek, a minor watercourse mean-
dering through the area that is now downtown Detroit, was used by 
the householders along its banks as a place to dispose of refuse, until 
it became so noisome that the city fathers, in 1836, walled it in, cov-
ered it over, and created the first underground sewer in that city. It 
was known as the "Grand Sewer," and its success was such as to con-
vince a doubting citizenry of the merits of underground drainage; 
however, for many years yet there was no general system. Private par-
ties built their mvn sewers in their own ways, many lots had no drain-
age, and for many others the drainage available was most imperfect. 
A system did not begin to emerge until a new city charter in 1857 
gave a board of sewer commissioners control over all sewers, public 
and private.6 
In that same year the supreme court, in Dermont v. Mayor of 
Detroit,7 entertained the first case involving a claim against the city 
arising out of its management of such matters. During a heavy rain-
fall in 1853 the Grand Sewer backed up into the cellar of Dermont's 
store. Dermont claimed the damage was caused by the city, which had 
introduced too many tributaries into the main trunk and had con-
nected the Woodward Avenue sewer, at the very comer where his 
store was located, at right angles instead of on a curve; all of this was 
done after he had, with the city's consent and at the cost of an annual 
fee, connected his private drain to the sewer.8 The court rejected his 
claim, resting its decision upon the proposition that the city had no 
obligation to furnish private drainage to individual property owners.0 
It was conceded that the city would be liable if plaintiff's damage had 
happened "directly" in consequence of defendant's want of prudence 
or skill in the construction of the sewer, or if the water had flowed up 
through the manholes and flooded his cellar. But it was asserted that 
his damage had, in fact, resulted from his connection of his private 
drain to the sewer for his own convenience, and that the rule in such 
case was no different from what it would be if a private individual 
6. s. FARMER, THE HlsrORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN 60-61 (2d ed. 1889). 
7. 4 Mich. 435 (1857). 
8. 4 Mich. at 436. 
9. 4 Mich. at 442. 
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had dug a drain and permitted his neighbor to tie into it.10 The an-
nual fee paid by plaintiff did not alter these conclusions, for it was 
viewed as payment for a license only, and not as the consideration for 
an obligation, express or implied, to furnish sufficient drainage for 
the premises connected to the sewer.11 
Since Dermont's assertions appear sufficient to support a claim of 
misfeasance, the factual image from which the decision proceeds, i.e., 
that the claim was based on nonfeasance, a "failure to provide suffi-
cient drainage," seems questionable. Nevertheless, the decision did 
rest on an application of tort doctrine not peculiar to the liabilities 
of governments. The opinion did contain, however, the statement 
of a position, applicable particularly to governmental defendants, 
which echoed down through subsequent cases: 
The powers granted to Municipal Corporations for the laying out 
and making of highways, and for opening and grading streets, and 
the construction of sewers, involve the exercise of discretion on the 
part of the municipal authorities, ancl. should be employed for the 
benefit of the public at large, and not for the private convenience or 
advantage of individuals; nor are the officers of a Municipal Corpora-
tion justified in the exercise of those powers, except in reference to 
the public demands.12 
It was thought that to recognize liability in this case would "impose 
upon the city the obligation to furnish private drainage for individ-
uals; and the question presented to its officers would not be, what the 
public exigencies demanded in reference to its capacity, but how 
they might best discharge its legal obligations to individuals."13 
Another landmark in the area of municipal liability was estab-
lished by the court at the same term when, in Commissioners of High-
ways v. Martin,14 it rejected a claim for damage arising from the non-
repair of a bridge. Judge Douglass, the reporter responsible for the 
publication of the first volumes of Michigan supreme court reports, 
asserted in his opinion that the court was unaware of any previous 
attempt in Michigan to assert such a liability. While he carefully 
noted.'>the state of authorities in England and the historical origins 
of duties in regard to maintenance of highways and bridges there 
reposed in local units of government, he focused primarily upon 
indigenous conditions and upon American authorities, which, in the 
10. 4 Mich. at 443. 
11. 4 Mich. at 444. 
12. 4 Mich. at 442. 
13. 4 Mich. at 443. 
14. 4 Mich. 557 (1857). 
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absence of statute, he found to be almost unanimously contrary to the 
claim.15 
Unlike the situation in Russell's pursuit of the Men of Devon,10 
Martin's problem was not the absence of a suable entity, for under 
Michigan statutes the inhabitants of each organized township con-
stituted a body corporate that could sue and be sued, hold and dispose 
of property, and enter into contracts.17 His difficulty, as the judges 
viewed the scene in Michigan, was that the corporate township had, 
not just no liability, but no duty at all, even of an operational char-
acter, in respect to the maintenance of bridges. The reason they saw 
the situation in this light had little to do with the immunity of sov-
ereigns, but much to do with the way in which such matters had been 
handled on the frontier. 
At that time the inhabitants of a Michigan township assembled 
each year in an annual meeting to elect certain officers and transact 
such other business as required their action.18 One of the officers 
elected at the meeting was a highway commissioner. Since his term of 
office was three years, each township had three such commissioners, 
who together constituted the Board of Highway Commissioners.10 
In addition, an overseer of highways was elected for each road district 
that had been set aside within the township.20 The highway commis-
sioners were, by statute, directly burdened with responsibility for 
the care and superintendence of highways and bridges within the 
township, and with the duty to see that they were kept in repair.21 
15. 4 Mich. at 562. 
16. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). RtlSsell, which is gen-
erally identified as the basis for common law doctrine concerned with the liability or 
immunity of municipal corporations, was an action for damages arising from an un-
repaired bridge. It was the county's duty to repair the bridge, but the county was not 
a corporate entity, and a demurrer was interposed by two of the inhabitants of the 
county for themselves and the other inhabitants. The judges concluded that no action 
could be maintained without statutory authorization because of the difficulties tliat 
would be created with regard to the collection of the award and the identification 
of the inhabitants bound to contribute to it, there being no corporate fund out of 
which it might be paid. This reasoning was imported into American doctrine via dicta 
in Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169 (1810), and the decision in 
Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812), wherein the court assumed it was 
applicable to a claim against a town, though the town apparently was possessed of a 
corporate identity, and stated the proposition that quasi-corporations (i.e., towns and 
counties) "created by the legislature for purposes of publick policy are subject by the 
common law to an indictment for the neglect of duties enjoined on them: but arc not 
liable to an action for such neglect, unless the action be given by statute." 9 Mass. at 
250. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 977 (4th ed. 1971), and sources cited therein at 
978 n.80. 
17. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 2 (1846). 
18. MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 16, §§ 8, 12 (1846). 
19. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 12 (1846). 
20. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 10 (1846). 
21. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 22, § I (1846). 
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Their "department" for this purpose consisted of the overseers, them-
selves elected representatives of the inhabitants, upon each of whom, 
within his own district, fell the explicit duty "to repair and keep in 
order the highways."22 The commissioners and the overseers were 
subject to indictment and fine for refusal or neglect to perform the 
duties imposed upon them by law,23 and the commissioners were 
required to prosecute an overseer against whom a complaint was 
filed, with security for costs, by any resident.24 
While the duties of the commissioners were explicit, as were their 
risks of office, their resources were limited. Although the township 
board was authorized, at the behest of the highway commissioners, 
to request of the annual township meeting an appropriation for the 
improvement of highways and bridges,25 the amount of that appro-
priation was expressly limited to 250 dollars, and the principal re-
source for the maintenance and improvement of the highway system 
was the labor of the township inhabitants, who were conscripted 
through an assessment system administered by the highway commis-
sioners. Each male inhabitant between the ages of twenty-one and 
fifty was annually assessed one day of labor on the highways, and the 
remaining labor required for the maintenance program was assessed 
against all property owners in proportion to the value of their assessed 
property, not in excess of one day of labor per one hundred dollars 
valuation.26 It was the duty of the overseer, who was assessed along 
with the rest, to notify persons when to come to work and to super-
vise their labors when they appeared.27 
This mobilization of the inhabitants for the repair and construc-
tion of highways had been in effect in Michigan from early territorial 
days. The same basic system is found in a statute promulgated in 1805 
by the governor and judges of the Michigan territory, coupled with 
the declaration, essential to their power to legislate, that it was 
"adopted from the laws of one of the original States, to wit, the State 
of New York, as far as necessary and suitable to the circumstances of 
the territory of Michigan."28 It was this system the judges had in 
22. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 5 (1846). 
23. MlcH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 16, §§ 85-86, ch. 22, § 13 (1846). 
24. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 14 (1846). 
25. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 4 (1846). 
26. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 23, § 5 (1846). The labor could be commuted in cash at the 
election of the person assessed, MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 24, § 3 (1846), or he could hire a 
substitute to work out his obligation. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 24, § 6 (1846). 
27. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 5 (1846). 
28. Act of Sept. 18, 1805, 1 MICH. TERR. LAws 75, 79 (1871). Numerous revisions ap-
peared thereafter, e.g., one adopted in 1819 that was then attributed to "the laws of 
three of the original states; to wit, the states of New-York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio." 
Act of Dec. 30, 1819, 1 MICH. TERR. LA.ws 449, 461 (1871). The final territorial version 
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mind when they considered Martin's claim against the Niles com-
missioners. 
His action was brought, not against the township as such, but 
against the commissioners of highways as a "quasi corporation" under 
a procedural chapter (chapter ll9) of the Revised Statutes that au-
thorized the commissioners, and other similar public boards, to sue 
in the name of their office on contracts made by them or their pre-
decessors, or to enforce any legal duty, or to recover damages for in-
juries to their official property or rights.29 They were made subject 
to suit in the same fashion, and it was provided that if judgment were 
recovered in such an action, payment thereof was to be made by the 
township treasurer after the amount had been levied and collected 
from the taxpayers like other township charges.80 There was no speci-
fication, however, of the kinds of claims that could be asserted against 
the board. The judges thought that the township as such could not 
be held liable for the nonperformance by the commissioners of a 
duty that was imposed directly upon them, since in the performance 
of such duties they were neither responsible to nor controlled by the 
township. Moreover, the judges could not bring themselves to believe 
that the procedural provisions of chapter 119 were intended to create 
such a liability, which, by virtue of the collection machinery that the 
law provided, would ultimately come to rest on the inhabitants of the 
township.81 Their conclusion was that those provisions authorized 
a suit only for acts done by the commissioners or on contracts made 
by them within the scope of their authority and did not extend to 
claims for damages caused by an alleged neglect of official duty. The 
opinion added without explication that, "if liable at all, [the com-
missioners] are liable individually, and not officially, as a quasi 
Corporation. "82 
These conclusions were perhaps not inevitable, but neither were 
they unreasonable. They were not the product of a mindless obeisance 
to Russell v. Men of Devon,83 although they were influenced by the 
was adopted by the Legislative Council in 1833. Act of April 17, 1833, 8 MICH. TERR. 
LAws 1049 (1874). It was then reiterated in MICH. R.Ev. STAT. pt. 1, tit. IV, ch. 1 (town• 
ship organization) & tit. VI, ch. 1 (highways) (1838), 
29, MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 119 (1846). 
30. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 119, § 7 (1846). 
31. 4 Mich. at 563-64. 
32. 4 Mich. at 564. 
33. For critiques of American decisions following Russell v. Men of Devon, discussed 
in note 16 supra, see Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and 
Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Cor• 
porations, 16 ORE. L. R.Ev. 250, 264 (1937): Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 
34 YALE L.J. 1, 41-45 (1924). 
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weight of American authority, which had in turn been influenced 
by that decision. If one is inclined to speculate about unexpressed 
premises, it may be that the judges saw the problem of imperfect 
rural highways as one of the common perils of the times, which the 
community dealt with as best it could through the efforts of its mem-
bers, and that their sense of justice did not strongly suggest that the 
community be required to assume the costs of individual misfortunes 
arising from a risk to which all were exposed. 
A few years later, in City of Detroit v. Corey,34 the city was again 
before the court, this time as a result of an injury suffered by one 
Corey, who drove his wagon into a Grand River Street excavation 
that had been made and left unprotected by a contractor who was 
building a sewer for the city. The court rejected the city's "indepen-
dent contractor" defense and held it liable. The court argued that, 
although the city streets were public highways, the sewers were the 
city's private property, and the people of the state at large had no 
interest in them.35 The grant of power to the city to locate sewers 
in its streets was therefore a grant for private purposes, and the donee 
of such a power, whether it be a corporation or an individual, took 
it subject to the conditions that it shall be so executed as not unneces-
sarily to interfere with the rights of the public and that all proper 
measures be taken to guard against accidents to persons lawfully using 
the highway. Such an obligation is binding upon the donee person-
ally and cannot be divested by delegating the execution of the power 
to another.86 
The first case to imply a possible public liability for nonrepair of 
public facilities was Dewey v. City of Detroit.87 Plaintiff had tripped 
on a loose plank in a city sidewalk. The trial judge told the jury that 
the city would be liable only if it had had notice of the defect and 
that notice might be inferred if the defect were open and notorious, 
or of long standing and of such character that it would naturally ar-
rest the attention of persons passing by. Plaintiff's counsel argued that 
this condition was too restrictive, but Justice Campbell could find 
no fault ·with the charge. He did not deny the implication that liabil-
ity would arise from a failure to repair after notice. He answered 
the plaintiff's claim of more extensive responsibility by pointing to 
the fact that sidewalk repairs were required by the city charter to be 
made under the supervision of street commissioners, that there were 
34. 9 Mich. 165 (1861). 
35. 9 Mich. at 184. 
36. 9 Mich. at 184-85. 
37. 15 Mich. 307 (1867). 
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only two commissioners for the entire city, and that, as a practical 
matter, the commissioners could not be expected to be aware of de-
fects that were not apparent to every ordinary observer, since the 
walks in a city the size of Detroit covered "many scores, and probably 
several hundreds of miles."38 He thought that the "minute daily in-
spection which is possible and necessary on a line of railroad, where 
a small break may endanger hundreds of lives, would be absurd and 
impracticable in relation to sidewalks."39 Although it might be ar-
gued that the city could have decided to appoint more commissioners, 
that decision, he was firmly convinced, was legislative in character 
and not subject to judicial review; nor could it be made the basis of 
a complaint against the city.40 
Thus, in these early decisions the court had held that road and 
bridge maintenance in rural areas was, under Michigan statutes, the 
personal responsibility of certain elected officials, and not that of any 
public entity, so injuries arising from the lack of repair of such facili-
ties were not a source of community liability, and further, that the 
charter of the city of Detroit did not impose upon the city any obliga-
tion to provide adequate drainage £or its inhabitants, so the city had 
no liability to private parties £or failure of the drainage system to 
conduct surface water away rapidly enough to avoid flooding. On the 
other hand, the court had held that the city was liable to a private 
party harmed by the negligence of the city's contractor in opening 
an excavation in a public street without taking the necessary precau-
tions to prevent accidents to users of the public way and had voiced 
dicta to the effect that a city would be liable for harm caused by con-
struction operations in building a sewer, or by a sewer that, because 
of insufficient capacity, overflowed and cast water upon private prem-
ises. In another early case, Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw,41 wherein 
plaintiff complained of ditches that cast surface water upon his prem-
ises, the court had also stated that a city would be liable for the con-
tinuance of a nuisance that it had created. 
The evolving demarcation corresponded generally to the bound-
ary between misfeasance and nonfeasance, with two jogs, one on each 
side of the line. The court had disclaimed power to interfere, under 
the warrant of an action for damages, with decisions that it viewed as 
within the legislative or discretionary powers entrusted to other 
branches of government. This idea was advanced as part of the argu-
38. 15 Mich. at 313. 
39. 15 Mich. at 313. 
40. 15 Mich. at 313. 
41. 8 Mich. 534 (1860), 
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ment in Dermont and in Dewey that the decisions as to how much 
drainage and how many street commissioners should be provided by 
the city were not subject to judicial review. But in Larkin v. County 
of Saginaw42 the idea was also applied to bar a claim for damages 
allegedly caused to a steamboat by the county's action in building, 
across the Tittibawassee River, a bridge that the claimant asserted 
constituted an unlawful obstruction to navigation.43 On the other 
side of the misfeasance-nonfeasance line was the tacit assumption in 
Dewey that the city might be liable for an injury resulting from fail-
ure to repair a notoriously long-standing defect in the public ways. 
The latter deviation was not long-lived, however. 
At a time when street paving was a sometime thing, crossing the 
street in Detroit in inclement weather was a formidable experience. 
According to one account: 
The condition of all the streets up to 1835, and of most of them to 
about 1850, was such as to preclude all unnecessary use. Especially in 
the spring and fall, the fine black soil, saturated with water, and in 
places mixed ·with clay, made the roads almost impassable. Children 
living not two blocks away were carried to school on horseback, and 
horses were kept hitched in front of stores or offices to enable their 
owners to cross the streets, the animals literally wading from side to 
side.44 
In 1847, the city fathers took action to ameliorate the problem, pro-
viding by ordinance for the establishment by the city of crosswalks 
of wooden planks laid on cross ties and for their funding by assess-
ment.45 In the winter of 1868, Hannah Blackeby stepped into a hole 
in a crosswalk over Michigan Avenue, tripped, and fell, breaking her 
arm in two places. Her evidence, in an action against the city, tended 
to show that the walk had been "notoriously out of repair" for sev-
eral months prior to the accident. Chief Justice Campbell, in City of 
42. 11 Mich. 88 (1862). 
43. The argument was peculiar. Chief Justice Martin's opinion was as follows: 
The board of supervisors of Saginaw county is clothed with legislative as well 
as executive power; and while the county may be liable for its acts in the exercise 
of the executive, it can not for its exercise of legislative power. The determination 
that it was necessary to build a bridge across the Tittibawassee river, and the 
whole action of the board in relation thereto, were legislative, and whether any 
portion was usurpation or not, no action can be maintained against the county 
for any consequences resulting therefrom. What would be a nuisance if erected by 
an individual, is not such when erected by authority of law and by the public, so 
as to confer a right of private action against the public therefor; and the same 
principle I think controls in this case that would had the bridge been built by 
authority of the Legislature. 
11 Mich. at 91. 
44. S. FARMER, supra note 6, at 928. 
45. Id. at 931. 
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Detroit v. Blackeby,46 brushed aside any implications to be found in 
his dictum in Dewey as not required by that decision and posed for 
decision the question "whether the city of Detroit is liable to a pri-
vate action by an injured party, for neglect to keep a cross-walk in 
repair."47 There was no statute imposing such an obligation, and in 
view of the uniform opinion that, in the absence of statute, govern-
mental units such as towns, townships, and counties had no such lia-
bility as to highways generally, 48 there was, in his mind, a strong 
presumption against liability where cities were concerned. Mrs. 
Blackeby's counsel argued that a duty owed by the city to his client 
arose from the control, by law exclusive of others including state and 
county, that the city exercised over its streets; he cited a line of out-
side decisions that distinguished in this respect between towns and 
counties, on the one hand, and incorporated cities and villages, on 
the other.49 The pivotal decision was that of Judge Selden in the 
New York case of Weet v. Trustees of the Village of Brockport/50 
wherein he reviewed a number of English and American decisions 
and concluded that although, in the absence of statute, towns and 
counties were not subject to liability for failure to repair the public 
ways, with incorporated municipalities it was otherwise. 
The heart of the matter was the difficulty that courts of the time 
experienced in identifying a vehicle for tort liability-a "duty"-
when the plaintiff's complaint was that he had suffered injury be-
cause the defendant did not do something he ought to have done, 
and the "ought" was not derived from contract or any other special 
duty-creating relationship between the parties. Public officials owed 
to the public at large a duty to perform in a proper way the functions 
entrusted to them, and their nonfeasances were sanctioned by indict-
ment. But, with the exception of certain officials who, like sheriffs, 
acted or were bound to act at the behest and in the interest of indi-
viduals from whom they also received a special compensation, what 
was the source of any duty owed by the official to the individual citi-
zen? And if there was none, then why would there be any difference 
46. 21 Mich. 84 (1870). 
47. 21 Mich. at 105. 
48. 21 Mich. at 107. 
49. 21 Mich. at 88. 
50. The opinion of Judge Selden in this supreme court case was reported in a foot-
note to the court of appeals decision in Conrad v. Trustees of the Village of Ithaca, 16 
N.Y. 158, 161-73 n. • (1857), where it was stated by Chief Justice Denio that the Selden 
opinion had been adopted by the court of appeals as a correct exposition of the prin-
ciples governing such cases in the course of the court's decision to reverse the supreme 
court's decision in Hickock v. Trustees of the Village of Plattsburgh, 15 Barb. 427 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1853). See 16 N.Y. at 160-61 8c 161 n. •. 
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in so far as the obligations of public corporations were concerned? 
Judge Selden found his answer to the latter question in a theory, 
spun from English cases, that the special grant of governmental 
powers to a municipal corporation, normally made at the request 
of the incorporators, constituted consideration for an implied obli-
gation on the corporation's part to perform its duties in a proper way 
and that this implied obligation was for the benefit of individuals in-
jured by nonperformance, as well as for the benefit of the public at 
large.61 
But Justice Campbell would have none of this. The distinction 
between towns and counties, on the one hand, and cities, on the 
other, he thought irrational: 
It is competent for the Legislature to give towns and countries powers 
as large as those granted to cities. Each receives what is supposed to 
be necessary or convenient, and each receives this because the good 
government of the people is supposed to require it. It would be con-
trary to every principle of fairness to give special privileges to any 
part of the people and deny them to others; and such is not the pur-
pose of city charters. In England the burgesses of boroughs and cities 
had very important and valuable privileges of an exclusive nature, 
and not common to all the people of the realm. The charters were 
grants of privilege and not mere government agencies. Their free 
customs and liberties were put by the great charter under the same 
immunity with private freeholds. But in this State, and in this coun-
try generally, they are not placed beyond legislative control. The 
Dartmouth College case, which first established charters as contracts, 
distinguished between public and private corporations, and there is 
no respectable authority to be found anywhere, which holds that 
either offices or municipal charters generally involve any rights of 
property whatever.52 
In sum, his view was "that simply as municipal corporations ... no 
public bodies can be made responsible for official neglect involving 
no active misfeasance"53 and that "it will require legislative action to 
create any liability to private suit for non-repair of public ways. 
Whether such responsibility should be created, and to what extent 
and under what circumstances it should be enforced, are legislative 
51. 16 N.Y. at 161 n.•, 170-71. 
52. 21 Mich. at 116-17. This was not the first evidence of Justice Campbell's dis-
approval of the argument derived from W eet. He had dissented on similar grounds in 
City of Detroit v. Corey, discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-36 supra, because 
it seemed to him that the condition attached by the court to the city's exercise of its 
charter power to open excavations in the public way for the implantation of sewers was 
the product of some notion of implied contract between city and state in regard to the 
manner of its use. See 9 Mich. at 187-92. 
53. 21 Mich. at 116. 
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questions of importance and some nicety. They cannot be solved in 
courts. "54 
Justice Cooley, in dissent, was of a different opinion. To him it 
was unquestionably sound policy "that a municipal corporation 
which is vested with full control of the public streets within its limits, 
and chargeable with the duty of keeping them in repair, and which 
also possesses by law the means of repair, should be held liable to an 
individual who has suffered injury by a failure to perform this 
duty."55 Being of this view, he was not disposed to buck the strong 
trend of opinion in accord with Judge Selden's view for no better 
reason than the questions that might be raised against the logic by 
which it was derived. 56 
Two years later the court's position was brought into bolder relief 
by its decision in Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo.51 The village trus-
tees, having concluded that a number of property owners were main-
taining fences within the boundaries of the street along Olmstead 
Road, ordered the village marshal, in default of prior action by the 
owners, to remove the offending structures. In response to that direc-
tive, the marshal removed Sheldon's fence, and Sheldon sued the 
village, claiming that the fence was in fact on his property. The trial 
judge refused to hear Sheldon's evidence on the ground that the 
trustees had acted on their own responsibility as public officers and 
that the village was therefore not responsible for any resulting dam-
age. 58 This position was firmly rejected by Justice Campbell for a 
unanimous court. He asserted that, although some local officers are 
corporate agents and others are not, a public corporation is as much 
a legal person as is a private corporation, and if an unlawful act is 
brought home to the corporation itself, there is no reason why it 
54. 21 Mich. at 117. 
55. 21 Mich. at 117. 
56. But when, ten years later, the question was raised again by a litigant who hoped 
to benefit from a change in the court's membership, it was Justice Cooley who rebuked 
him: 
The case of Blackeby was very fully and carefully considered, and there can be 
no ground for supposing that either of the judges participating therein has since 
changed the opinion then deliberately formed and expressed. The case was decided 
on the concurring opinions of a majority of the court, and the decision is authorita-
tive. There has been a change in the court since that time, but it would be mis• 
chievous in a high degree to permit the re-opening of controversies every time a 
new judge takes his place in the court, thereby encouraging speculation as to the 
probable effect of such changes upon principles previously declared and enforced 
m decided cases. Nothing is more important than that the Jaw should be settled: 
and when a principle has once been authoritatively laid down by the court of last 
resort, it should be regarded as finally settled. 
McCutcheon v. Common Council, 43 Mich. 483, 486, 5 N.W. 668, 668-69 (1880). 
57. 24 Mich. 383 (1872). 
58, 24 Mich. at 384. 
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should not be answerable. On this point, he stated, there was no dis-
agreement at all. 
The only disagreement is concerning corporate responsibility in cases 
of alleged neglect of duty, and concerning the bounds of what may 
be termed their legislative discretion, as distinguished from their 
other action. To hold that positive wrongs must in all cases be con-
sidered as purely individual and not corporate acts, would be a 
novelty in jurisprudence. Although not subject like corporations to 
the jurisdiction of courts, it has always been understood that even 
states and nations may be held responsible for the wrongs of their 
authorized agents, and the whole system of public law rests on this 
assumption. The idea, therefore, that a corporate body has a dis-
cretionary power to do wrong and not suffer for it, is not in harmony 
with any safe principle. There may be certain cases where there is, 
of necessity, a final discretion; but there can be no absolute discretion-
ary power over private persons or property. They are assured by the 
law of the land against any improper interference, and no public 
authority exists which can authorize their immunity to be taken 
away.59 
The act complained of by Sheldon was a trespass, directly commanded 
by the village fathers themselves. Worse yet, it was in effect a forcible 
taking of private lands for public use and therefore in no way analo-
gous to cases involving claims for incidental inconveniences arising 
out of grade changes or other public improvements where a wide 
latitude for legislative decision-making must be allowed. Under the 
circumstances presented by plaintiff's complaint, neither the "non-
agency" argument nor the "legislative discretion" argument was 
applicable, and it was not a case of "mere neglect of public duty." 
Consequently, there was no reason why the village should escape 
responsibility for the act of its officers carried out in their corporate 
capacity.60 
During the remaining years in which the court enjoyed the coun-
sel of either Justice Campbell or Justice Cooley,61 the reason most 
commonly asserted by the court for a conclusion that a municipal 
corporation was not subject to liability (where the case did not in-
volve mere nonfeasance and the court was persuaded that the action 
in question was the action of the municipal corporation and not that 
of an independent officer or agency) was that the particular action 
59. 24 Mich. at 385-86. 
60. See also Rogers v. Randall, 29 Mich. 41 (1874) (similar reasoning applied to re-
moval of sidewalk from plaintiff's premises witbout his consent); Jordan v. Thorp, 142 
Mich. 515, 105 N.W. 1113 (1905). 
61. Justice Cooley was defeated for re-election in 1885; Justice Campbell died in 
1890. 
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reflected a decision within the legislative or political discretion of the 
policy-making organ of the unit. It is clear that both of these justices 
harbored strong convictions that judges and juries had no business 
second-guessing operational decisions made by the elected represen-
tatives of the people. Thus, in City of Pontiac v. Carter02 it was held 
that the city had no liability to a property owner for damages al-
legedly suffered by reason of a change in the grade of the street on 
which his premises were located. While the facts are not set forth in 
the opinion, the case was described in Ashley v. City of Port Huron°3 
as involving no intrusion upon plaintiff's premises, but only a claim 
that the value of his property was adversely affected because he had 
built by reference to the earlier grade. It was a case of first impression 
in Michigan. Justice Cooley cited what he described as an overwhelm-
ing weight of authority contrary to plaintiff's claim, which he saw as 
analogous to a claim £or loss arising from the removal of a public 
market or public hall from the vicinity of plaintiff's land, or from the 
bringing of a prison into its vicinity.64 He also cited Larkin v. County 
of Saginaw65 for the proposition that "no action would lie against a 
municipal corporation or body £or an injury resulting from a lawful 
exercise of its legislative authority," a principle that he thought was 
applicable here.66 
In Henkel v. City of Detroit07 plaintiff complained that the city 
was unlawfully interfering with his property rights by allowing traffic 
to accumulate around a public market to such an extent as to block 
access to his adjoining business premises. He sought an injunction. 
Justice Cooley, again, held that plaintiff could not complain about 
the establishment of the market even though it inconvenienced him, 
£or the establishment of the market was a legislative act and "[a]n act 
of legislation can never be counted on as a legal ·wrong, however in-
jurious it may prove to be to private interests."88 He did, however, 
review the facts of the case to determine whether the city's imple-
mentation of its legislative decision had been in any way wrongful; 
he concluded that the wrong, if any, must arise from the city's failure 
to establish and enforce due regulations to protect and preserve the 
62. 32 Mich. 164 (1875). 
63. 35 Mich. 296, 297-98 (1877). 
64. 32 Mich. at 171-72. 
65. See note 43 and text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
66. 32 Mich. at 169. 
67. 49 Mich. 249, 13 N.W. 611 (1882). 
68. 49 Mich. at 258, 13 N.W. at 615. 
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right of passage, "[b ]ut this would be a failure in duty of a political 
nature and could give no right of action."69 
In Burford v. City of Grand Rapids70 plaintiff complained of the 
city council's action in setting aside Fountain Street as a street on 
which coasting would be permitted. He asserted that the large num-
bers of people who gathered there for that purpose constituted a 
public nuisance and that he had suffered special injury when his 
horse, which he was driving on the street, was hit by a bob occupied 
by several men and boys. Justice Cooley held that the complaint 
failed to state a cause of action, for the permission granted by council 
was again the exercise of a legislative power conferred upon the city 
to control the use 0£ its streets, and "legislative power, whether held 
by the law-making authority of the State, or by municipal bodies, is 
in its nature governmental and discretionary."71 To plaintiff's claim 
that the council had, in effect, licensed a nuisance, he replied that 
coasting on a public highway is not necessarily a nuisance, and, this 
being so, 
[t]he case presented then, would seem to be this: The common council, 
having full control of the streets, has licensed the use of a particular 
street in a particular way differing from the ordinary use. In doing so 
it must be supposed to have determined that the use in that way will 
not interrupt or interfere with such customary use of it for passage 
or travel as the public may have occasion for. The decision to this 
effect is made in the exercise of its discretionary and governmental 
authority over a subject confided by the state to its judgment, and is 
presumptively correct. But, whether correct or not, no appeal from 
the judgment to court and jury has been provided for, and therefore 
none can be had. 72 
In Hines v. City of Charlotte78 the court held that the plaintiff 
had no cause of action against the city for a fire loss that he attributed 
to the city's failure to enforce its ordinance prohibiting the erection 
of wooden structures within certain areas, and in Amperse v. City of 
Kalamazoo74 it held that the city had no liability for the city council's 
wrongful refusal to approve a bond offered by the plaintiff so that he 
could engage in the sale of liquor. Both cases were treated as instances 
69. 49 Mich. at 261, 13 N.W. at 616. 
70. 53 Mich. 98, 18 N.W. 571 (1884). 
71. 53 Mich. at 100, 18 N.W. at 571. 
72. 53 Mich. at 105, 18 N.W. at 574. 
73. 72 Mich. 278, 40 N.W. 333 (1888). 
74. 75 Mich. 228, 42 N.W. 821 (1889). 
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of mere nonfeasance, although in the latter case the council had 
passed a resolution affirmatively disapproving the bond. 
In sum, it was decided in these cases that the city was not required 
to compensate a property owner for the prejudicial effect that a 
change of street grade would have upon the value of his property, nor 
for the inconvenience he suffered from the traffic near his place of 
business generated by the operation of a public market nearby, nor 
for a fire loss that would not have occurred if the ordinance pertain-
ing to the use of wooden buildings had been enforced; nor was it 
required to compensate a user of the highway for harm suffered at 
the hands of another person using the highway in a manner per-
mitted by the city, nor to compensate a citizen who claimed that the 
city council arbitrarily refused to take action in his favor that he 
was entitled to have taken. 
The most dubious decisions during this era were City of Detroit 
v. Beckman75 and City of Lansing v. Toolan,76 both products of the 
questionable decision in Larkin v. County of Saginaw.77 The "legis-
lative discretion" argument was used in these cases to exempt the 
municipal corporation from liability for personal injuries allegedly 
caused by defects in the design or plan of public works. In Beckman 
it was alleged that decedent's wagon had run off the end of a culvert 
and overturned and that the city was negligent in causing so short a 
culvert to be constructed. Justice Cooley's reaction was that, when 
the complaint is that the plan of a public work is so defective as to 
render it dangerous when completed, the fault found is with legisla-
tive action, for the determination to construct a public work and the 
prescribing of the plan for it are matters of legislation.78 In Toolan 
the plaintiff claimed that he had fallen into a ditch that had been cut 
by authority of the city and negligently left unprotected. It appeared 
that a contractor employed by the city to make improvements on a 
bridge had cut the ditch to protect his work from a flow of water after 
a heavy rain, that he had covered the ditch with a plank to a width 
of sixteen feet, and that the city thereafter allowed the ditch to re-
main as a permanent drain and paid the contractor for it. Plaintiff 
relied upon acceptance and ratification to bring responsibility home 
to the city. Despite the analogy of City of Detroit v. Corey,1° Justice 
Cooley thought that the case was controlled by Beckman. In planning 
75. 34 Mich. 125 (1876). 
76. 37 Mich. 152 (1887). 
77. See note 43 and text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
78. 34 Mich. at 126. 
'19. See text accompanying notes 34-86 supra. 
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a public work, he said, a municipal corporation must determine for 
itself to what ex.tent it will guard against possible accidents, and 
courts and juries are not to say it shall be punished in damages for 
failing to give the public more complete protection. The public has 
a right to require of the city that due care shall be observed in the 
construction of the work after the plans are fixed, and in its manage-
ment thereafter, but negligence is not to be predicated of the plan 
itself.SO 
Contemporary with these two decisions, on the other hand, was 
Ashley v. City of Port Huron,81 wherein plaintiff claimed that injury 
to his premises was caused by the cutting of a sewer, the "necessary 
result" of which was to collect and throw large quantities of water on 
his premises where water would not otherwise have flowed. While the 
trial judge thought that the "legislative discretion" argument pre-
cluded recovery, the supreme court was of contrary opinion. Accord-
ing to Justice Cooley, it was clear from the authorities that municipal 
corporations have no exemption from responsibility where the injury 
is directly caused by a corporate act in the nature of a trespass: "If 
the corporation sends people with picks and spades to cut a street 
through it without first acquiring the right of way, it is liable for a 
tort; but it is no more liable under such circumstances than it is when 
it pours upon his land a flood of water by a public sewer so con-
structed that the flooding must be a necessary result."82 The principle 
was the same as in Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw,83 where the city be-
came liable by creating a nuisance that caused injury to an individual. 
A distinction seems thus to have been drawn between a design 
feature of a public work that necessarily results in an invasion of 
plaintiff's property interest and a design feature that merely creates 
a risk of personal injury and property damage. Liability could be 
predicated of the former, but not of the latter. The trespass-appro-
priation image in the former situation made the difference. 
Ashley thereafter furnished the rationale by which persons with 
complaints against the municipality's handling of sewers and drains 
could frequently avoid the nonfeasance difficulty created by Dermont. 
In Defer v. City of Detroit84 the facts alleged by plaintiff were not 
unlike those which Dermont had asserted. The claim was that the 
city had rebuilt the junction between the sewers in Franklin and 
80. 37 Mich. at 154. 
81. 35 Mich. 296 (1887). 
82. 35 Mich. at 301. 
83. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
84. 67 Mich. 346, 34 N.W. 680 (1887). 
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Riopelle Streets in such a way as to raise the grade of that junction 
above the level of the Franklin Street sewer, so that the sewer ran 
backward and flooded plaintiff's basement. The city argued that the 
case was controlled by the proposition that a municipal corporation 
is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of legislative 
power, but the court cited Ashley as evidence that this is not univer-
sally true.85 When the plan adopted must necessarily cause injury to 
private property equivalent to some appropriation of the enjoyment 
thereof, the court said, liability arises. Only when fault is found with 
the wisdom or sufficiency of the measure, or its adaptability to carry 
out the purpose intended, is liability precluded.86 In this instance, the 
allegation that the grade of the sewer had been changed in such a 
way as to cause water to flood the plaintiff's premises was a charge of 
misfeasance for which there would be liability. 87 At the same term, 
in Rice v. City of Flint,88 a claim was sustained against the city for 
raising the grade of Saginaw Street without taking care to provide 
for the surface water that, because of the change, was cast upon the 
plaintiff's premises. Whereas in the past the street had carried the 
water away, its flow was now dammed up so that the gutters dis-
charged in front of plaintiff's buildings. The court said that "[£]or a 
direct act which causes water to flow upon the premises of another 
to his injury a municipality is responsible."89 
B. The Legislature Enters the Scene: Of Defects in the Public Ways 
Meanwhile, back at the Capitol, the legislature was not content 
with the outcome of Martin's action against the Niles highway com-
missioners.90 Four years after his case was decided, the following stat-
ute was enacted: 
That any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the 
public highways in this State, by reason of neglect to keep in repair 
any bridge or culvert, by any township or corporation whose duty it 
is to keep such bridge or culvert in repair, such township or corpora-
tion shall be liable to, and shall pay to the person or persons so in-
85. 67 Mich. at 349, 34 N.W. at 682. 
86. 67 Mich. at 349, 34 N.W. at 682. 
87. 67 Mich. at 350, 34 N.W. at 682-83. 
88. 67 Mich. 401, 34 N.W. 719 (1887). 
89. 67 Mich. at 403, 34 N.W. at 719. Accord, Seaman v, City of Marshall, 116 Mich. 
327, 74 N.W. 484 (1898); Morley v. Village of Buchanan, 124 Mich. 128, 82 N.W. 802 
(1900); McAskill v. Township of Hancock, 129 Mich. 74, 88 N.W. 78 (1901) (refused to 
distinguish between "quasi-corporations," such as townships and counties, and incor-
porated towns and cities). 
90. See text accompanying notes 14-32 supra. 
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jured or disabled, just damages, to be recovered in an action of tres-
pass on the case, before any court of competent jurisdiction.91 
In section 2 of the act similar provisions were made for in juries to 
horses and other animals and for injuries to vehicles and other prop-
erty.92 A collection procedure was provided, which involved certifi-
cation of the judgment to the township clerk, who was directed to 
collect the amount of the judgment by normal procedures of taxa-
tion. 93 
But the draftsmen had not read the court's opinion in Martin 
with sufficient care, and the statute failed its first test in an action 
against a township. In Township of Leoni v. Taylor,94 wherein plain-
tiff sought compensation for injuries to his horses arising from a de-
fective bridge, the court read the statute, saw that it, by its terms, 
imposed liability only upon a township or corporation "whose duty 
it is to keep such bridge or culvert in repair," recalled that the 
Martin case had established that bridge and highway repair is not 
the duty of the township, and decided that the plain meaning of the 
statute required a decision that the township, not having acquired 
a repair duty, still had no liability. "The courts are not at liberty," 
said Justice Graves, "in order to effectuate what they may suppose 
to have been the intention of the Legislature, to put a construction 
upon the enactment not supported by the words, though the conse-
quences should be to defeat the object of the act,"95 and his brothers, 
Campbell, Christiancy, and Cooley, concurred. 
The wheels ground slowly, but the legislature's eventual reaction 
to this decision was the enactment in 1879 of Public Act No. 244.96 
This time the terrain had been more carefully reconnoitered, and an 
effort was made to interdict all escape routes. The initial section of 
the statute was as follows: 
That any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the 
public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep 
such public highways or streets, and all bridges, crosswalks and cul-
verts on the same in good repair, and in a condition reasonably safe 
and fit for travel, by the toi.vnship, village, city, or corporation whose 
corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, 
crosswalk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in good 
91. Act of March 15, 1861, No. 197, § 1, [1861] Mich. Acts 407. 
92. Act of March 15, 1861, No. 197, § 2, [1861] Mich. Acts 408. 
93. Act of March 15, 1861, No. 197, § 2, [1861] Mich. Acts 408. 
94. 20 Mich. 148 (1870). 
95. 20 Mich. at 155. 
96. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 223. 
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repair, such township, village, city, or corporation shall be liable to, 
and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled, just 
damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case, before 
any court of competent jurisdiction.97 
As in the earlier statute, a second section provided the same re-
sponsibility for injury to animals and other property,98 and in section 
3 a procedure was provided for collection of the judgment.00 In sec-
tion 4 it was explicitly made "the duty of townships, villages, cities, or 
corporations to keep in good repair, so that they shall be safe and 
convenient for public travel at all times, all public highways, streets, 
bridges, crosswalks, and culverts that are within their jurisdiction 
and under their care and control, and which are open to public 
travel."100 Moreover, the public entities upon which the duty was 
imposed were authorized to levy additional taxes, up to five mills, 
for repair purposes if other means of financing provided by law 
proved insufficient;191 it was further stipulated that "highway com-
missioners, street commissioners, and all other officers having special 
charge of highways, streets, bridges, crosswalks, or culverts, and the 
care or repairs thereof, are hereby made and declared to be officers 
of the tmvnship, village, city, or corporation wherein they are elected 
or appointed, and shall be subject to the general direction of such 
to,vnship, village, city, or corporate authorities, in the discharge of 
their several duties."192 All actions brought under the statute were 
subject to the proviso that "it must be shown that such township, 
village, city, or corporation has had reasonable time and opportunity 
after such highway, street, crosswalk or culvert became unsafe or 
unfit for travel, to put the same in the proper condition for use, and 
has not used reasonable diligence therein."103 
One hardy defense attorney argued thereafter that the 1879 stat-
ute was still ineffective to impose liability upon a township, because 
the repair duty continued to rest upon the highway commissioners 
as individuals and their office was created by the constitution, which 
did not subject them to the general direction of the township authori-
ties as the statute proposed to do.104 Justice Cooley, however, tendered 
the court's surrender. He conceded that the legislature's intent in 
97. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 1, [1879] Mich. Pub, Acts 223, 
98. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 2, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 223. 
99. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 3, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224. 
100. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224. 
101. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224. 
102. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224. 
103. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 223, 224. 
104. Burnham v. Township of Byron, 46 Mich. 555, 9 N.W. 851 (1881). 
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1861 may have been to change the rule of Commissioners of High-
ways v. Martin and asserted that no doubt as to the existence of that 
intent could remain after 1879. Wherever the operational duty was 
located, section 4 of the statute had the effect of imputing neglect of 
duty on the part of the commissioners "to the corporation by whose 
people they are chosen and within whose limits they exercise their 
authority,"105 and there could be no question of the legislature's 
power to make the municipalities liable, regardless of where the duty 
was located. 
On the same day, in City of Grand Rapids v. Wyman,106 Justice 
Cooley held that the legislature had also succeeded in overriding 
Detroit v. Blackeby101 and that the statutory liability was now ap-
plicable to cities as well as to the other units named in the statute. 
The city attorney had argued that the city still had only two street 
commissioners, who could scarcely be expected to discover and cor-
rect promptly all the defects that might develop in the city ways. But 
that argument was no longer viable: "The statute having imposed 
the duty of repair and the liability for neglect, the city at its peril 
must do whatever is needful to protect itself against actions for in-
jury."108 It was quickly established, however, that the duty imposed 
was only one of reasonable care; the municipalities did not have an 
insurer's liability.100 
In the 1879 version the coverage of the statute, which in 1861 had 
been limited to bridges and culverts, was expanded to include high-
ways, streets, and crosswalks. The very first case to reach the supreme 
court thereafter was a claim for injury caused by a defective public 
sidewalk. In City of Detroit v. Putnam110 the court examined the 
statute, noted that sidewalks had not been mentioned, and concluded 
that they were not covered. Correction of this omission was attempted 
in 1885 in a statute that added sidewalks to the list.111 But the law-
makers slipped again. That statute contained, in addition to the side-
105. Burnham v. Township of Byron, 46 Mich. 555, 558, 9 N.W. 851, 852 (1881). 
106. 46 Mich. 516, 9 N.W. 833 (1881). 
107. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra. 
108. 46 Mich. at 517, 9 N.W. at 834. 
109. Fulton Iron&: Engine Works v. Township of Kimball, 52 Mich. 146, 17 N.W. 
733 (1883); Township of Medina v. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67, 11 N.W. 810 (1882). Both cases 
arose from the failures of bridges under heavy loads, apparently steam tractors. In the 
latter case the court said that lack of reasonable care could be found in a failure to 
discover the defect in the bridge, but that the jury should take into account all the 
circumstances, including the size of the governmental unit involved and the degree of 
engineering knowledge to be expected of the township officers. 48 Mich. at 72, 11 N.W. 
at 811-12. 
110. 45 Mich. 263, 7 N.W. 815 (1881). 
111. Act of June 17, 1885, No. 214, [1885] Mich. Pub. Acts 289. 
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walk provision, a section abolishing common law liability for injuries 
of the type covered by the statute112 and another setting dollar limits 
on sidewalk claims, on a sliding scale from 300 dollars, when the 
population of the defendant municipality was less than 500, to 1,800 
dollars, for a population of more than 2,000.113 Unfortunately, these 
provisions had not been described in the title of the act, which was, 
for that reason, promptly held unconstitutional,114 and the whole 
thing had to be done over.115 
The court did not receive this derogation of the common law 
with open arms. While Justices Cooley and Campbell were still pres• 
ent, the new statutory liability developed at a conservative pace. In 
Keyes v. Village of Marcellus116 the village was held to have no lia• 
bility where plaintiff departed from the traveled portion of a road in 
the dark and fell into a hole that some youngsters had excavated 
within the right of way. Nor was the city liable, in Williams v. City 
of Grand Rapids,111 to a plaintiff who fell at a point where a city side-
walk came to the margin of an intersecting street, when it appeared 
that no crosswalk had ever been constructed at that crossing. While 
the statute required the city to keep crosswalks in repair, it imposed 
no obligation to build one where none existed. How many crosswalks 
should be built, and in what locations, was wholly a question of need, 
within the discretion of the common council, and not to be reviewed 
by any court. 118 
In Davis v. Mayor, Recorder b Alderman,119 when plaintiff ran 
into a stone that marked the end of a drain running under the street, 
it was error not to give the jury an instruction based on the "no lia-
bility for negligence in the plan or for legislative decisions" notion. 
112. Act of June 17, 1885, No. 214, § 6, [1885] Mich. Pub. Acts 291. 
IHI. Act of June 17, 1885, No. 214, § 6, [1885] Mich. Pub. Acts 291. 
114. Church v. City of Detroit, 64 Mich. 571, 31 N.W. 447 (1887), The court noted 
that the provision abrogating a common law liability that the court had held did not 
exist was included in the act because the federal courts had held otherwise. As a result 
a nonresident might recover where a resident could not. In the interest of uniformity, 
the statute was designed to create a purely statutory liability. Since the 1885 enactment 
purported to be only an amendment of existing law and contained no repealer, its 
demise left the 1879 statute in effect. 
115. Act of June 28, 1887, No. 264, [1887] Mich. Pub. Acts 345. This statute reiterated 
the provisions of the 1879 statute, adding liability for sidewalks and the section abrogat-
ing common law liability, but, prudently it would seem, omitting the dollar limits on 
sidewalk claims that had been included in the 1885 version. It repealed, and therefore 
superseded, the 1879 statute. It was codified in 3 Mrca. GEN. STAT. §§ 1446c-h (A. 
Howell ed. 1890). 
116. 50 Mich. 439, 15 N.W. 542 (1883). 
117. 59 Mich. 51, 26 N.W. 279 (1886). 
118. 59 Mich. at 55, 26 N.W. at 281. 
119. 61 Mich. 530, 28 N.W. 526 (1886). 
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Focusing upon the duty to keep the ways "in repair," rather than 
upon the following clause requiring them to be kept "in a condition 
reasonably safe and fit for travel," the court, in McKellar v. City of 
Detroit,120 held that the city was not liable for failing to remove snow 
and ice from a crosswalk. A trial judge's opinion that Beckman121 
and Toolan122 were abrogated by the 1879 statute was brusquely 
corrected by Justice Campbell in Shippy v. Village of Au Sable.123 
Pointing to Williams and Davis, he deprived a plaintiff of a verdict 
based on a claim that the step-off from a sidewalk to a crosswalk was 
too precipitous. Again, he was much concerned about the chaos that 
would result if plans for public works were subjected to review by 
juries: "If it can be referred to a jury to determine on the propriety 
of such action, there will be as many views as there are juries, and it 
can never be definitely known when a municipality is safe."124 
Justice Campbell was also most reluctant to recognize a liability 
on the part of the municipality for injury resulting from conditions 
created by third persons.125 In McArthur v. City of Saginaw126 he 
·wrote that a lumber pile within the limits of the right-of-way but 
outside its traveled portion was not a "defect" the failure to eliminate 
which would represent a neglect of "repair." At most, it represented a 
failure by the city to enforce its police regulations, and "the Legisla-
ture," he averred, "seldom imposes responsibility to individuals for 
that kind of municipal negligence or misconduct."127 
But in 1889 a turning point was reached. Justice Campbell, on a 
single decision day, found himself in solitary dissent in Southwell v. 
City of Detroit,128 which, in effect, reaffirmed the outcome of City of 
Detroit v. Corey,129 and also in Joslyn v. City of Detroit,180 which, 
without expressly overruling them, cut the ground from under his 
120. 57 Mich. 158, 23 N.W. 621 (1885). 
121. See text accompanying notes 75 & 78 supra. 
122. See text accompanying notes 76 & 79-80 supra. 
123. 65 Mich. 494, 32 N.W. 741 (1887), 
124. 65 Mich. at 501, 32 N.W. at 744. 
125, See, e.g., Agnew v. City of Corunna, 55 Mich. 428, 21 N.W. 873 (1885); McArthur 
v. City of Saginaw, 58 Mich. 357, 25 N.W. 313 (1885); Joslyn v. City of Detroit, 74 Mich. 
458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889) (dissenting opinion). 
126, 58 Mich. 357, 25 N.W. 313 (1885). 
127. 58 Mich. at 362, 25 N.W. at 315. By this statement he was putting the case 
in the same category as Henkel v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 
67-69 supra; Burford v. City of Grand Rapids, discussed in text accompanying notes 
70-72 supra; and Hines v. City of Charlotte, discussed in text accompanying note 73 
supra. 
128. 74 Mich. 438, 42 N.W. US (1889). 
129, See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. 
130. 74 Mich. 458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889). 
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decisions in McArthur and in Agnew v. City of Corunna.181 Mrs. 
Joslyn's buggy upset when its wheels ran up on a pile of sand in the 
traveled part of a street that she was traversing after dark. The sand-
pile had been placed there by a contractor who was building a house 
for an abutting owner; it had been there for more than a month and 
was unmarked by lights or other warnings at the time of the accident. 
Justice Campbell sturdily contended that the city's only statutory 
duty was to keep the streets in repair, that the sandpile did not con-
stitute a condition of disrepair, that the city had no responsibility 
for foreign articles placed on the street by others, and that the court 
could not, consistently with its own precedents, sustain the claim.182 
But Chief Justice Shenvood was of a different mind: "It was the 
object of the Legislature in the passage of this statute to avoid the 
decisions of this Court, by which, before the passage of the act, the 
law by construction was made to relieve the municipality from all 
liability of this kind, and we think the statute should be so construed 
as to effect the object intended by the Legislature."133 The duty im-
posed by the statute was not just a duty to repair; rather, the statute 
made the city liable for accidents that occurred by reason of its 
neglect to keep its streets in a condition reasonably safe and fit for 
travel: "The duty resting upon the city to make safe its streets ... is 
entirely independent of the police power. It requires everything to 
be done by the city necessary to make travel upon its streets reason-
ably safe."134 And, again over Justice Campbell's dissent, the same 
reasoning was relied upon in Malloy v. Township of Walker136 to 
sustain an action against the township based upon a claim of negli-
gence in failing to provide railings along a steep embankment, the 
defense having argued that this was at most a claim of negligence in 
the design of the road: 
This statute cannot be given a construction that would relieve a 
township or other municipality, upon which a burden is cast to keep 
its highways in repair and reasonably safe for travel, from liability 
by saying that it had adopted a method of construction, and had built 
according to the plan. A municipality cannot construct a dangerous 
and unsafe road,-one not safe and convenient for public travel,-
and shield itself behind its legislative power to adopt a plan and 
method of building and constructing in accordance therewith .•.• 
131. 55 :Mich. 428, 21 N.W. 873 (1885). 
132. See 74 Mich. at 461-65, 42 N.W. at 51-52. 
133. 74 Mich. at 460, 42 N.W. at 50. 
134. 74 Mich at 461, 42 N.W. at 51. See also Lombar v. Village of East Tawas, 86 
Mich. 14, 48 N.W. 947 (1891); Sebert v. City of Alpena, '18 Mich. 165, 43 N.W. 1098 
(1889). 
135. 77 Mich. 448, 43 N.W. 1012 (1889). 
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The statute is imperative to make a road reasonably safe, and whether 
it is in that condition of safety and fit for travel must be a question 
for the jury, under proper circumstances.186 
C. Deflection of Responsibility Through State Intervention: 
Independent Agencies; State and Local Functions 
During the nineteenth century local political units in Michigan 
frequently did not stand alone as agencies of government or of public 
service within their geographical boundaries. The state government 
was in close touch with local affairs, and when, in particular com-
munities, particular problems proved intractable or new departures 
were needed, the legislature frequently devised ad hoc solutions. One 
common solution was to entrust the problem to a commission, spe-
cially created and empowered, which, although it might draw its 
financial support in whole or in part from the local political unit, 
operated more or less independently of the local legislative body. 
By mid-century it had become apparent that Detroit had out-
grown its town marshal system for enforcing the law and keeping 
the peace, and it was generally agreed that the time had come to 
create an urban police force; but all efforts of local authorities to 
respond to the need foundered on the issue of cost.137 At last, in 1865, 
the state legislature took charge and, overriding the protest of the 
local establishment, enacted a special statute that established "a police 
government for the city of Detroit."138 The statute created a com-
mission that was entrusted with the police function within the city 
and empowered to prepare an annual budget, the funds for which 
were required to be provided by the city council. The original com-
missioners were named in the act, and the governor was empowered 
to fill vacancies by appointment. In People ex rel. Drake v. Ma-
haney,139 the supreme court quickly sustained the constitutionality 
of the act against a challenge, "based on general principles," that it 
was bad because it imposed upon the people of Detroit the obligation 
to tax themselves to pay the expenses of a board in whose appoint-
ment they had no voice and over whose conduct they had no control. 
Fire protection became an issue at about the same time. Prior to 
1860 the city depended upon the protection provided by volunteer 
fire companies utilizing man-powered equipment. But the interest 
and elan that had sustained these companies was fading, and the 
136. 77 Mich. at 462, 43 N.W. at 1016. 
137. S. FARMER, supra note 6, at 240. 
138. Act of Feb. 28, 1865, No. 78, [1865] Mich. Acts 99, 
139. 13 Mich. 481 (1865). 
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process of converting to steam fire engines in the care of companies 
composed of paid officers and :firemen was begun. In 1867, the legis-
lature created a fire commission to administer the new steam fire 
department, designated its original membership and provided for the 
filling of vacancies by appointment of the common council.140 
A few years later the legislature attempted to deal in a similar 
fashion ·with still another subject matter; it adopted an act "to estab-
lish a board of public works in and for the city of Detroit"141 to super-
sede the existing boards of sewer commissioners and water commis-
sioners and assume control of the city's streets, parks, and other 
public grounds. Again, the initial members of the board were desig-
nated in the act, and it was this feature that evoked, in People ex rel. 
Le Roy v. Hurlbut,142 a subsequent quo warranto proceeding, a 
chorus, unusual in its time, of opinions from each of the four mem-
bers of the supreme court. Since the court had raised no objection 
to the similar feature in the police commission act, its opposite re-
action to the board of public works act required explanation. The 
basis for the attack upon the provision was a clause in the state con-
stitution that provided that "[j]udicial officers of cities and villages 
shall be elected and all other officers shall be elected or appointed at 
such time and in such manner as the legislature may direct."148 Chief 
Justice Campbell construed that requirement as applicable only to 
municipal officers and therefore saw the question to be whether 
"the police commissioners are essentially city officers in the same sense 
that the board of works are city officers."144 His answer to that ques-
tion was negative: 
The preservation of the peace has always been regarded, both in 
England and America, as one of the most important prerogatives of 
the state. It is not the peace of the city or county, but the peace of 
the king or state that is violated by crimes and disorders .•.. 
The general purposes of the police act were such as appertain 
directly to the suppression of crime and the administration of justice. 
There is, therefore, no constitutional reason for holding it to be other 
than a regulation of matters pertaining to the general policy of the 
state, and subject to state management,145 
On the other hand: 
There is no dispute concerning the character of the public works 
140. Act of March 26, 1867, No. 453, [1867] Mich. Acts 931. 
141. Act of April 18, 1871, No. 494, [1871] Mich, Loe. &: Pers. Acts 278. 
142. 24 Mich. 44 (1871). 
143. Mrca. CONST. art. XV, § 14 (1850). 
144. 24 Mich. at 79. 
145. 24 Mich. at 83-84. 
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act. Its purposes are directly and evidently local and municipal. And 
the main point to be decided is, whether the legislature of the state 
can, ·without the concurrence of the city of Detroit, select the local 
officers of the city,146 
He then proceeded to forge a theory of implied constitutional right 
to local self-government that produced a negative answer to that last 
question.147 In this, he was strongly supported by his brother Cooley, 
who said, "The state may mould local institutions according to its 
views of policy or expediency; but local government is a matter of 
absolute right; and the state cannot take it away."148 
Thus was stated, in cases concerned with the proper allocation of 
certain decision-making powers between the state government and 
the local community, and not ·with the question of community liabil-
ity for the tortious acts of public officials, a portentous distinction 
between functions performed by local officials as agents of state policy 
and functions that relate instead to the "private" or parochial con-
cerns of the local community. In the time of Cooley and Campbell 
the reason for the distinction was remembered, and it did not bloom 
out into the "governmental-proprietary" cliche of later days. There 
were, however, some cases that edged in that direction. 
When the city of Detroit decided to build and operate the Detroit 
146. 24 Mich. at 84. 
147. 24 Mich. at 89-90. 
148. 24 Mich. at 108. Justice Cooley emphasized even more sharply the distinction 
between state and local functions: 
For those classes of officers whose duties are general,-such as the judges, the officers 
of the militia, the superintendents of police, of quarantine, and of ports, by what-
ever name called,-provision has, to a greater or less extent, been made by state 
appointment. But these are more properly state than local officers; they perform 
duties for the state in localities, as collectors of internal revenue do for the general 
government; and a local authority for their appointment does not make them local 
officers when the nature of their duties is essentially general. In the case before us, 
the officers in question involve the custody, care, management, and control of the 
pavements, sewers, water-works and public buildings of the city, and the duties are 
purely local •••• The municipality, as an agent of government, is one thing; the 
corporation, as an owner of property, is in some particulars to be regarded in a 
very different light •.•• In Detroit v. Corey ••• Manning, J., bases his opinion 
that the city was liable for an injury to an individual, occasioned by falling into 
an excavation for a sewer, carelessly left open, upon the fact that the sewers were 
the private property of the city, in which the outside or public people of the state 
at large had no concern •••• Other cases might be cited, but 1t seems not to be 
needful. They rest upon the well understood fact that these corporations are of a 
two-fold character; the one public as regards the state at large, in so far as they 
are its agents in government; the other private, in so far as they are to provide the 
local necessities and conveniences for their own citizens •••• 
24 Mich. at 103-05. 
The other cases cited in the argument, in addition to Corey, had nothing to do with 
municipal liability, but related instead to the protection of municipal property rights 
against state intrusion. These ideas were further elaborated by Justice Cooley in People 
ex rel. Board of Park Commrs. v. Common Council, 28 Mich. 228 (1873) (legislature not 
able to confer upon a special commission the power to obligate a municipal corporation 
to provide funds for the acquisition of a park). 
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House of Correction, the legislature provided by statute for its estab• 
lishment and for the confinement of convicted persons therein.140 
The administration of the prison was, by this statute, put under the 
control of a board of inspectors, three of whom were appointed by 
the city council; the mayor and the chairman of the state board of 
prison inspectors were made ex officio members. Some years later an 
action was brought against the city of Detroit by a person who had 
been confined in the prison for a period of time; he asserted that he 
had suffered in jury from being required by the prison officers to take 
a cold bath under improper conditions and by subsequent exposure 
in a cold cell. The supreme court, in City of Detroit v. Laughna,160 
reversed a judgment favorable to the plaintiff on the ground that the 
city had no control over the management o.f affairs within the prison, 
since the prison had been entrusted to a board that served as an 
agency of the state rather than as an agency of the city: 
The whole subject of personal liberty is one of general state con-
cern, and imprisonment in all its incidents has always been regulated 
by statute. The law of 1861, adopting the house of correction as a 
public prison, has provided for a state representative on the govern-
ing board, and has provided expressly, and has not left to the action 
of the common council to determine, under whose control its regula-
tion shall be placed. 
It is impossible under such a law to regard the city of Detroit 
either as custodian of the prison or as jailer and guardian of the 
prisoners. The officers are not city agents, and the city has nothing to 
do with their responsibility.161 
It was a limited holding: not that the correctional officers were, by 
reason of their function, state rather than municipal agents, but that 
they were so by reason of the way in which the legislature had orga-
nized this particular activity. 
In 1889, in Coots v. City of Detroit,152 the court affirmed a judg-
ment against the city of Detroit in favor of a fireman who was injured 
when the wheel of the engine being driven to a fire struck a street 
defect and threw him against the machinery. Two of the majority 
justices rejected the city's assumption of risk and fellow servant de-
fenses on the ground that they were not applicable to a claim based 
on breach of the city's statutory street repair obligation,163 but the 
third, Justice Champlin, argued that they were inapplicable because 
149. Act of March 15, 1861, No, 164, [1861] Mich. Acts 262, 
150. 34 Mich. 402 (18'76). 
151. 34 Mich. at 404-05. 
152. '75 Mich. 628, 43 N.W. 1'7 (1889), 
153, '75 Mich. at 636, 43 N.W. at 20. 
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members of the fire department were not servants or agents of the 
city.164 Justice Campbell, in dissent, was persuaded that the judgment 
should not stand and desired to rest his decision in part on the fellow 
servant doctrine, an approach that was somewhat difficult in view of 
the independent status of the fire department.155 That difficulty did 
not prove insuperable, but the significance of the opinion lies in the 
difference that was revealed between his perception of the municipal 
situation and that of Justice Champlin. The latter had asserted that 
firemen, as such, were "public officers, who perform duties imposed 
by law for the benefit of all the citizens, the performance of which the 
city has no control over, and derives no benefit from in its corporate 
capacity. The acts of such public officers are their own official acts, 
and not the acts of the municipal corporation or its agents."156 For 
this proposition he cited and quoted outside cases and asserted that 
it was also the well-settled law in Michigan. For the latter assertion 
he cited no authorities, and in fact there were none. Justice Campbell 
made no such dogmatic assertion. His perception was that the Detroit 
fire department was a public instrumentality that the legislature had 
seen fit to remove from the direct control of the city and place under 
a commission governed by law and not subject, in the immediate 
government of the force, to the will of the city legislature: 
Although in a certain sense it is sometimes called a city agency, yet 
its members are in no proper sense city agents, in the usual meaning 
of agency. Their duties are not powers delegated by the city, but 
powers conferred by the law of the State. They relate to matters which 
public policy requires should be placed in the list of municipal af-
fairs, and which are often put entirely within the control of the gov-
erning body of the city. But they are of such importance that the 
immediate control has been thought proper to be removed from the 
other city authorities.157 
In Laughna the plaintiff failed to hold the city responsible for the 
acts of officials who acted, as the court viewed it, independent of city 
control. In O'Leary v. Board of Fire & Water Commissioners158 the 
plaintiff was equally unsuccessful in an effort to bring liability home, 
not to the city, but to just such an independent board that provided 
services to a local community. While the city of Marquette was yet a 
village the legislature created for it a board of water commissioners, 
154. 75 Mich. at 637, 43 N.W. at 20-21. 
155. 75 Mich. at 647, 43 N.W. at 23-24. 
156. 75 :Mich. at 637-38, 43 N.W. at 21. 
157. 75 Mich. at 646, 43 N.W. at 23-24. 
158. 79 Mich. 281, 44 N.W. 608 (1890). 
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the members of which were appointed by the common council of the 
municipality and empowered to issue bonds, purchase lands, con-
struct a water system, provide fire protection, and levy water rates 
upon consumers.159 O'Leary fell into a ditch that had been dug for 
the laying of water pipes and sued the board, whose servants had dug 
it. While the statute did not expressly declare the board to be a cor-
poration, Justice Campbell agreed that it was a corporation to all 
intents and purposes,160 although it was not a municipal corporation 
because its members did not directly represent the local constituency 
and it had not been favored with general governmental authority.101 
If it had been a municipal corporation, it might have become liable 
if it had caused injury by neglect in the process of construction of a 
work that was its private property or if its action had been directly 
injurious to private property.162 But Justice Campbell could not 
believe that the legislature, having created the board to perform a 
particular service for the people of Marquette and having failed to 
provide it with access to funds from which a judgment might prop-
erly be paid, had intended that it should be liable for the tortious 
acts of its servants: 
It is for the Legislature to determine how far, if at all, a body whose 
negligence, if it is so called, is imputed, and in no sense actual, shall 
be made subject to suit for the misconduct of its employes. There are 
many cases where such liability does not exist, except against the 
immediate individual wrong-doer. The person injured is not harmed 
any more where there are several persons liable than where there is 
only one. Imputed negligence is purely a question of public policy, 
and subject to legislative regulation.163 
D. Reprise: The Law in 1890 
Thus ended Justice Campbell's association with these questions. 
Two months later he died. As he and his brothers viewed the terrain, 
it would seem that they saw the city as an instrumentality of govern-
ment, which, largely for convenience in the performance of certain 
159. Act of March 2, 1869, No. 243, [1869] Mich. Acts 104. 
160. 79 Mich. at 283-84, 44 N.W. at 609. 
161. 79 Mich. at 284, 44 N.W. at 609. 
162. 79 Mich. at 285, 44 N.W. at 609, dting City of Detroit v. Corey, discussed in 
text accompanying notes 34-36 supra; Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw, discussed in text 
accompanying note 41 supra; Ashley v. City of Port Huron, discussed in text accompany• 
ing notes 81-82 supra; Defer v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 
84-87 supra. 
163. 79 Mich. at 286-87, 44 N.W. at 610. Why O'Leary sued the board and not the 
city does not appear. The court noted that "[w]hether the corporation in charge of the 
public ways is liable is not before us." 79 Mich. at 282, 44 N.W. at 609. 
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service functions for its inhabitants, was also incorporated, but which 
did not stand alone in either capacity. Some of the local functions of 
central government and some of the service functions of the local 
community were entrusted by the constitution and the legislature to 
particular officers or public bodies. Some of these were locally elected 
or appointed, and some were designated from Lansing, but all of 
them operated to some extent on their own responsibility or at least 
independent of control by the corporate municipality. Where this 
was so, the court saw no reason why the cities should bear legal re-
sponsibility for their acts. Hence the city of Detroit was not liable 
for the acts of the prison officers at the Detroit House of Correc-
tion, 164 nor was the township of Niles liable for the neglect of duty 
by the local highway commissioners.165 
Moreover, the court did not consider the doctrine of respondeat 
superior to be part of the law of nature. Whether a public board or 
corporation was subject to "imputed" responsibility for the deficient 
conduct of persons who were unquestionably its servants was a ques-
tion of policy, and if the legislature had established a hoard to accom-
plish a given end and had conferred upon it powers and resources for 
the attainment of that end only and no other, this action was likely to 
be seen as evidence that the legislature did not intend the corporate 
entity to be vicariously liable to tort claimants, who had, after all, 
recourse against the primary actors. 
On the other hand, this principle would not protect from liability 
a public entity, whether municipal corporation or special agency, 
which, by its corporate act, i.e., by the decision of its responsible 
officers, took action that directly injured, by trespass or nuisance, the 
property interest of an individual. In such a case, the liability was 
primary, not imputed, and there was, moreover, an element of ap-
propriation of private interests involved. 
General principles of affirmative obligation in tort had not yet 
been completely worked out, and a conservative approach in this 
context was reinforced by a concern that the decision-making powers 
of public bodies not be clogged by apprehensions of private liability. 
It was difficult for the court to see why a private individual should 
have a money claim against a public entity because it had failed or 
refused to provide services or to enforce its police regulations, or 
which had made some other decision that was of incidental disadvan-
tage to him. Such municipal decisions frequently involved no mis-
164. See text accompanying notes 150-51 supra. 
165. See text accompanying notes 14-32 supra. 
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feasance and were "legislative," "discretionary," or "political" in 
nature. Freedom to make decisions concerning the nature and extent 
of public services (absent nuisance or trespass, of course), without 
being required to pay compensation to those disadvantaged by them 
or being subject to second-guessing by judges and juries, was essen-
tial to political governance and a necessary implication of the division 
of function between the political and judicial aspects of government. 
There was a questionable extension of this principle of judicial re-
straint to situations that seemed to involve misfeasance, where it 
became an immunity from liability for injuries caused by deficiencies 
of public works attributable to plan or design decisions unless such 
defect constituted an unsafe condition of the public ways. 
Finally, the legislature had, in regard to the maintenance of 
public ways, specifically overridden the court's refusal to recognize 
affirmative tort duties and created a special statutory rule that evolved 
into a principle of liability not only for negligent failure to repair, 
but, more broadly, for negligent failure to keep the highways in a 
reasonably safe condition for travel. 
The cases that would test the liability of the municipality for 
injuries caused by defective or dangerous premises and by the affirma-
tive tortious acts (other than those resulting in trespass) of municipal 
employees had not arisen. There were occasional dicta that the cor-
poration would be liable for negligent "ministerial" acts, and there 
were, in some cases, implications that, when a municipal corporation 
was sought to be held liable for negligent misfeasances of its servants 
or agents, it might make a difference that the employees were engaged 
in work related to the corporation's "private property" (e.g., in the 
construction of sewers rather than streets).166 Also, Justice Campbell 
did say in O'Leary, in most general terms, that a municipal corpora-
tion may be liable in such cases and in cases where it causes direct 
166. See also Rowland v. Superintendents of the Poor, 49 Mich. 553, 14 N.W, 494 
(1883), in which the superintendents of the poor, under statutory authorization, oper-
ated a poor farm. Plaintiff claimed that the superintendents borrowed a boar from ltim 
for use on their farm, negligently exposed it to swine infected with hog cholera, re• 
turned it to him in a diseased state, and thus caused his entire herd to become infected, 
The court upheld his claim, stating that "municipal corporations in the care and 
management of their property, like an individual, are in duty bound to produce no 
injury to others. In clearing up the poor-farm the superintendents could not, nor could 
those in their employ, with impunity, negligently set fires, or carelessly permit them 
to extend to and destroy the property of their neighbors, nor could they permit the 
farm stock. to trespass upon the lands of adjoining proprietors and claim exemption 
from all liability therefor." 49 Mich. at 560-61, 14 N.W. at 495, citing Ashley v. City 
of Port Huron, discussed in text accompanying notes 81-82 supra; T. COOLEY, TORTS 
619-20 (1879). All this was said after the court emphasized that the complaint was 
against the defendants as owners and managers of the farm property, authorized to 
make it productive and to sell and dispose of the produce. 
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injury to a property interest, but that "it is not usually liable in other 
cases."167 But there had been, as yet, no assertion of immunity from 
liability derived from the governmental nature of the activity or 
function, as distinguished from the legislative character of the par-
ticular decision, on which the claim was predicated. Hindsight reveals 
that that egg had been laid, but it did not hatch until the nineties. 
II. THE AsCENDANCY OF THE "GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTION" DEFENSE 
A. Evolution of the Defense 
In January 1890, the common council of Detroit authorized the 
construction of a public market building. Before the year was out 
the structure had been designed and built, and had collapsed on 
Adolphus Barron during a fifty mile-per-hour wind because the iron 
columns that supported it had not been anchored to the foundation. 
CitingLarkin,168 Beckman,169 and Toolan,110 the city sought to escape 
liability by arguing that the absence of anchoring fixtures had been 
a design decision, made first by the city engineer and adopted by the 
council when it approved the plans, and that therefore Barron's 
action was an attempt to derive liability from a legislative decision. 
The court replied, in Barron v. City of Detroit,111 that, while this 
contention would be correct "if the city had been acting purely in a 
matter of public concern, in its governmental capacity or charac-
ter,''172 it was not applicable to the instant case because the city had 
had no imperative duty to provide a market building and in choosing 
to do so had assumed the same responsibility as would a private cor-
poration or individual, whether the negligence occurred at the con-
struction or at the planning stage.173 
The decision was progressive, for it would have been unfortunate 
to deny compensation to Barron because the mistake was in the engi-
neering of the structure rather than in its construction, but the re-
verse implication of nonliability if the building had been dedicated 
to a "public" or "governmental," rather than to a "private" or "pro-
prietary" use put Michigan law in a new track. The court explained 
its position by quoting, from Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal 
167. 79 Mich. at 285, 44 N.W. at 609. 
168. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
169. See text accompanying notes 75 8: 78 supra. 
170. See text accompanying notes 76 8: 79-80 supra. 
171. 94 Mich. 601, 54 N.W. 273 (1893). 
172. 94 Mich. at 604, 54 N.W. at 274. 
173. 94 Mich. at 606, 54 N.W. at 275. 
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corporations, its exposition of the dual character of municipal corpo-
rations-"govemmental or public" versus "private or proprietary" 
-and by pointing to earlier Michigan cases that distinguished be-
tween state and local functions as evidence that the distinction had 
been accepted by the Michigan court.174 
The following year, in Webster v. County of Hillsdale,17r; the 
court denied to Daniel Webster his claim against the county for in-
jury to his health arising from the unhealthful conditions of the jail 
where he had been confined for 207 days, awaiting trial on a charge of 
which he was acquitted. The court thought it could not recognize 
liability in such a case without overruling Blackeby,176 for if there 
were no common law liability for defects in public highways there 
could be none for defects in public buildings. The Blackeby court 
might have thought the distinction between failure to repair a cross-
walk and forcible incarceration in a pest-hole to be not without signif-
icance, but reliance was now on Dillon's generalization that "counties 
are under no liability in respect of torts, except as imposed by stat-
ute," which was explained on the ground that counties are involun-
tary political divisions of the state.177 The court gratuitously added 
the comment that "the same rule appears to apply to municipal cor-
porations when acting under general laws of the state, and not under 
special charters which they voluntarily assume, or for private gain."178 
In Ostrander v. City of Lansing179 the city sought to defend a 
claim brought by a city employee who was injured in a cave-in 
while he was digging a trench for a sewer; the city argued that the 
injury occurred while the city "was in the exercise of a governmental 
function, instead of a private municipal enterprise."180 This plea was 
foredoomed by City of Detroit v. Corey,181 which had referred to 
sewers as the "private property" of the city, though only for the pur-
pose of emphasizing the rights of "the public" (meaning all the peo-
ple of the state) in the safety of the highways. The court cited that 
case and threw in the additional comment that "as to the sewers con-
174. 94 Mich. at 604-06, 54 N.W. at 274-75, citing 2 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoR• 
PORATIONS § 66 (4th ed. 1890); People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, discussed in notes 142-
48 supra and accompanying text. 
1'15. 99 Mich. 259, 58 N.W. 317 (1894). 
176. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra. 
177. 99 Mich. at 260, 58 N.W. at 317, citing 2 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 963 (4th ed. 1890). 
178. 99 Mich. at 260, 58 N.W. at 317. 
179. 111 Mich. 693, 70 N.W. 332 (1897). 
180. 111 Mich. at 695, 70 N.W. at 333. 
181. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. 
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structed under the charter by the city of Lansing, they may also be a 
source of revenue,"182 thus introducing the notion that pecuniary 
gain from the activity in question was an important factor. 
In Gilboy v. City of Detroit183 the city was held to have no liabil-
ity for a loss to a boarding house proprietor arising from the alleged 
negligence of the city board of health in permitting a person ex-
posed to smallpox to go at large and contaminate plaintiff's premises. 
The explanation for the ruling was that "such boards and offi-
cers are not acting for private, but for public, purposes. They repre-
sent the entire State, through the municipality, a political subdivision 
of the State; and municipalities, in the absence of express statutes 
fixing liability, are not liable for the negligence of such officers and 
boards."184 The absence of municipal responsibility for the actions 
of certain officers and boards, which in the past had been attributed 
to the fact that those officers and boards operated under statutory 
authorization independent of municipal control, was thus re-ex-
plained as a consequence of the fact that the functions performed by 
a board of health have an a priori identification with statewide, rather 
than local, objectives. 
In Corning v. City of Saginaw185 plaintiff's claim against the city 
for damage to his barge caused by the failure of a bridge tender to 
open the draw promptly in response to a signal, which failure alleg-
edly resulted from negligent maintenance of the bridge, was rejected 
on the ground that it was settled law in Michigan that legislative 
action is required to create any liability in private suit for nonrepair 
of public ways. The court added that "it does not appear that the 
city derives any benefit from the bridge. It is maintained for the 
public good by the city in its governmental or public character, and 
not in its proprietary or private character, and the city is therefore 
not liable in this action ..• 1 Dill.Mun.Corp. (4th ed.) Sec. 66."186 
Most surprising was the decision in Murray v. Village of Grass 
Lake.181 The claim was that the village council, on the recommenda-
tion of the village board of health, had caused action to be taken that 
raised the level of the lake two feet above the level that had been 
maintained for twenty years, thus flooding and rendering useless land 
182. 111 Mich. at 695, 70 N.W. at 333. 
183. 115 Mich. 121, 73 N.W. 128 (1897). 
184. 115 Mich. at 122, 73 N.W. at 128. 
185. 116 Mich. 74, 74 N.W. 307 (1898). 
186. 116 Mich. at 79, 74 N.W. at 309, citing 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 66 (4th ed. 1890). 
187. 125 Mich. 2, 83 N.W. 995 (1900). 
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that had long been used for pasture and meadow. The act under 
which the village was incorporated authorized the council to exercise 
the powers conferred by statute on boards of health and further 
authorized the council to appoint a board of health.188 Noting that 
the council's action had doubtless been taken under the authority 
of these provisions, the court said: 
The fact that the wrong was committed by the officers of the village 
does not fix the responsibility upon the municipality if the wrongful 
act was done under authority of a general statute in the attempt to 
perform a public service not distinctively local or corporate. 2 Dill. 
Mun.Corp. (4th ed.) sec. 974. It is apparently the established rule 
that local health officers, acting under a general statute of the State 
conferring their powers, are not performing corporate functions, but 
are representatives of the State, and that the municipality is not liable 
for the acts of such boards, either of misfeasance or nonfeasance.180 
Finally, after ten years of such nibbling at the immunity bait, 
giving more attention to external cases and their synthesis by Judge 
Dillon than to its own tradition, in 1902 the court opened wide and 
swallowed the whole thing. In Nicholson v. City of Detroit100 the 
plaintiff's decedent had been a carpenter employed by the city in the 
construction of a new hospital at the site of an existing hospital for 
contagious disease. The old building and the grounds were alleged 
to have been infected with smallpox germs, and the claim was for 
death from smallpox allegedly contracted as a consequence of the 
city's negligence in exposing the decedent to this contamination.101 
The court referred to statutes that imposed upon the city a duty to 
take measures for the protection of the public health through a board 
of health, that required it to provide a place of reception for persons 
afflicted by smallpox, and that authorized it to build permanent hos-
pitals, and then asserted, "It is the well-settled rule that the State is 
not liable to private persons who suffer injuries through the negli-
gence of its officers; and the rule extends to townships and cities, 
while in the performance of State functions, imposed upon them by 
law."192 The argument against this position that evoked the most 
extensive rebuttal from the court had been many times implied: that 
in its capacity as property owner a governmental unit has the same 
duties and liabilities as any other property owner, and that the city's 
duties to its employee in this case arose out of its ownership of the 
188. 1 MICH. COMP. LAws § 2821 (1897). 
189. 125 Mich. at 5, 83 N.W. at 966. 
190. 129 Mich. 246, 88 N.W. 695 (1902). 
191. 129 Mich. at 247, 88 N.W. at 696. 
192. 129 Mich. at 248, 88 N.W. at 696. 
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property and its contractual relations with him. The court's reply 
was that the property was owned in this instance for governmental 
purposes, not for the "private purposes of the municipality" or "for 
purposes in which the state has no interest."193 Murray v. Village of 
Grass Lake was cited and quoted for the governmental nature of the 
powers e..-.cercised by health officers, and the court reiterated that such 
officers, though chosen by the city, "do not represent the city, but the 
State."194 In providing a hospital under the statutory duty and au-
thority, the city was acting as a governmental agency, just as it did 
when "providing a police force for the preservation of the peace, or 
a fire department, and prescribing regulations for the same."195 
Justice Campbell's suggestion in O'Leary that the application to a 
public body of the respondeat superior principle is a question of 
public policy was repeated,196 and it was argued that such application 
was contraindicated because public officers are the representatives 
of the injured person as well as of the other taxpayers who must pay 
for his judgment and that the selection of prudent officers is as much 
his duty as theirs.197 Moreover, 
[t]he rule of public liability in such cases offers such opportunities 
and inducements for abuse that there is some ground for doubting 
the expediency of relieving individuals at public expense in any such 
case; and as has been said, it is only in cases where the legislature has 
authorized it that the obligation can be enforced against the public, 
instead of the individual to whose misconduct the injury is due, and 
who should, in justice, be primarily liable in all cases.1us 
While in the minds of Justices Campbell and Cooley there was a 
presumption against liability of the municipal corporation for the 
nonperformance by local officers of duties imposed upon them by 
statute, this statement seems to place the whole question of vicarious 
liability for any negligence of municipal servants engaged in "gov-
ernmental functions" peculiarly within the area of legislative deci-
sion. The court summed up its position in the following sweeping 
terms: 
The true theory is that the township or city represents the State 
in causing these things to be done, and, like the State, it enjoys im-
munity from responsibility in case of injury to individuals, leaving 
193. 129 Mich. at 250, 88 N.W, at 697. 
194. 129 Mich. at 254, 88 N.W. at 698. 
195. 129 Mich. at 254, 88 N.W. at 698. 
196. 129 Mich. at 250, 88 N.W. at 697, citing O'Leary v. Board of Fire &: Water 
Commrs., discussed in text accompanying notes 158-63 supra. 
197. 129 Mich. at 249-50, 88 N.W. at 696-97. 
198. 129 Mich. at 250, 88 N.W. at 696. 
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liability for such injuries to rest upon the persons whose misconduct 
or negligence is the immediate cause of the damage. The township 
and city must always act through officers. If it builds or repairs a road, 
constructs a bridge, collects a State or county tax, erects a town house, 
provides for the poor or the infirm, preserves the public peace, or 
provides a smallpox hospital, it must do it through persons selected 
for the purpose; and whether the law broadly directs that it shall do 
these things, or shall select officers whose duties are prescribed by 
law, its obligation is the same. The State relieves itself from the 
burden of multitudinous detail by delegating to and imposing upon 
aliquot parts of the body politic the power, and perhaps the duty, of 
doing for the State what it would otherwise have to supervise for 
itself. These powers are frequently legislative as well as ministerial. 
In this sense the township or city is a political agency, and the per-
sons selected to perform the details whereby the result is accom-
plished are no more agents of the city or township, and no less the 
agents of the State, than as though the legislature had been more 
definite in prescribing the duties of the officers, and merely left their 
selection to the municipality. In imparting a portion of its powers, 
the State also imparts its own immunity.199 
Substantially contemporaneous with Nicholson was the court's 
decision in Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey,200 in which 
the opinion, as in Nicholson, was written by Chief Justice Hooker. It 
was a quo warranto proceeding that questioned, on the ground that 
it violated the "home rule" principle, the constitutional validity 
of a statute incorporating a new school district to take over the 
area previously occupied by a number of other districts.201 Excluding 
"municipal corporations proper" from the discussion as not involved 
in the case, the court stated that "quasi corporations," including such 
units as counties, townships, school districts, and highway districts, 
were quite different, for they performed functions "for and about 
the business and policies of the State, which has imposed upon them 
the responsibility and expense of maintaining highways, schools, 
drains, bridges, etc.," and were therefore completely subject to the 
power of the legislature except to the extent of any limitations im-
posed upon that power by the constitution:202 "The school district 
is a State agency."203 
It was a strange time for the emergence in Michigan of this strong 
image of the local presence of a central sovereign. Only five years 
after Nicholson and Lowrey a constitutional convention was to pro-
199. 129 at 258-59, 88 N.W. at 700. 
200. I3I Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289 (1902), a/fd., 199 U.S. 233 (1905). 
201. See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, discussed in notes 142-48 supra. 
202. 131 Mich. at 643-44, 92 N.W. at 290. 
203. 131 Mich. at 644, 92 N.W. at 290. 
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pose, on the basis of a consensus so broad that the matter was scarcely 
debated, the most advanced constitutional home-rule provisions in 
the land;204 they required the legislature to provide by general law 
for the incorporation of cities and villages and confer upon the elec-
tors of cities and villages the power and authority to frame, adopt, 
and amend their own charters; to pass ordinances relating to all 
municipal concerns; to acquire, own, and maintain parks, boulevards, 
cemeteries, hospitals, almshouses, and all works that involve the 
public health or safety; and, subject to certain limitations, to acquire 
and operate public utilities. Under the implementing legislation 
each city charter was required to provide for the election or appoint-
ment of such officers as were deemed necessary, and for the public 
peace and health, and for the safety of persons and property, and 
was allowed to provide for the establishment of any department 
deemed necessary for the general welfare of the city.205 
Thus, the special charters and other ad hoc legislative creations 
in the local government field, which were responsible for the nine-
teenth-century court's perception that many local officers were agents 
of the state rather than of the city, became obsolete at the same time 
that the twentieth-century court began to see almost everything done 
by local units as done in the name of the state. 
Nevertheless, the die had been cast. Nicholson and Lowrey com-
bined, in Whitehead v. Board of Education,206 to produce a holding 
that a painter injured in the employ of the board of education, al-
legedly as a consequence of the negligence of the board's agents in 
providing for his use a defective and unsafe scaffold, had no cause 
of action. Applying the Lowrey decision, the court said that "the 
learned trial judge was correct in saying that 'the affairs of the board 
of education are as purely a State function as those of the board of 
health,' and that this case could not be distinguished in principle 
from the case of Nicholson v. City of Detroit."207 An attempt was 
later made, by the plaintiff in Daniels v. Board of Education,208 to 
escape the "quasi-corporation" rubric by setting up the fact that the 
defendant board had been incorporated by a special act of the legis-
lature and was not simply operating under the general laws applicable 
to all alike, but the court's reply was that the powers exercised by 
204. :M1CH. CoNST. art. VIII, §§ 20-29 (1908). See generally Fairlie, The Michigan 
Constitutional Convention, 6 MICH. L R.Ev. 533, 541 (1908). 
205. Act of June 2, 1909, No. 279, §§ 3-4, [1909] Mich. Pub. Acts 497. 
206. 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905). 
207. 139 Mich. at 494, 102 N.W. at 1029. 
208. 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23 (1916). 
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the board were still solely of a governmental nature. The distinction 
between "quasi-corporations" and "municipal corporations proper" 
was, therefore, not the significant distinction, since "[t]ouching their 
immunity from liability in the exercise of strictly governmental func-
tions, the authorities are as a rule applicable to either. "200 The claim 
in this case was for negligence in building, maintaining, and using 
for school purposes, a building that contained a stairwell with a rail-
ing of inadequate height, over which the eight-year-old plaintiff had 
fallen to his injury. 
The actions of firemen in flushing a fire hydrant, allegedly the 
cause of injury to plaintiff, whose horse was frightened, were held to 
be governmental in Brink v. City of Grand Rapids.210 The court, 
adverting to the fact that there was no evidence that the particular 
hydrant had ever been used for any purpose other than fire protec-
tion, said: "The city had no pecuniary interest in establishing or 
maintaining this hydrant. It received no compensation for its use. 
It was maintained entirely by taxation upon the entire city, and its 
use was for the sole benefit of the city. It was constructed, maintained, 
and used in a governmental capacity."211 Justice Ostrander, concur-
ring, thought the question of the city's pecuniary interest in the 
hydrant was not the material factor. The city's water system was 
unitary, though used for miscellaneous purposes, but there was no 
liability in this case because the firemen were acting, pursuant to 
their duties as members of the fire department, as "independent 
public officers."212 
209. 191 Mich, at 347, 158 N.W. at 26. 
210. 144 Mich. 472, 108 N.W. 430 (1906). 
211. 144 Mich. at 475, 108 N.W. at 431. 
212. 144 Mich. at 475-76, 108 N.W. at 431. Cone v. City of Detroit, 191 Mich, 198, 
157 N.W. 417 (1916), is another example of the problem presented by a mixture of 
functions. Plaintiff's decedent was killed, while standing in the entranceway to a store, 
when a firetruck, making a run, struck a hole in the street, went out of control, and 
ran him down. The city relied on Brink as a defense, but the court permitted liability 
to rest upon the city's breach of the highway statute. It commented, however, that the 
question whether liability under the statute could extend to a person not on the high-
way at the time of injury had not been discussed by counsel and would not, therefore, 
be considered. 191 Mich. at 200, 157 N.W. at 417-18. The notion of nonliability on the 
part of the municipality for the acts of certain public officers who were regarded, in 
respect to duties imposed upon them by general statute, as independent agents rather 
than as municipal servants, did not die out completely. In 13odewig v. City of Port 
Huron, 141 Mich. 564, 104 N.W. 769 (1905), a claim against the city, referred to as a 
trespass claim, that the city health officer obtained possession of plaintiff's house by 
trick and used it as a place for reception of smallpox cases, was held not maintainable, 
under the principle of Murray v. Village of Grass Lake, discussed in notes 187-89 supra, 
since it was not claimed that the city authorized or ratified the "trespass," and the city 
was not responsible for the acts of the health officer because he was independent of 
city control. In Hoek v. Township of Allendale, 161 Mich. 571, 126 N.W. 987 (1910), 
it was held that the township was not liable for a trespassory act of the highway com-
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But two years later, -in Davidson v. Hine,213 the court held uncon-
stitutional, as contrary to the home-rule principle, a statute that 
created a bureau of public safety for Bay City, included within the 
jurisdiction of that bureau not only the police but also the fire de-
partment, and provided for appointment of the governing officials 
by the governor. The court thought that fire protection, as distin-
guished from police protection, was a local, rather than a state func-
tion, indistinguishable in that respect from sewers and water: All 
were "agenc[ies] of local government maintained for the benefit of 
the local community."214 A board of health would also be different, 
since neglect of duty on its part might produce an epidemic that 
would affect the rest of the state, while fire was a problem only for 
the local inhabitants.215 Brink, the court said, was not inconsistent 
with this conclusion, since it did not rest upon the proposition that 
the fire department was a state agency, but on no more extensive a 
principle than that a municipality is not liable for injuries negli-
gently caused by members of the fire department engaged in work 
pertaining exclusively to the extinguishment of fires because when 
so occupied they are engaged in the performance of "a local gov-
ernmental duty."216 
And so the mutation was complete. The end product was a 
strange mixture of uprooted and reshaped conceptions. The home-
rule principle had originally required that a distinction be made 
between local functions of state government, which could constitu-
tionally be placed under the control of state appointees, and func-
tions that were inherently local, carried on for the benefit of the local 
inhabitants and not for the benefit of the state at large, which must 
be left to the control of officers locally appointed or elected. The 
police function was of the former character,217 while the public 
missioner, or for such an act ordered by him, since, in the performance of his highway 
repair duties, he did not act as the agent of the township. The fact that the highway 
statute, ever since 1879, had explicitly provided that "highway commissioners ••• are 
hereby made and declared to be the officers of the township ••• wherein they are elected 
••• and shall be subject to the general direction of such township ••• in the discharge 
of their several duties," see text accompanying 102 supra, was apparently overlooked. 
And as late as 1940, a claim against a county for flooding, allegedly caused by the drain 
commissioner's action in accelerating the drainage above plaintiff's premises without 
doing the same below, was rejected on the ground that the commissioner was acting 
on his own in the performance of duties imposed by statute on him rather than on the 
county, and that the county had no control over his actions. Maffei v. Berrien County, 
293 Mich. 92,291 N.W. 234 (1940). 
213. l51 Mich. 294, 115 N.W. 246 (1908). 
214. 151 :Mich. at 299, 115 N.W. at 248. 
215. 151 Mich. at 301, 115 N.W. at 248. 
216. 151 Mich. at 301-03, 115 N.W. at 249. 
217. See People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, discussed in text accompanying note 139 
supra. 
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works function was of the latter.218 The prison function was also a 
state function, and when a local prison was placed under the ad-
ministration of a board, one member of which was a state official, 
not only was the home-rule principle not offended, but the municipal 
corporation was not responsible for the acts of the board's servants.210 
At a second stage, the health officer function was identified as a 
state function. Originally the classification was made because the 
function was located in a board of health created pursuant to statu-
tory requirement. But then it was decided that, whether the function 
was committed to a special board or was performed by a municipal 
corporation through its own officers and servants, the municipal 
corporation was not liable for the nonfeasance or misfeasance of such 
officers because this was a state function and the duties were imposed 
by general statute.220 In performing such statutory duties the corpo-
ration itself acted as an agency of state government, and its nonliabil-
ity was an extension of the state's immunity from liability for the 
negligence of its officers.221 "Quasi-corporations," which perform, for 
the state, functions that are imposed upon them by law without 
their consent, are fully subject to state power and do not fall within 
the home-rule principle. The board of education is such an agency.222 
Therefore, since it performs only state functions, it has no liability 
for the negligence of any of its officers and employees.228 Since the 
same principle is applicable to municipal corporations when they 
are engaged in strictly governmental functions, the immunity is de-
rived from the nature of the function rather than from the nature 
of the corporate organization of the entity in question.224 Moreover, 
it extends to premises and equipment devoted to a governmental 
purpose.225 
Finally, firemen engaged in fire protection activities are perform-
218. See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, discussed in text accompanying notes 
142-48 supra. 
219. See City of Detroit v. Laughna, discussed in text accompanying notes 150-51 
supra. 
220. See Gilboy v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 183·84 
supra; Murray v. Village of Grass Lake, discussed in text accompanying notes 187-89 
supra; Nicholson v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 190,99 supra. 
221. See Nicholson v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 190-99 
supra. 
222. See Attorney General, ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, discussed in text accompanying 
notes 200-03 supra. 
223. See Whitehead v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 206-07 
supra. 
224. See Daniels v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 208-09 
supra. 
225. See cases cited in notes 221, 223 & 224 supra. 
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ing a governmental activity, and the municipal corporation is there-
fore not responsible for their negligent acts.226 But fire protection is 
not a "state" function; rather, it is, insofar as the home-rule principle 
is concerned, a "local" function, as are sewers, water, parks, and 
streets. The exemption of the municipal corporation from liability 
for the negligent acts of employees engaged in such activities is there-
fore related solely to the "governmental nature" of the activity and is 
not dependent on a conclusion that the state has an overriding in-
terest in the performance of the function. And, for the purpose of 
determining whether a given activity is "governmental in nature," 
the principal clue that emerges is the fact that it is carried on for the 
benefit of the general public, without pecuniary return and supported 
by general taxation. 
B. "Governmental" Versus "Proprietary" 
The case of the market building that fell on Barron227 was perhaps 
the first instance of liability engendered by the "proprietary" nature 
of the activity, though at that time the term referred to the fact that 
in providing a market the city was doing its own thing, rather than 
acting under a state-imposed duty. The sewer trench that Ostrander228 
was digging when he was injured was a "private municipal enter-
prise" rather than a thing done "in the exercise of a governmental 
function," in part because sewers had at an early time been used as 
an example of an enterprise carried on by the municipal corporation 
in its own "private" interest, rather than in the interest of the entire 
public, and in further part because, as the court suggested, under the 
applicable charter the sewer might become a source of revenue to 
the city. The fact that the fire hydrant in Brink229 produced no 
revenue was considered by all but one of the judges to be important 
to the conclusion that the firemen who flushed it were not engaged in 
a proprietary activity. In Hodgins v. Bay City230 a telephone lineman 
was electrocuted when he came in contact with a wire that had be-
come charged as a result of broken insulation on a city-owned power 
line strung on the same poles. The city had two lines on the pole, one 
supplying DC current for street lighting and the other, AC current 
for home lighting. It was decided that the claim was good because 
226. See Brink v. City of Grand Rapids, discussed in text accompanying notes 210-12 
supra. 
227. See text accompanying notes 168-74 supra. 
228. See text accompanying notes 179-82 supra. 
229, See text accompanying notes 210-12 supra. 
230. 156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909). 
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the decedent had been electrocuted by the AC line; it was asserted, 
obiter, that the result would have been different if the injury had 
been caused by the DC line, since street lighting was a governmental 
function.231 
It was "conceded" in Borski v. City of Wakefield232 that a city 
bus line was a proprietary enterprise, and in Foss v. City of Lan-
sing233 the claim of a plaintiff who was hit by a garbage truck was 
validated by the argument that if garbage disposal is a governmental 
activity, the city was nevertheless liable because it was making an 
"incidental profit" by recouping its costs, in part, from a user fee and 
from the sale of its garbage-fed hogs. It was expressly asserted in 
Foss that in Michigan, if the city is engaged in governmental work 
with an incidental profit, it has the same liability as a private corpora-
tion.2a4 
On the other hand, Kilts v. Board of Supervisors23 r; held that the 
county board of supervisors, when operating a poor farm, was en-
gaged in a governmental activity and was therefore not liable for the 
death of a workman employed by a contractor doing work on a 
water tower when the platform upon which the workman was stand-
ing collapsed because it was insufficiently supported. And, in Heino 
v. City of Grand Rapids,236 a city park system and swimming pool, 
provided by the city through a park board, supported by taxation, 
and open to the public without charge, was held to be a governmental 
activity. The court noted the home-rule cases that held that parks are 
a local rather than a .state function, but said they were not in point. 
Brink237 and Davidson238 were evidence that a particular activity 
might be "governmental" for some purposes and "private" for 
others.239 
Road and street construction and maintenance activities, whether 
performed by the city or by the county road commission, were re-
peatedly held to be govemmental,240 thus creating the paradox of 
231. 156 Mich. at 692, 121 N.W. at 276-77. 
232. 239 Mich. 656, 215 N.W. 19 (1927). 
233. 237 Mich. 633, 212 N.W. 952 (1927). 
234. 237 Mich. at 636-37, 212 N.W. at 953. 
235. 162 Mich. 646, 127 N.W. 821 (1910). 
236. 202 Mich. 363, 168 N.W. 512 (1918). 
237. See text accompanying notes 210-12 supra. 
238. See text accompanying notes 213-16 supra. 
239. 202 Mich. at 374-75, 168 N.W. at 516. 
240. Alberts v. City of Muskegon, 146 Mich. 210, 109 N.W. 262 (1906); Gunther v. 
Board of County Road Commrs., 225 Mich. 619, 196 N.W. 386 (1923); Longstreet v. County 
of Mecosta, 228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W. 248 (1924); Wrighton v. City of Highland Park, 
236 Mich. 279, 210 N.W. 250 (1926); In re Moross v. Hillsdale County, 242 Mich. 277, 
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liability for nonfeasance under the highway statute, and immunity 
from liability for mis/ easance in doing the work required by the 
statute. For instance, in Longstreet v. County of Mecosta,241 where 
the plaintiff's car went off the end of an unfinished bridge that al-
legedly had not been provided with warning lights or barriers, the 
board of road commissioners, which was doing the construction work 
on the bridge, was exempted from liability by the governmental 
nature of its activities, while the county itself, to which the highway 
liability provisions originally applicable to wwnships and cities had 
been extended in 1909,242 was held liable for having failed in its 
statutory duty to keep the highway safe for use. 
In these cases the proposition asserted in Foss, that an "incidental 
profit" realized in the course of a governmental activity engenders 
tort responsibility with respect to that activity, began to cause 
trouble, since county boards of road commissioners did much of their 
highway construction and maintenance work under contracts with 
the state highway commissioner that provided for payments to the 
board in connection ·with the work done. For example, the contract 
in Gunther v. Board of County Road Commissioners243 provided for 
a sharing of expense pursuant to which the state commissioner ulti-
mately paid to the board seventy-five per cent of the total cost of the 
work done. In Johnson v. Board of County Road Commissioners244 it 
was alleged that the contract called for payment to the county board, 
over and above its expenses, of a percentage fee for overhead and 
supervision. In neither case did the payment result in liability, but in 
Johnson this result was explained by a statement that the burden of 
proof was on the plaintiff to show that the payment would result in 
a profit to the board and the burden had not been met.245 While this 
explanation can be used to reconcile the outcomes of Johnson and 
Foss, the conflict between the two was not resolved. 
In Afotthews v. City of Detroit246 plaintiff sustained injuries while 
alighting from the miniature railway at the Detroit zoo. The zoo 
was a public park, open free of charge, and therefore "governmental," 
but a small fee was charged for a ride on the train, and that particular 
218 N.W. 683, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 635 (1928); Johnson v. Board of County Road 
Commrs., 253 Mich. 465,235 N.W. 221 (1931); Russo v. City of Grand Rapids, 255 Mich. 
474, 238 N.W. 273 (1931). 
241. 228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W. 248 (1924). 
242. See Act of June 2, 1909, No. 283, ch. IV, § 21, [1909] Mich. Pub. Acts 573. 
243. 225 Mich. 619, 196 N.W. 386 (1923). 
244. 253 Mich. 465, 235 N.W. 221 (1931). 
245. 253 Mich. at 470, 235 N.W. at 223. 
246. 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939). 
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operation produced a small profit that contributed to the support of 
the zoo, which was otherwise mainly supported by taxation. Plaintiff 
cited the "incidental profit" argument from Foss, while the city 
relied on Johnson and particularly on a statement therein that did 
conflict with Foss, that "municipal corporations and other govern-
mental agencies when performing a purely governmental function 
do not lose their immunity from liability for its negligent perfor-
mance merely because they derive an income therefrom, provided the 
income is only incidental to the main purpose of so functioning and 
aimed at covering the cost of the undertaking."247 Plaintiff's judg-
ment survived an even split on the court, and the opinion for affir-
mance suggested that Foss and Johnson could be distinguished from 
each other on the ground that "the maintenance of roads is peculiarly 
a governmental function."248 
The problem became more pressing in cases involving another 
activity, which had a strong "governmental" aura. As in the case of 
municipal corporations proper, entities primarily engaged in educa-
tion sometimes become involved in activities with "proprietary" over-
tones. For instance, a question arose in Robinson v. Washtenaw 
Circuit Judge,249 as to whether The University of Michigan was liable 
for the alleged malpractice of a physician on the staff of the Univer-
sity Hospital. Plaintiff contended that "The Regents of the Univer-
sity of Michigan" was by law a body corporate and as such was liable, 
like other corporations, for the torts of its agents. The argument and 
the decision did not clearly separate the "charitable immunity" de-
fense from that based on "governmental immunity," but the court 
took notice of the provisions of the constitution relating to The Uni-
versity of Michigan and its governance and decided that 
[w]ith such provisions in our Constitution it seems clear that the 
general supervision of the University, and direction and control of 
all expenditures from its funds is a governmental activity, and the 
board of regents a state agency to carry out the ·will of the people, as 
expressed in the Constitution they adopted, in regard to the educa-
tional institution committed to its care and supervision.200 
Moreover, the hospital was a charitable institution, and in the long 
run the court thought denial of liability could safely be rested on 
either ground.251 
247. 291 Mich. at 165-66, 289 N.W. at 117, quoting 253 Mich. at 471, 235 N.W. at 
223 (emphasis added). 
248. 291 Mich. at 166, 289 N.W. at ll7 (emphasis added). Presumably garbage col• 
lection and distribution is a more doubtful case. 
249. 228 Mich. 225, 199 N.W. 618 (1924). 
250. 228 Mich. at 228, 199 N.W. at 619. 
251. 228 Mich. at 230, 199 N.W. at 619-20. 
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In Daszkiewicz v. Detroit Board of Education,252 the board, oper-
ating as board of control for Wayne University, was held to be free 
of liability for the death of a medical student caused by the failure 
of the door catch on an elevator shaft, despite the fact that the ex-
penses of operation of the school were partially recouped from tuition 
fees. The court said that a board of education or school district can-
not be held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its em-
ployees "because they, in furthering the purposes of education, are in 
the exercise of a public or governmental function";253 the court thus 
seemed to leave little room for "proprietary" activities to be identi-
fied. Nevertheless, the court, citing Johnson and not mentioning 
Foss, went on to observe that since the tuition fees covered only about 
thirty per cent of the costs of the school and were therefore "only 
incidental" to the main purpose they did not deprive the board of 
its immunity.254 
Interscholastic athletics put governmentalism to a sterner test. 
In Watson v. School District,255 after a football game at the high 
school stadium plaintiff's decedent fell into an excavated traffic ramp, 
allegedly unlighted and insufficiently protected, in the school park-
ing lot. It was argued that in conducting the athletic contest and 
charging admission for it the school was engaged in a commercial 
activity, rather than in one that was strictly governmental. The court 
split down the middle again and by so doing allowed a judgment 
n.o.v. for the defendant to stand. The opinion for reversal relied 
largely on Foss and reasoned that even if the activity were govern-
mental, there was nevertheless an incidental profit to justify impos-
ing liability.256 The contrary opinion emphasized the school's obli-
gation to include a physical education program in its curriculum, 
relied on Daszkiewicz, and argued that if Foss really stood for the 
proposition that a governmental function coupled with an incidental 
profit is a source of liability, to that extent it should be overruled.257 
252. 301 Mich, 212, 3 N.W .2d 71 (1942). 
253. 301 Mich. at 221, 3 N.W .2d at 75. 
254. 301 Mich. at 222, 3 N.W.2d at 75, citing 253 Mich. at 471, 235 N.W. at 223. 
See also Martinson v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W .2d 148 (1950), arising from 
a similar accident in a city-owned hospital. The court analyzed the hospital's financing 
to demonstrate that it was not a profit-making enterprise and that it served the entire 
region, not just the residents of the city. The test for governmental immunity was said 
to be whether the activity was carried on for the common good, without special corpo-
rate benefit or profit. 328 Mich. at 598, 44 N.W .2d at 149. Neither the tuition fees 
charged by the city medical school, nor charges made by the hospital for operating ex-
penses made it a proprietary activity, since the hospital operated for the purpose of 
promoting the general public health. 328 Mich. at 598-99, 44 N.W.2d at 149. 
255. 324 Mich. I, 36 N.W .2d 195 (1949). 
256. 324 Mich. at 6-8, 36 N.W.2d at 197-98. 
257. 324 Mich. at 11-13, 36 N.W.2d at 199-200. 
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The same issue was posed in Richards v. Birmingham School Dis-
trict258 by injuries arising from the collapse of the bleachers at a 
high school football game. Three of the justices, relying on Daszkie-
wicz and Watson, thought that there was no claim;2llo two others con-
curred with the outcome on irrelevant grounds without mentioning 
this issue.260 Justice Edwards, joined by Justice Talbot Smith, 
strongly criticized the immunity doctrine261 but in the end argued 
that the activity in the particular case should be classified as "proprie-
tary. "262 Justice Carr explained Foss away by suggesting that the city 
in that case might be regarded as having been engaged in two activi-
ties-garbage collection and removal (governmental) and the opera-
tion of a piggery for profit (proprietary)-and reinforced that 
explanation by reference to Matthews, with its governmental park 
and its proprietary railway.263 (He did not explain why the operation 
of the truck was to be identified with the proprietary piggery rather 
than with the governmental collection function; perhaps the classi-
fication was made because the truck was returning from the piggery 
when the accident occurred?) Justice Edwards thought that Justice 
Carr's approach was a step backward and that the court should take 
every opportunity to whittle the defense away; he implied that Foss 
had offered one such opportunity. Much of the confusion in the 
cases, he suggested, came from the assumption that the terms "gov-
ernmental" and "proprietary" are mutually exclusive. All things 
done by a municipal corporation are in a sense governmental, but 
some are more closely related than others to things more normal to 
private enterprise than to governmental units. The conduct of the 
football game by the school was governmental enough, but there 
was no reason why the admission charge, plus other circumstances-
such as the fact that the game was held on a national holiday, that it 
was open to the public, and that the collapsing bleachers had been 
rented from a supplier in order to increase seating capacity and thus 
enhance the pecuniary return-should not be taken into account in 
concluding that the school was sufficiently involved in a proprietary 
activity to require it to surrender the defense.264 He also recognized 
that if his opinion should prevail, it would, for the first time in 
258. 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957). 
259. 348 Mich. at 507-10, 83 N.W.2d at 652-53 (Dethmers, C.J., Kelly & Carr, JJ.). 
260. See 348 Mich. at 512-14, 83. N.W.2d at 654-55 (Black & Sharpe, JJ.). 
261. See 348 Mich. at 514-20, 83 N.W .2d at 655-59. 
262. 348 Mich. at 523-24, 83 N.W.2d at 660. 
263. 348 Mich. at 505-06, 83 N.W .2d at. 651. 
264. 348 Mich. at 521, 83 N.W.2d at 659. 
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Michigan, specifically apply the proprietary limitation to an im-
munity defense asserted by a school district, though he thought there 
were sufficient implications in earlier cases to make this result justi-
fiable.20u His opinion was an open invitation for a frontal attack upon 
the immunity defense, since he relied on the "proprietary function" 
argument only because the more general question had not been ade-
quately briefed and argued. In the following year, in Penix v. City 
of St. ]ohns,266 Justice Edwards again voiced his discontent with the 
basic rule (with the concurrence, this time, of four other justices) 
but went along with its application in the particular case-arising 
from the collapse of bleachers at a public park-for the reason that, 
unlike Richards, the case offered no basis for a proprietary-function 
argument. 
On its face this was a conservative record in the use of the pro-
prietary-function idea. Cases in which the supreme court explicitly 
held a particular activity to be within the proprietary category were 
few. As the problem was worked out, a pecuniary return of some sort 
from the activity appeared to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, con-
dition to its characterization as proprietary. The activity was deemed 
governmental unless such a return was shown, but if it was shown, 
the situation remained ambiguous because the court frequently used 
the word "profit" without settling whether it meant a net pecuniary 
gain to the unit or merely the realization of some income from the 
activity. The implication in ]ohnson267 was that the percentage fee 
did not make the road contract proprietary because there was no 
proof that it made the activity profitable to the county. There was 
specific reference in Daszkiewicz268 and in Martinson269 to the fact 
that the fees and charges collected by the medical schools and the 
hospital only partially made up the costs of these enterprises, and 
the prevailing opinion in W atson270 made a point of the fact that 
the school's athletic program as a whole was conducted at a loss; all 
of this would suggest that an operation actually for profit was 
required. On the other hand, the comment in Ostrander271 was that 
the sewer might become a source of revenue, and in Brink,272 that the 
265. 348 Mich. at 522, 83 N.W .2d at 659. 
266. 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958). 
267. See text accompanying notes 244-45 supra. 
268. See text accompanying notes 252-54 supra. 
269. See note 254 supra. 
270. See text accompanying notes 255-57 supra. 
271. See text accompanying notes 179-82 supra. 
272. See text accompanying notes 210-12 supra. 
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fire hydrant never had been. The bus line in Borski273 and the com-
mercial power line in Hodgins214 were assumed to be proprietary 
·without attention to whether they were "profitable" activities, and it 
appears that the proceeds of the piggery in Foss21o only partially re-
couped the costs of the operation. In Matthews216 the train operation 
did tum a profit and was therefore deemed by half the court to be 
separable from the zoo operation of which it was a part. 
In later decisions this ambiguity appears to have been resolved. 
In Dohm v. Township of Acme217 it was held that a plaintiff who 
£ell on the steps of the township hall during a wedding anniversary 
party there in progress might recover against the township because 
the second floor of the building was leased out to private parties, and 
the first floor, though used primarily as a town hall, was occasionally 
rented to persons who wished to hold private functions there. The 
purpose of the building was primarily governmental, but the anni-
versary party was a purely private transaction, which had nothing to 
do with a governmental use. The fact that the fee was small and the 
rentals infrequent did not change the nature and purpose of the use 
when the injury occurred. Foss and Matthews were both cited with 
approval278 and thus gained a new lease on life. The principle was 
extended by Munson v. County of Menominee270 to a situation where 
the county permitted the state welfare department to use an office 
in the courthouse in return for a payment covering the expense of 
maintenance and the amortization of some costs for modifications 
to fit the state office's needs. Plaintiff, an employee in the state office, 
was injured when a window shade fell on her head. The fact that the 
county did not anticipate a profit from the transaction was held not 
to be controlling; rather, the opinion seems to say, the county had 
involved itself in the rental business by supplying a facility for a 
consideration and in so doing was performing a function proprietary 
in nature.280 The fact that the state department was performing a 
governmental function in the office did not alter the county's relation 
to the situation; furnishing space to the state office was not a govern-
mental function vested by law in the county.281 
273. See text accompanying note 232 supra. 
274. See text accompanying notes 230-31 supra. 
275. See text accompanying notes 233-34 supra. 
276. See text accompanying notes 246-48 supra. 
277. 354 Mich. 447, 93 N.W .2d 323 (1958). 
278. 354 Mich. at 451, 93 N.W .2d at 326. 
279. 371 Mich. 504, 124 N.W .2d 246 (1963). 
280. 371 Mich. at 512, 124 N.W.2d at 250. 
281. 371 Mich. at 514, 124 N.W.2d at 250. 
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Carlisi v. City of Marysville282 opened a complementary route of 
expansion. Dohm and Munson established that where governmental 
property is devoted primarily to a "governmental" use, the govern-
mental unit may nevertheless be subject to the same liability as a 
private occupier toward persons on the premises in connection with 
a secondary, "nongovernmental" use. Carlisi established that where 
the premises are devoted primarily to a "proprietary" use, the gov-
ernmental unit is subject to the same liability as a private occupier 
toward visitors on the premises even though their presence is not 
connected with, and their injuries are not caused by, the "proprie-
tary" activity carried on there. In such cases, "[t]he city stands as an 
individual possessor of land with the duties imposed by law."283 
The case arose from the drowning of two girls who were over-
whelmed by the turbulence created by a passing ship when they went 
wading in the St. Clair River off premises owned by the city. The 
tract in question was across the road from a public park, but was 
itself occupied by the city waterworks; there was, however, a grassy 
area frequented by sightseers for the purpose of viewing traffic on the 
river. At thf: time of the accident a "no swimming" sign ordinarily 
posted at the location had been temporarily removed for repair. 
Reversing the city's judgment n.o.v., the court reasoned that, like 
Matthews and Munson, the case involved a dual use of property and 
that in such cases the rule is that, if the legislature's purpose in con-
ferring the power to engage in the activity carried on there was 
exclusively public, the municipality will be deemed to be acting gov-
ernmentally, but if it was "for private advantage or emolument," 
then, even if the public draws some incidental benefit, the munici-
pality stands on the same footing as any private occupier.284 In this 
instance the primary use was the waterworks, a "proprietary activity" 
carried on for the "private advantage and emolument" of the city; 
the use of the premises by sightseers was only incidental. Conse-
quently, the applicable rule was that of the Restatement of Torts 
pertaining to privileged visitors, and the city became liable for a 
failure to warn of known dangers.285 
282. 373 Mich. 198, 128 N.W .2d 477 (1964). Although the decision was subsequent 
to Williams v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 1-5 supra &: 420-
21 infra, the accident occurred prior to that decision and was therefore not subject to 
the principle of that case. 
283. 373 Mich. at 208, 128 N.W.2d at 483. 
284. 373 Mich. at 205, 128 N.W .2d at 482. 
285. 373 Mich. at 208-09, 128 N.W .2d at 483, citing RESrATEMENT OF TORTS § 345 
(1934). 
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C. The Nuisance-Trespass Claim 
During the period in ·which the governmental-function defense 
gained its ascendancy, the nuisance-trespass concept, while it re-
mained a viable basis of claim, was held in check by close attention 
to its origins. In later years, when recollection of the common law 
forms began to fade and the governmental-function defense came 
under fire, the concept lost some of its definition and was accepted 
by the court in some situations that are difficult to reconcile with 
the original category. 
The original cases, it has already been noted, were Pennoyer v. 
City of Saginaw,286 Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo,281 and Ashley v. 
City of Port Huron.288 Pennoyer sued the city for maintaining ditches 
that cast surface water upon his land. The trial judge, for reasons that 
did not appear, excluded from evidence the record of the proceedings 
in the city council that would have shmvn that the contract for the 
digging of the ditches existed prior to plaintiff's acquisition of his 
title. Holding this ruling to be erroneous, the supreme court said, 
"If on the ground that it was of proceedings anterior to the plaintiff's 
title, and his possession of the land-as stated in the brief submitted 
by defendant's counsel-it is only necessary to say that the city, by 
creating the nuisance, which the evidence offered tended to prove, 
is prima facie liable for its continuance."289 In Sheldon, the village 
board of trustees, by resolution, directed the village marshal to re-
move plaintiff's front fence, which was believed to be within the 
limits of the highway, and he obeyed their command. It was held 
that the act was a trespass and a taking of private property; more-
over, it had been commanded by the corporate body itself. The court 
could see no reason why the corporate entity should escape respon-
sibility for the consequences.290 In Ashley, again, the claim was that 
the city had cut a sewer, the necessary result of which was that water 
was cast upon plaintiff's land that would not otherwise have flowed 
there. In response to a defense that the city was exercising its legis-
lative authority in ordering the sewer to be built, the supreme court 
answered that a municipal corporation enjoys no exemption from 
responsibility for a direct injury in the nature of a trespass accom-
plished by an act of the corporation itself.291 
286. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
287. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra. 
288. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. 
289. 8 Mich. at 535. This is the entire discussion; no authorities were cited. 
290. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra. 
291. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. 
December 1973] Governmental Tort Liability 239 
The court was dealing, in these cases, with an act, directed by the 
corporate decision-making body, that was, or the necessary conse-
quence of which was, a physical intrusion on plaintiff's land. It was 
not a case of "mere neglect" on the part of the public authorities to 
perform some duty imposed upon them by law, nor was there any 
necessity to "impute" to the corporate entity responsibility for the 
acts of an underling, for the corporate body itself had ordered the 
thing done. Moreover, in Sheldon at least, the act impliedly laid 
claim to and appropriated possession of land that plaintiff claimed 
belonged to him. In these circumstances, neither the plea that the act 
was legislative in character, nor the contention that it was the act of 
the officers themselves, rather than that of the corporation, was ap-
plicable. 
A case in which a conclusion of no liability was reached elucidates 
the court's reasoning further. In Fuller v. City of Grand Rapids,292 
plaintiff claimed that a contractor engaged in a street improvement 
project under contract with the city had deposited some earth on her 
land. Noting that the amount of earth deposited, if any, was trifling 
and that it was doubtful that plaintiff was entitled to maintain an 
action of trespass quare clausum fregit under her pleadings, the court 
said, "However this may be, the act of depositing earth upon her land 
was unnecessary, and not the natural result of making the improve-
ment. The trespass, therefore, was one for which the contractor, and 
not the city, was liable."293 
Four years later, in Ferris v. Board of Education,294 personal inju-
ries "proximately" caused by the "trespass" were included under this 
rubric. A Detroit school building was constructed in such a location 
and in such a fashion that ice and snow would naturally slide from 
its roof onto plaintiff's back steps. On one occasion plaintiff, informed 
by his wife that it had happened again, went out to survey the situa-
tion, slipped upon the deposit from defendant's roof, and fell.295 It 
was held that the board of education had no more right to build its 
building in such a way that ice and snow would inevitably slide from 
the roof onto plaintiff's premises than it would have to accumulate 
water and permit it to be discharged in a body across the boundary 
line. There would have been no question if the claim had been for 
damages to the premises, and the personal injury was the proximate 
consequence of the erection of the building, designed as it was, with-
292. 105 Mich. 529, 63 N.W. 530 (1895). 
293. 105 Mich. at 534-35, 63 N.W. at 531. 
294. 122 Mich. 315, 81 N.W. 98 (1899). 
295. 122 Mich. at 316-17, 81 N.W. at 99. 
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out devices on the roof to prevent such slides. This was not a claim 
for "neglect in the performance of a corporate duty rendering a pub-
lic work unfit for the purposes for which it was intended, but rather 
for the doing of a wrongful act, causing a direct injury to the 
person of the plaintiff, while outside the limits of the defendant's 
premises. "296 
Ferris was the genesis of various strategies, most of which proved 
unsuccessful, for outflanking the governmental-function defense. 
A court that had not been mesmerized by the latter idea might have 
recognized in Ferris and the cases that stood behind it the basis for 
a principle of liability on the part of governmental agencies for in-
juries resulting from the misfeasances of governmental officers and 
employees, which would have interfaced with the older principle 
of nonliability for mere failure to perform affirmative duties imposed 
by statute. But this line of development was blocked by Alberts v. 
City of Muskegon,291 wherein plaintiff claimed that the loss of his 
house by fire was caused by the negligent emission of sparks from a 
steam roller used by city employees in street construction work. The 
court held the work was governmental in character and rejected a 
misfeasance argument based on Sheldon, Ashley, and Ferris. The 
case was not one, it was said, in which the misfeasance claimed 
amounted to a direct trespass; rather, the basis of the claim was negli-
gence, substantially the basis of all liability in this country for dam-
age caused by fire. The cases cited were inapplicable, for "it cannot 
be said that the burning of plaintiff's property was the necessary re-
sult of employing the roller as equipped upon the road. The machine 
and the agents of the city were properly employed in performing a 
public work. This employment involved no injury to plaintiff's prop-
erty."2os 
In other cases the avoidance strategy was an attempt to pin the 
"nuisance" label on dangerous or defective conditions of public 
premises, which were injurious, not to outsiders, but to visitors on 
the premises, but the Ferris principle was held to be not applicable: 
to a claim that the board of education or its agents had supplied to 
plaintiff, a painter, a defective scaffold to be used on school prem-
ises;299 to a claim that a school building contained a stainvell dan-
296. 122 Mich. at 319, 81 N.W. at 100 (emphasis added). 
297. 146 Mich. 210, 109 N.W. 262 (1906). 
298. 146 Mich. at 215-16, 109 N.W. at 264 (emphasis added). 
299. Whitehead v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 206-07 
supra. 
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gerous to the children who used it;300 in Kilts v. Board of Super-
visors,801 to a ·wrongful death claim arising from the collapse of a plat-
form on a water tower on which plaintiff's decedent was working; 
and in Royston v. City of Charlotte,802 to a wrongful death claim 
arising from the collapse of a swing in a public park. 
In Kilts808 the distinction was clearly drawn between, on the one 
hand, a condition of the premises that threatens harm to persons off 
the premises, which is a public nuisance if the threat is to users of 
the public ways or a private nuisance if the threat is to neighboring 
property or persons thereon, and, on the other hand, a condition that 
is dangerous only to persons on the land. The court said that one 
who erects a weak structure upon his own land far enough from the 
perimeter that it can cause no injury to outsiders may become liable 
for negligence in some instances to those who enter and are harmed 
by it. But those who so enter have no right to have such structures, 
which are in no way related to property rights of their own, abated, 
and to hold the structures to be nuisances would undermine the law 
of negligence, for juries would then be asked to find all dangerous 
structures to be nuisances.304 The same reasoning prevailed in Roy-
ston, where a child was killed when a post that served as a support 
for a swing broke off because it was decayed at its base, and the iron 
bar from which the swing was suspended fell upon the child. Plain-
tiff claimed the swing was a public nuisance, but the court replied 
that if the municipality performed a governmental function in erect-
ing and maintaining the swing in a public park and was therefore not 
liable for negligence in its erection or maintenance, it would be 
inconsistent to say that the same negligence made the swing a public 
nuisance. Acts in discharge of a governmental function that create a 
nuisance per se do not come within the immunity, but want of care 
in maintenance presents a question of negligence only. To adopt the 
principle relied upon by plaintiff would abrogate the doctrine of 
governmental immunity by classifying as nuisance the result of the 
negligence of municipal agents and employees in the maintenance 
of any governmental instrumentality, thus immunizing the negli-
gence but not its result.305 
300. Daniels v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 208-09 supra. 
301. 162 Mich. 646, 127 N.W. 821 (1910). See text accompanying note 235 supra. 
302. 278 Mich. 255, 270 N.W. 288 (1936). 
303. See text accompanying notes 235 &: 301 supra. 
304. 162 Mich. at 650-51, 127 N.W. at 822. 
305. 278 Mich. at 260-61, 270 N.W. at 289-90. 
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Bator v. Ford Motor Co.306 involved damage to plaintiff's prem-
ises resulting from the digging of a large water tunnel seventy feet 
below the surface of the street on which the premises were located. 
The work was done by a contractor working for the Ford Motor 
Company, pursuant to an arrangement whereby the tunnel would 
become the property of the city of Detroit and be used to furnish 
water to the Ford plant in Dearborn. As the tunnel shield passed 
through a plastic subsoil at this point, the earth was disturbed in such 
a way that subsidence occurred for a period of eighteen months, 
causing damage to the buildings abutting the street. The jury found 
that the work had been carried on with due care and skill, and there 
was evidence that the disturbance to the soil was the inevitable result 
of doing the job in the way that it was done. Judgment for plaintiff 
was entered upon a count asserting essentially a trespass theory, and 
the court held that the absence of negligence was no defense if it 
were true that it was impossible to carry on the construction without 
damage to the abutting property. The court said that there would 
have been no justice in requiring the plaintiffs, who were in no way 
interested, to bear part of the cost,307 and that Ashley308 and Defer!00 
made it unnecessary to determine whether plaintiff's title ran to the 
center of the street, for the claim could be sustained without finding 
that the tunnel actually passed through his land.310 
In McDonell v. Brozo311 plaintiff was injured when, while passing 
by a school playground on a public sidewalk, she was bowled over by 
a fourteen-year-old physical education student running a dash under 
the supervision of school personnel. In support of her claim against 
the board of education, plaintiff relied on Ferris and argued that the 
distinction between Ferris and Daniels312 was that the injury in 
Ferris had occurred off, rather than on the school premises. But the 
court held that the immunity was not limited to on-premises injuries. 
The instant case did not involve trespass to the land of another, and 
there was no nuisance, since there was no continuing danger to the 
lives or safety of the public or to the property or personal rights of 
persons so located as to be peculiarly subject to such a danger.313 On 
306. 269 Mich. 648, 257 N.W. 906 (1934). 
307. 269 Mich. at 666, 257 N.W. at 912. 
308. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. 
309. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra. 
310. 269 Mich. at 669, 257 N.W. at 914. 
311. 285 Mich. 38, 280 N.W. 100 (1938). 
312. See text accompanying notes 208-09 & 300 supra. 
313. 285 Mich. at 43-44, 280 N.W. at 102. 
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the other hand, Pound v. Garden City School District314 fell easily 
into the Ferris category. The claim was for a fall on the public side-
walk attributed to an icy condition caused by the discharge of water 
across the sidewalk by a school downspout. The trial judge's con-
clusion that the immunity defense was applicable was corrected by 
the supreme court, which explained that the immunity decisions 
relied on by defendant were all cases in which the injury did not 
occur, as it did in Ferris, outside the limits of the school premises, 
but rather in areas subject to school control.315 
The loss of definition began to appear in Donaldson v. City of 
Marshall,316 wherein it was claimed that plaintiff lost the use of a 
portion of his land because the city failed to keep clear of debris a 
tile drain under a street so that "it became clogged and was unable 
to carry off the water that accumulated on plaintiff's land."317 Recov-
ery was allowed, and Seaman v. City of Marshall318 was cited as the 
controlling authority. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate 
that the water had been introduced upon the plaintiff's premises by 
the city drainage system, and it was said that 
[t]he city of Marshall was under no obligation to drain the plaintiff's 
land, but when it established a drain in that vicinity it became its 
duty to maintain it in such a way as to carry off the natural flow of 
the water, and if by reason of its failure to do so water accumulated 
on plaintiff's land which otherwise would not have been there the 
city would be liable for any damages sustained.319 
The distinction between the intrusion that is the intended or 
necessary result of the defendant's act and that which is accidental 
was again blurred in Robinson v. Township of Wyoming.320 Plain-
tiff's claim was for loss of a garage building by fire allegedly caused 
by a short circuit produced by water that fl.owed into the garage after 
escaping from a reservoir in a park owned by the township. Plaintiff 
asserted that "it was the duty of the township to so construct and 
operate its park and impound the waters ... in such a manner that 
they would not be a nuisance and would not trespass upon and dam-
age" his property.321 The township raised the governmental-function 
314. 372 Mich. 499, 127 N.W.2d 390 (1964). 
315. 372 Mich. at 501-02, 127 N.W.2d at 392. 
316. 247 Mich. 357, 225 N.W. 529 (1929). 
317. 247 Mich. at 358, 225 N.W. at 530. 
318. 116 Mich. 327, 74 N.W. 484 (1898). 
319. 247 Mich. at 359, 225 N.W. at 530. 
320. 312 Mich. 14, 19 N.W.2d 469 (1945). 
321. 312 Mich. at 19, 19 N.W.2d at 471. 
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defense and objected to the court's failure to dismiss the case for lack 
of proof of negligence and its failure to instruct the jury on that 
point. The court said that the governmental-function defense is avail-
able where negligence is charged but not in a case of trespass; more-
over, it said, in a trespass case it is not necessary to prove negligence. 
From the evidence the jury could find that the township had so con-
structed its park and lake that the flooding of plaintiff's property was 
a "natural" result of surplus water escaping from a break in the em-
bankment by which the water was contained.322 
In Rogers v. Kent Board of County Road Commissioners323 the 
claim was that plaintiff's decedent died of injuries received when his 
mower ran into a steel stake that defendants placed upon his land in 
order to support a snow fence; they acted under a license granted by 
the deceased. The agreement between the defendants and the de-
ceased allegedly contained an undertaking by the defendants that the 
fence and all its attachments would be removed from the land at the 
end of the winter season. The plaintiff's claim was styled as one based 
on trespass and negligence, but the trial court dismissed it on the 
ground that it was clearly a negligence claim and hence barred by 
the immunity defense. The supreme court, however, held that the 
claim could be maintained as one for trespass under the principle 
that one who, at the end of the term, fails to remove from the land 
of another a thing placed there pursuant to a license, becomes guilty 
of a trespass at that time.324 Since there was no allegation that the 
defendants were aware of the continuing presence of the stake upon 
the land, this conclusion seems debatable. 
The idea was even more loosely applied in De/net v. City of De-
troit.326 The claim was for property damage resulting from the sub-
sidence of the soil on plaintiffs' residential premises, which was al-
legedly caused by a broken connection in a sewer under a portion of 
their lot that had formerly been a public alley. The alley had been 
vacated with no reservation of rights in the city before plaintiffs 
acquired title to the lot, but nothing had been done to block off or 
remove the sewer. Its existence was not revealed by plaintiffs' abstract, 
but they learned of it when they received their deed, at which time 
the grantor told them the sewer had been blocked off. The truth was 
not discovered until some years later when the damage occurred and, 
after a number of complaints, the city investigated and discovered 
322. 312 Mich. at 23·25, 19 N.W .2d at 473. 
323. 319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W .2d 358 (1948). 
324. 319 Mich. at 666, 30 N.W .2d at 360. 
325. 327 Mich. 254, 41 N.W .2d 539 (1950). 
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that the sewer still served a number of houses in the vicinity. The 
break was also discovered and repaired at that time. The trial judge 
decided that the city, in maintaining the sewer, was engaged in a gov-
ernmental function and was therefore not liable for the damage 
caused by the faulty connection. The supreme court reinstated the 
plaintiffs' verdict on the ground that "the maintenance of an active 
sewer since 1915 beneath the plaintiffs' lands constitutes a tres-
pass,"328 and "[t]he city cannot excuse its tortious taking of private 
property by invoking the shibboleth of governmental function.''827 
Further evidence of the increasing ambiguity of the "trespass" 
basis of claim is provided by two cases arising out of one incident. To 
eliminate frequent overflows of a county road by the runoff of snow-
melt and storm water from nearby high land, the Chippewa County 
Road Commission raised the grade of the road where the flooding 
occurred and increased the size of the culvert under the road by an 
amount grossly inadequate to accommodate the water that was there-
after impounded behind the higher grade in times of freshet. In May 
of 1959, during a period of unusually heavy rainfall, water accu-
mulated in the pocket created by the convergence of this and other 
highways in such quantities that it eventually broke through one of 
the roads and poured in a torrent toward nearby Lake Superior. In 
the process it washed out a gully, into which a lakeside cottage and 
its occupants were precipitated. Actions against the road commission 
for the death of one of the guests in the cottage, and for the damage 
to the property, were dismissed by the trial court on a motion that 
set up a claim of immunity. That order was appealed in both cases, 
but Herro v. Chippewa County Road Commissioners,328 the wrong-
ful death case, was the vehicle for the supreme court's ruling. The 
complaint alleged that the defendant was on notice of the dangerous 
situation that it had created by reason of an accumulation of water 
in unprecedented quantities in the month preceding the incident in 
question. It also asserted a duty on the defendant's part, in construct-
ing and maintaining its roads, to provide adequate escape routes for 
the water impounded, so that it "would not be a nuisance and would 
not trespass" upon the property "occupied" by plaintiff's decedent 
and to prevent the artificial creation of a dangerous body of water 
above the property and its sudden discharge in large and unnatural 
quantities on the plaintiff's decedent.829 Justice Black called this an al-
326. 327 Mich. at 258, 41 N.W .2d at 541. 
327. 327 Mich. at 258, 41 N.W.2d at 541-42. 
328, 368 Mich. 263, 118 N.W.2d 271 (1962). 
329. 368 Mich. at 266-68, 118 N.W.2d at 272-73. 
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legation of "actionable trespass" resulting directly in decedent's death 
by drowning and held that it was governed by the Ashley-Ferris-
Rogers-Robinson line of cases.330 In re Morass v. Hillsdale County831 
and 1vlaffei v. Berrian County332 were distinguished on the ground 
that they were based, "mistakenly it would seem," on claims of negli-
gence rather than trespass,383 and it was asserted that in no Michigan 
case had a city, township, village, county, or any administrative sub-
division thereof, been held immune from liability for destructive 
flooding of private property occasioned by trespass, provided that the 
trespass was pleaded and proved as it was in Ashley.834 It was asserted 
further that the latter case stood for the proposition that "even the 
State 'could not intrude upon the lawful possession of a citizen.'"881l 
The complaints were therefore sustained against the immunity de-
fense on the ground that a trespass had been alleged. While there do 
not appear to have been allegations equivalent to those in the early 
cases that the water intrusion was "the necessary and natural result" 
of the defendant's acts, the assertions relative to the probability of 
such an occurrence and the notice of the situation that the defendant 
had received before the disaster put a less severe strain on the original 
principle than Robinson did. 
But thereafter, in Smith v. Board of County Road Commission-
ers,886 the property owner's claim was tried, and it succumbed to a 
jury verdict after the jury received an instruction based on an act-of• 
God defense. The judgment based on the verdict was affirmed. The 
majority of the court thought that the defense was supported by evi-
dence tending to prove that the breakout would not have occurred 
but for the unusual rainfall that preceded it,387 although, as was 
pointed out in Justice Black's dissent, it seems to have been indispu-
table that the change in the grade of the road had the inevitable 
effect of diverting from its natural drainage course the water that 
could not pass through the culvert and causing it to flow in an oppo-
site direction. Therefore, the change in grade was a but-for cause of 
330. 368 Mich. at 265, ll8 N.W .2d at 271. 
331. 242 Mich. 277, 218 N.W. 683, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 635 (1928). See text accom• 
panying note 240 supra. While the facts in Morass would arguably have supported a 
trespass claim, the argument was apparently not made, and the claim succumbed to 
the court's conviction that road building is a government activity. 
332. 293 Micl1. 92, 291 N.W. 234 (1940). See note 212 supra. 
333. 368 Mich. at 271, 118 N.W .2d at 274. 
334. 368 Mich. at 272, 118 N.W.2d at 275. 
335. 368 Mich. at 272, 118 N.W.2d at 275, citing 35 Midi, at 300 (emphasis added). 
336. 381 Mich. 363, 161 N.W.2d 561 (1968). 
337. 381 Mich. at 368, 161 N.W.2d at 563, 
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plaintiff's inundation.888 The court in these cases seems to be in-
cluding under the "trespass" heading unintentional intrusions on 
land caused by negligent or extrahazardous activity. While this may 
be consistent with current usage,839 it is not what the court meant 
by the term in Ashley and Ferris. The situation contemplated in 
those cases would scarcely have been subject to an act-of-God defense. 
What seems to be taking place in this area, through the blurring of 
the original outlines, is an acceptance of liability on the part of the 
governmental unit for intrusions on land ( and their proximate conse-
quences) caused by the unit, either intentionally or by negligent or 
extrahazardous activity. 
It may be that the development is also being extended, though by 
a different logic, to include such harms caused by negligent omission. 
The claim in Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. State340 was for 
damages caused by a fire that spread to plaintiff's premises from a 
neighboring property owned by the state. The state property was an 
abandoned factory, title to which was acquired by the state through a 
tax sale. The plant was dilapidated, subject to vandalism, and a 
recognized fire hazard, and the state had notice of these facts through 
citations issued by the city department of building and safety engi-
neering. The fire occurred in 1963, at which time the state's "sov-
ereign immunity" was intact. The claim was based on an assertion 
that, since the factory was a fire hazard, it was a nuisance, and the 
supreme court upheld that assertion against a contention that the 
gist of the claim was negligence.341 But, probably because of the 
court's established view that exceptions to the rule of "sovereign im-
munity" are created only by statute where the state is concerned,842 
the court apparently felt that liability could not be rested upon the 
"nuisance" characterization, which derives from case law and has no 
statutory endorsement. In order to sustain the claim, therefore, the 
court was forced to characterize the situation as one involving a 
"taking" of private property, for which the constitution requires that 
compensation be made.843 As I have criticised this holding else-
338. 381 Mich. at 379-80, 161 N.W.2d at 568. 
339. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, TORTS 64 n.17 (4th ed. 1971). Although in both Herro 
and Smith the claims were called "trespass," Justice Black, at least, thought they were 
governed by the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. l Ex. 265 (1866), afjd., L.R. 3 
H.L. 330 (1868). See 381 Mich. at 280, 161 N.W .2d at 568. 
340. 383 Mich. 630, 178 N.W.2d 476 (1970). 
341. 383 Mich. at 633-38, 178 N.W.2d at 478-80. 
342. See text accompanying note 382 infra. 
343. 383 Mich. at 641-43, 178 N.W.2d at 482-84. 
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where,344 I will here only offer the opinion that this characterization 
of the situation represents a fiction of the most obvious and most un-
wise variety, since it obfuscates distinctions that are significant and 
useful, and further because it draws an indefensible line between 
personal injuries and property losses caused by governmental negli-
gence. If the defendant were a subordinate governmental unit not 
covered by the state's "sovereign immunity," the liability would ap-
parently have been deemed supported by the "nuisance" characteriza-
tion alone. While this holding would do no great violence to the 
general concept of nuisance, again it represents an extension of lia-
bility beyond that which the Michigan cases had heretofore recog-
nized. Pennoyer v. Saginaw345 stated a continuing liability for damage 
resulting from a nuisance created by the city; Buckeye Union recog-
nizes liability for damage resulting from a nuisance on government-
owned property that the owner did not create, but which it failed to 
abate. Liability is therefore extended to an additional group of situa-
tions wherein the government, as owner of land, failed to take pre-
cautionary measures that ought to have been taken for the protection 
of persons outside the land; the gist of the liability in these situations 
is negligence, but negligence of the government qua landowner. 
Finally, with all the emphasis upon the word "trespass" and upon 
injury "caused by a direct act," it seems strange that an attempt ap-
parently was never made to formulate an argument for liability in 
instances of personal trespass, the most obvious instance being ag-
gressions by the police. There was an opening for expansion beyond 
the limits of trespass to land in Tzatzken v. City of Detroit,346 where 
the claim was that the city police had entered plaintiff's home without 
a warrant and wrongfully seized his private stock of fifty-three bottles 
of high quality brandy. The court, while regretting this high-handed 
action, held that the police were acting in a governmental capacity 
and that the city was therefore not liable even if a conversion had 
occurred.847 There was no reference at all to the fact that there was 
both a "trespass" and a "taking." The opinion asserted that the 
police department operates as an arm of the state in its sovereign 
capacity, rather than as an agency of the municipality, and that this 
is so whether the department is organized by the direct act of the 
legislature or under a home-rule charter.848 The decision is appar-
344. Cooperrider, Torts, 1971 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 18 WAYNE L, Rlw. 
503, 520 (1972). 
345. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
346. 226 Mich. 603, 198 N.W. 214 (1924). 
347. 226 Mich. at 604, 198 N.W. at 214. 
348. 226 Mich. at 608, 198 N.W. at 215. 
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ently an echo of the nineteenth-century perception that some local 
officials are actually state officers in disguise. 
On the same day that it decided Williams v. City of Detroit849 the 
supreme court rejected a wrongful death claim against the city 
wherein it was .charged that Detroit police officers "negligently and 
carelessly exerted unnecessary force in effectuating the arrest of the 
deceased, as a result of which serious injury, ultimately causing his 
death, were [sic] inflicted."850 All the justices agreed that the claim 
had been properly dismissed; they cited only their opinions in Wil-
liams. And in Hirych v. State Fair Commission,851 a claim for assault 
and battery and false arrest against the state, the state fair commis-
sion, the city. and others. which arose out of a melee at the state fair 
grounds that had been broken up by police action (the incident oc-
curred prior to the Williams decision), the claims against the state 
and the commission were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the 
claim against the city was dismissed as based on a governmental 
activity. 
D. Claims Against the State-Motor Vehicle Liability-A Willing 
Legislature and an Unyielding Court 
The glib statement in Nicholson that "[i]n imparting [to munici-
palities] a portion of its powers, the State also imparts its own im-
munity"852 was a vacuous reference so far as Michigan decisions were 
concerned. Prior to that time, 1902, the question of responsibility 
on the part of the state in tort situations had never been directly 
raised, since the court's position was that there was no judicial forum 
in which it could be raised. This, of course, was not an immunity that 
had been shared by the state with its subordinate units, for they were 
routinely subject to judicial jurisdiction. 
At an early date the court expressed the view that a state cannot 
be sued in its own courts unless it has explicitly consented to submit 
itself to their jurisdiction.853 While references were made to Black-
stone and Puffendorf for their explanation of the position of the sub-
ject who seeks to hold the crown responsible in its own court, and to 
the absence in Michigan of a procedure corresponding to the English 
petition of right, this proposition, for the Michigan court, was a de-
349. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra &: notes 420-21 infra. 
350. Wardlow v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 291, 292, 111 N.W .2d 44, 45 (1961). 
351. 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W .2d 910 (1965). 
352. See text accompanying note 199 supra. 
353. Michigan St. Bank v. Hammond, I Doug. 527 (Mich. 1845); Michigan St. Bank 
v. Hastings, I Doug. 225 (Mich. 1844), afjg., I Walker Ch. R. 9 (Mich. Ch. 1842). 
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duction from constitutional and statutory allocations of jurisdiction 
in Michigan, rather than a doctrinal notion concerning the attributes 
of sovereignty. 
In the early years the legislature was very much involved in the 
everyday business affairs of state government. It received and acted, 
by bill or resolution, upon numerous individual claims against the 
state, following procedures that were at first wholly legislative, but 
which evolved into a generally applicable administrative practice. 
Routine claims for services and supplies were routinely approved by 
the standing committees on claims; those that involved a more com-
plex account, or some element of controversy, were typically referred 
to an ad hoc commission with power to act.354 
In 1842, a Board of State Auditors was created; it was composed 
of the Secretary of State, the State Treasurer, and the Attorney Gen-
eral, and was authorized and directed to settle the accounts of state 
officers charged with the handling of state funds.31m In the following 
year that Board was directed to investigate and settle all unsettled 
claims for damages arising from the construction of "works of internal 
improvement" prior to April I, 1842.356 The Board, in entertaining 
such claims, was directed to sit "as a legal body" and to swear and 
examine witnesses. Its determinations were declared to be final, the 
claims described were declared barred if not submitted to the Board 
after a prescribed notice had been given, and the Board's certificate 
was made a sufficient voucher for the Auditor General to draw a war-
rant for payment on the state treasury. Thereafter it became normal 
practice for the legislature, by joint resolution, to refer individual 
claims of a miscellaneous nature to the Board with directions to make 
a final settlement and authorize payment.357 
. 
This general procedure for the handling of claims not otherwise 
provided for apparently proved satisfactory, for the new constitution 
in 1850 provided that "[t]he Legislature shall not audit nor allow 
354. E.g., Joint Resolution of March 4, 1840, No. 8, [1840] Mich. Acts 240 (Auditor 
General, State Treasurer, and Secretary of State directed to audit the claims of Joel 
Clemons for labor and materials and contingent damages as construction contractor 
for the central railroad, and to allow such sum as they deemed just and equitable). See 
also Act of Feb. 15, 1842, No. 28, [1842) Mich. Acts 47; Act of Feb. 15, 1842, No. 29, 
[1842] Mich. Acts 48; Act of Feb. 16, 1842, No. 55, [1842] Mich. Acts 78; Act of March 
6, 1843, No. 45, [1843] Mich. Acts 53; Act of March 8, 1843, No. 61, [1843] Mich. Acts 
138. 
355. Act of Feb. 4, 1842, No. 12, [1842] Mich. Acts 13. 
356. Act of March 8, 1843, No. '14, [1843] Mich. Acts 153. 
357. E.g., Joint Resolution of Feb. 23, 1843, No, 11, [1843] Mich. Acts 226: Joint 
Resolution of March 6, 1843, No. 13, [1843] Mich. Acts 227; Joint Resolution of March 
8, 1843, No. 15, [1843] Mich. Acts 228. 
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any private claim or account"358 and further provided for a Board 
of State Auditors, composed of the Secretary of State, the State Treas-
urer, and the Commissioner of the State Land Office and vested with 
jurisdiction "to examine and adjust all claims against the state, not 
otherwise provided for by general Iaws."359 After the 1850 constitu-
tion was adopted, the duties and procedures of the Board were elab-
orated by law. The Board was forbidden to allow any claims against 
the state except those established by competent testimony and was 
directed to keep a record of its proceedings that contained an itemiza-
tion of each claim and an abstract of the evidence taken. The mem-
bers of the Board were given the power to administer oaths to claim-
ants and witnesses, to examine such persons under oath, to issue 
subpoenas and attachments for failure to attend, and to set off against 
the claims asserted any legal or equitable claims in favor of the 
state.800 
Not until 1875 was the supreme court required to comment upon 
the Board's claims function. Then, in People ex rel. Dewey v. Board 
of State Auditors861 it held that under the constitution the Board was 
a separate and independent tribunal over which the court had no 
supervisory control. This position was reiterated three years later in 
People ex rel. Ambler v. Auditor General362 and again in People 
ex rel. Ayres v. Board of State Auditors.863 In the latter case Justice 
Campbell explained the matter at some length: 
Except in regard to those ordinary claims against the State which 
became fixed by the action of various auditing officers, and involved 
no important inquiry, no claim against the State could, under the 
old Constitution, be allowed except by the Legislature. The State 
has never, before or since, allowed itself to be sued in its own courts, 
and no officer could lawfully subject it to suit .... 
We had no Petition of Right and no court of claims. The policy 
of the State, (as at that time of the United States also), left the sole 
power to allow claims against the State to the Legislature. In provid-
ing for a different method of determining claims against the State, it 
was not deemed proper to include it within the judicial power; and 
the inquiry not being subject to judicial action, any interference by 
this court with the auditing body in the exercise of its constitutional 
358. MICH. CoNsr. art. IV, § 31 (1850), 
359. MICH, CONsr, art. VIII, § 4 (1850). 
360. Act of April 7, 1851, No. 142, [1851] Mich. Acts 173 (codified at MICH, CoMP. 
LA.ws ch. 7, § 205 (1857)). 
361. 32 Mich. 191 (1875). 
362. 38 Mich. 746 (1878). 
363. 42 Mich. 422, 4 N.W. 274 (1880). 
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functions, would have been practically entertaining a suit against the 
State to compel the disposition of a claim which they had already 
rejected as not a claim entitled to consideration, and which he had no 
right to pass upon in one stage more than another.364 
Thus, while the common law immunity of the crown from ordi-
nary judicial process was in the background, the court's thinking 
again appears to have been more importantly influenced by in-
digenous practice. The court's emphasis was not upon the theoretical 
unreachability of the sovereign, but rather upon the distribution of 
functions within the local version of republican government. As a 
matter of original Michigan policy, claims against the government 
were seen as falling within legislative rather than judicial cognizance 
and as subject to legislative conscience rather than to judicially ad-
ministered rules of law. When this original policy was changed, in the 
constitution of 1850, "it was deemed not proper to include [the 
cognizance of claims against state government] within the judicial 
power"; instead, an administrative body was established £or that 
purpose. It was this constitutional allocation of jurisdiction that 
placed these matters beyond the original and revisory jurisdiction of 
the courts. 365 
The advent of the motor vehicle created an entirely new set of 
problems, which quickly brought all these rules under a pressure that 
had not been felt before. The legislature quickly recognized this fact 
and at an early date moved to regulate the use of motor vehicles and 
establish responsibility on the part of owners for the harm that re-
364. 42 Mich. at 427-28, 4 N.W. at 277-78, See also Smith v. Aplin, 80 Mich. 205, 45 
N.W. 136 (1890); Aplin v. Van Tassel, 73 Mich. 28, 40 N.W. 847 (1888); Board of Super-
visors v. Auditor General, 68 Mich. 659, 36 N.W. 794 (1888); McElroy v. Swart, 57 Mich. 
500, 24 N.W. 776 (1885). 
365. In just one case during this era did the court's action at all suggest a position 
concerning tort responsibility on the part of the state. The legislature passed a joint 
resolution for the relief of a person who claimed to have been imprisoned after con• 
viction of a crime of which he was allegedly not guilty. The resolution directed the 
Board of State Auditors to investigate the claim and, if it found the facts asserted to be 
true, to authorize a payment to be made to the petitioner. The resolution was pre• 
sented to the Board, which refused to consider the claim, and the supreme court denied 
the petitioner's subsequent application for a writ of mandamus requiring the Board 
to entertain the claim. Allen v. Board of State Auditors, 122 Mich. 324, 81 N.W. 118 
(1899). In his opinion Chief Justice Grant heatedly denied that the legislature lmd 
power to establish a tribunal for the retrial of the crime and asserted that the resolution 
provided for a gratuity and therefore an appropriation for private purposes, which 
required an extraordinary majority for enactment. Further, he said that the petition 
did not contain a "claim" within the meaning of article VIII, section 4 of the constitu• 
tion, and that the legislature was only empowered to authorize the Board to pass on 
"claims," as distinguished from requests, petitions, and claims for appropriations, which 
would represent mere gratuities or would be based on sentimental or moral grounds, 
122 Mich. at 326-29, 81 N.W. at 113-14. 
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suited from it. The Motor Vehicle Act of 1915366 was concerned 
largely with the registration and identification of vehicles used on 
the public highways, but it also contained a requirement that vehicles 
be equipped with certain safety devices, including an adequate 
horn,367 and a civil liability provision making owners responsible for 
the negligent use of their vehicles when driven with their consent or 
knowledge: 
The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occa-
sioned by the negligent operation of such motor vehicle, whether 
such negligence consists in violation of the provisions of the statutes 
of this State or fo. the failure to observe such ordinary care in such 
operation as the rules of the common law require: Provided, That the • 
owner shall not be liable unless said motor vehicle is being driven by 
the express or implied consent or knowledge of such owner.368 
The language defining the statute's coverage was ambiguous with 
regard to municipally owned vehicles, but it was not that ambiguity 
that defeated a claim for injury caused by the negligent operation 
of a city-owned truck engaged in street maintenance activities, 
wherein it was also asserted that the truck was not equipped with a 
horn or other signalling device. The court, in Wrighton v. City of 
Highland Park,869 assumed that the horn requirement was applicable 
but disregarded the civil liability provision and stated that the ques-
tion was whether, "because a municipality is required to place a horn 
on its vehicles while it is discharging governmental functions, •.• it 
thereby consents to be sued if this provision is violated?"370 Its 
answer to that question was: 
It is conceivable that the legislature might require the city to carry 
a horn on its vehicles in the interest of public safety without in any 
manner making itself liable for negligence while performing govern-
mental operations. Concededly there would be no liability except for 
the automobile law, and from that law no legislative intention can be 
implied abrogating this old and well established rule of law. We think 
if the legislature had intended to change that rule of law it would not 
have done so in the uncertain way suggested by counsel.371 
366. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 302, [1915] Mich. Pub. Acts 533 (codified at 1 MICH. 
COMP. LAws ch. 89, §§ 4797-832 (1915)). 
367. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 302, § 16, [1915] Mich. Pub. Acts 538 (codified at 1 
MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 89, § 4812 (1915)). 
368. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 302, § 29, [1915] Mich. Pub. Acts 543 (codified at 1 
MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 89, § 4825 (1915)). 
369. 236 Mich. 279, 210 N.W. 250 (1926). 
370. 236 Mich. at 281, 210 N.W. at 251. 
371, 236 Mich. at 281, 210 N.W. at 251. 
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When the law was amended in 1925 the civil liability provision 
was retained, and the coverage of the statute was redefined in such a 
way as clearly to include vehicles owned by the state and by munici-
palities.372 Nevertheless, in a claim arising thereafter based on a col-
lision with a police cruiser, the court thought there was still no reason 
to conclude that the legislature had intended to recognize liability 
on the municipality's part for accidents arising in the performance of 
a governmental function. Citing Wrighton for the proposition that 
when the legislature intends to change a common law rule of law it 
does so in terms of certainty, the court, in Butler v. City of Grand 
Rapids,878 said, "We see no reason to change the rule followed in 
Massachusetts and Michigan which holds that, there being no liability 
at common law, a statute is required to impose such liability before 
the same can be asserted. In the case at bar, the 1925 act does not 
impose such liability."374 The decision was perverse. The statute said 
"The term 'motor vehicle' as used in this act shall include all vehicles 
impelled on the public highways of this state, by mechanical power" 
(with certain exceptions which explicitly included vehicles owned by 
the federal government but not those owned by municipal corpora-
tions or by the state);375 it specifically required vehicles owned and 
operated by the state or any municipality to be marked so as to iden-
tify the department or institution by which they were employed370 
and also provided that the "owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable" 
for any injury occasioned by its negligent operation if the vehicle was 
being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowl-
edge.a11 
A few years later, in Miller v. Manistee County Board of Road 
Commissioners,318 Justice McAllister calmly ignored the Butler deci-
sion and sustained a claim against the county and the county board 
of road commissioners for injury caused by the negligent operation of 
a vehicle owned by the latter; he rested his decision in part on the 
civil liability provision of the 1915 Act and in part on a section of 
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act, adopted in 1927, which stated that 
372. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § l(a), [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 418 (codified at 
1 MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 73, § 4632(a) (1929)). 
373. 273 Mich. 674, 263 N.W. 767 (1935). 
374. 273 Mich. at 679, 263 N.W. at 769. 
375. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § l(a), [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 418 (codified at l 
MICH. COMP, LAWS ch. 73, § 4632(a) {1929)) (emphasis added). 
376. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § l(a), [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 418 (codified at 1 
MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 73, § 4632(a) (1929)). 
377. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § 29, [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 424 (codified at 1 
MlcH. CoMP, LAws ch. 73, § 4648 (1929)). 
378. 297 Mich. 487, 298 N.W. 105 (1941). 
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the provisions of that Act, the "rules of the road," were applicable 
"to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by this State or any 
county, city, town, district or any other political subdivision of the 
State."379 But this aberration was quickly corrected. In the following 
year, in Mead v. Michigan Public Service Commission,389 the court 
had before it, on appeal from the recently created court of claims, a 
motor vehicle claim against the state public service commission. The 
trial judge had thought that Miller provided a basis for the liability 
asserted against the state. The court reconsidered its position, noted 
that the section cited by Justice McAllister from the Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Act applied to drivers rather than to owners and decided 
again that "it would be contrary to the great weight of authority to 
hold that by enacting" the civil liability provision of the 1915 law 
"the legislature intended to deprive the State of immunity from lia-
bility incident to the negligent use of its automobiles; and in that 
respect place the State on a par with private or corporate owners."381 
By this time the idea that the immunity defense is peculiarly a 
possession of the legislature had taken firm hold. In the early muni-
cipal corporation cases Justice Campbell had not, it is true, been per-
suaded that when the legislature imposed an affirmative duty upon 
certain local officials, as it did by general statutes upon the township 
highway commissioners and by special charter upon city street com-
missioners, it necessarily intended that the local governmental unit 
should be responsible in damages for the failures of such officials to 
perform their duties. 1£ that was what the legislature intended, he 
expected it to tell him so in explicit language. It told him so in the 
particular instance of duties relating to the repair of the public ways, 
and that came to be seen as the exception that proved the rule. 
Through frequent uncritical repetition of expressions of this attitude, 
there evolved a position that in Mead, with regard to the state's 
immunity, was put in the following words: 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been firmly estab-
lished in the common law of this State, and it may not be held to have 
been waived or abrogated except that result has been accomplished 
by an express statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a 
statute .... Irrespective •.. of how impelling the argument may be 
that governmental agencies with large numbers of motor vehicles on 
the highway should not be absolved from liability to innocent victims 
of the carelessness of the drivers of such vehicles, a change in the 
379. Act of June 1, 1927, No. 318, § 32, [1927] Mich. Pub. Acts 591 (codified at 1 
. MICH, COMP. LAWS ch. 74, § 4724 (1929)). 
380. 803 Mich. 168, 5 N.W .2d 740 (1942). 
381, 803 Mich. at 172, 5 N.W.2d at 741. 
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established law of immunity of such governmental agencies as owners 
of such vehicles cannot be brought about by judicial fiat. It can only 
be done by the legislature. s82 
Thus, a principle that was originally nothing more than a judicial 
rule of interpretation came to be treated like a proposition written 
into the statute books in black-faced type. What the legislature had 
willed, only the legislature could waive, and only by language that 
could be given no other meaning. The curious thing is that the legis-
lature had never expressed such a will in the first place. Indeed, one 
would be hard put to demonstrate from its actions, including the 
various versions of the highway statute and the civil liability provi-
sion in the Motor Vehicle Act, any intent to defend the principle of 
irresponsibility that had captured the court's thinking. 
The Board of State Auditors was retained by the constitution of 
1908,883 but during the twenties its general claims function was 
largely transferred to a new entity, the State Administrative Board, 
which consisted of the governor and other high ranking state officers. 
The new Board was given authority to authorize payment of emerg-
ency claims,884 to inquire into, settle, and pay claims for injuries to 
persons while they were in the employ of the state or any of its de-
partments or institutions, 385 and to do the same for claims for com-
pensation of dependents of state police officers killed in the line of 
duty386 and claims for injuries received in the line of duty by mem-
bers of the Michigan National Guard.887 Of greater interest was the 
authority conferred upon the Board, by a statute that became section 
238 of the Compiled Laws, to entertain and pay claims for damages 
arising from negligence in the construction, improvement, or main-
tenance of state trunk line highways, 888 and by another that became 
section 237 of the Compiled Laws, which vested it with discretionary 
power to hear and determine claims against the state arising from 
"negligence, malfeasance or misfeasance of any state officer, employee, 
commission, department, board, institution, or other governmental 
382. 303 Mich. at 173-74, 5 N.W.2d at '142, 
383. MICH. CoNsr. art. VI, § 20 (1908). 
384. Act of June 15, 1921, No. 29, [1921] Mich. Pub. Acts 803 (codified at l M1cu, 
COMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 227 (1929)). 
385. Act of May II, 1927, No. 133, [1927] Mich. Pub. Acts 191 (codified at 1 M1cu. 
COMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 230 (1929)). 
386. Act of May II, 1927, No. 134, [1927] Mich. Pub. Acts 192 (codified at l M1cu. 
COMP. LAws ch. 11, § 232 (1929)). 
387. Act of April 29, 1927, No. 93, [1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 235 (codified at 1 M1cu. 
COMP, LAws ch. 11, § 235 (1929)). 
388. Act of May 27, 1925, No. 374, [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 736 (codified at 1 M1cu, 
CoMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 238 (1929)). 
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division" and to allow the same and order payment, provided that 
such payments should not in the aggregate exceed 25,000 dollars in 
any one year.389 
These provisions would seem to evidence a developing willing-
ness by the legislature to accept responsibility on the part of govern-
ment for injuries arising from its activities, but that willingness was 
still not shared by the court. Indeed, section 238 may have been the 
legislature's reaction to the decision a year earlier in Longstreet v. 
Mecosta County,890 which held that an action against the state high-
way commissioner was an action against the state and that there was 
nothing in the extensive powers the commissioner enjoyed over the 
construction and maintenance of state highways to indicate a legisla-
tive intent to waive the immunity of the state from suit arising from 
any failure to perform such duties. The claim in that case was that 
a partially completed bridge on a state highway had been left unpro-
tected by barriers or lights, so that a passenger car was driven off 
the end and into the water, with fatal consequences. 
A further step was taken in 1939, when the legislature adopted a 
statute that created a court of claims and conferred upon it exclusive 
jurisdiction "to hear and determine all claims and demands, liqui-
dated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state 
and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or 
agencies."891 Section 24 of the statute provided that "this act shall in 
no manner be construed as enlarging the present liabilities of the 
state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, 
arms or agencies."892 The legislature's purpose in conferring jurisdic-
tion upon the court to hear ex delicto claims while at the same time 
barring a construction that would enlarge the state's "present liabili-
ties" is less than clear. In Manion v. State Highway Commissioner,893 
an injury claim against the state on behalf of a seaman employed by 
the highway commissioner on one of the Mackinac ferries, a majority 
of the court reconciled the twn cla'l!ses by concluding that the state 
enjoyed two immunities-one from suit and one from tort liability 
while engaged in a governmental function-the first of which had 
been waived without relinquishing the second.894 Justice Bushnell 
389. Act of May 22, 1929, No. 259, [1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 621 (codified at 1 Mica. 
COMP. LAws ch. 11, § 237 (1929)). 
390. 228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W. 248 (1924). 
391. Act of May 23, 1939, No. 135, § 8(1), [1939] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 249 (codified 
at 4 MICH. COMP. I..Aws § 691.108 (1948)) (emphasis added). 
392. Act of May 23, 1939, No. 135, § 24, [1939] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 252. 
393. 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527, cert. denied~ 317 U.S. 677 (1942). 
394. 303 Mich. at 19, 5 N.W .2d at 528. 
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noted in his prevailing opinion that, while the Court of Claims Act 
did not expressly repeal sections 237 and 238 of the Compiled Laws, it 
did appear to have assigned all claims jurisdiction exclusively to the 
new court.395 The following year, in McNair v. State Highway De-
partment, 896 an appeal from a court of claims action against the high-
way department for negligence in the maintenance of a state high-
way, it was argued by the plaintiff that the claim could rest on sec-
tions 237 and 238, though it came before the court of claims instead 
of the administrative board. The court's laconic response was: 
From an examination of the above acts relied upon by the peti-
tioner, we are unable to find an express or implied intent upon the 
part of the legislature to abolish the defense of sovereign immunity. 
The authority to waive such defense is in the legislature and until 
there is legislative action authorizing an officer or agent of the State 
to waive such defense, it may not be done by any officer or agent.897 
Thus, by holding that the jurisdiction to hear claims against the 
state had been lodged exclusively in the court of claims, while reject~ 
ing the thought that that jurisdiction extended to claims of a type that 
had formerly been entertained by the administrative board under 
sections 237 and 238, the court managed to read those provisions out 
of the books and to attribute to the legislature, in its adoption of a 
systematic claims adjudication procedure, the intent, not just to 
assume no new liabilities, but to reduce the state's ability to respond 
to claims in tort situations. 
Two weeks after that decision was handed down the legislature 
adopted a statute that made certain amendments to the Court of 
Claims Act, including the following substitute for section 24: 
Upon the happening of any event subsequent to November I, 1943, 
which gives rise to a cause of action, the state hereby waives its im-
. munity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees and 
consents to have its liability for such torts determined in accordance 
with the same rules of law as apply to an action in the circuit court 
against an individual or a corporation, and the state hereby assumes 
liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the 
court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the state to 
recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused 
by the misfeasance or negligence of the officers or employees of the 
state while acting as such officer or employee. Such claim must be 
895. 303 Mich. at 20, 5 N.W .2d at 528-29. 
896. 305 Mich. 181, 9 N.W .2d 52 (1943). 
897. 305 Mich. at 187, 9 N.W.2d at 55. The reference in the last sentence is to the 
fact that the attorney general had not pleaded or otherwise raised the defense below, 
which plaintiff argued was a waiver if none was found in the statutes themselves, 
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submitted pursuant to procedural provisions of the court of claims 
act. The provisions of this act shall not apply to (a) any claim for 
injury to or death of a prisoner, or for services rendered while an in-
mate of a penal institution; (b) any claim arising out of the injury 
to or death of an inmate of any state institution in connection ·with 
the rendition of medical or surgical treatment; ( c) any claim for prop-
perty damage or personal injury caused by the Michigan state troops 
and/or the national guard when called into the service of the state.898 
But then the legislature flinched. In 1945, it repealed this general 
waiver of the state's immunity, and assumption of liability, and 
adopted in its place a statute providing that "[i]n all actions brought 
in the court of claims against the state of Michigan to recover dam-
ages resulting from the negligent operation by an officer, agent or 
employe of the state of Michigan of a motor vehicle of which the 
state of Michigan is owner ... the fact that the state of Michigan was 
in the ownership or operation of such motor vehicle, engaged in a 
governmental function, shall not be a defense to such action."899 At 
the same session the defense was abolished "[i]n any civil action 
brought against a political subdivision of the state of Michigan, in-
cluding all municipal corporations, to recover damages resulting 
from the negligent operation by any officer, agent or employee of 
such political subdivision, of a motor vehicle of which said political 
subdivision is owner."400 Thus, the legislature finally overrode thirty 
years of judicial resistance and gave the court the express directive 
that it had insisted upon. The motor vehicle liability problem was 
solved, though in the process the responsibility for other forms of 
governmental negligence, which, in so far as the state was concerned, 
had existed in rudimentary form before the administrative board 
and in general form for a brief period before the court of claims, 
was abandoned. In later years a majority of the supreme court was 
persuaded that this retreat at the state level was in fact an advance 
to the rear; it was construed as a legislative adoption of the "sovereign 
immunity" principle, qualified only by the statutory acceptance of 
liability in motor vehicle cases. 
398. Act of April 21, 1943, No. 237, [1943] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 390. 
399. Act of April 11, 1945, No. 87, [1945] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 84 (codified at 4 
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 691.141 (1948)). This provision was amended in 1960, to include 
within its coverage negligent operation of state-owned aircraft. Act of April 14, 1960, 
No. 33, [1960] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 28. The statute, with minor word changes, is now 
contained in MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6475 (1968). 
400. Act of April 27, 1945, No. 127, § 1, [1945] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 132 (codified 
at 4 MICH, CoMP. LAws § 691.151(1) (1948)). This provision was repealed by Act of May 
19, 1964, No. 170, § 14, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221. 
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III. WILLIAMS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. The Court's Struggle with the Problem 
A brief recapitulation of what Michigan lawmakers had done, as 
distinguished from what they had said, prior to the decision in 
Williams v. City of Detroit,401 would disclose the following pattern: 
After initial resistance by the court, the legislature established the 
principle of local government responsibility for unsafe conditions of 
the public ways.402 Later, again after stiff resistance from the court, 
the legislature also established the principle of general governmental 
responsibility for the negligent operation of government-owned 
motor vehicles by government employees.403 The court recognized 
governmental responsibility for activities by governmental officers 
that constituted or necessarily caused physical intrusion on or dis-
turbance of private premises,404 for maintenance on governmental 
premises of conditions that endangered and caused harm to persons 
or property outside those premises,405 and for injury caused by 
revenue-earning activities of local government units.400 On the other 
hand, the governmental-function defense was applied by the supreme 
court to negate liability in cases involving road construction and 
maintenance activities (though the area of immunity in this respect 
was greatly reduced in importance after 1945 by the statutory lia-
bility for negligent operation of motor vehicles),407 activities of fire-
men and police officers,408 and, in one instance, injury to a third 
party that was attributed to negligent supervision by school per-
sonnel of students engaged in school activities.409 But the great 
majority of all cases in which the governmental-function defense had 
been successful in the supreme court involved injury caused by the 
401. 864 Mich. 281, Ill N.W.2d I (1961). 
402. See text accompanying notes 90-136 supra. 
408. See text accompanying notes 852-400 supra. 
404. Herro v. Chippewa County Road Commrs., 368 Mich. 268, 118 N.W,2d 271 
(1962); Bator v. Ford Motor Co., 269 Mich. 648, 257 N.W. 906 (1984); Ashley v. City of 
Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296 (187'1); Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 883 (1872), 
See text accompanying notes 286-851 supra. 
405. Pound v. Garden City School Dist., 372 Mich. 499, 127 N.W .2d 390 (1964); 
Robinson v. Wyoming Twp., 312 Mich. 14, 19 N.W.2d 469 (1945); Ferris v. Board of 
Educ., 122 Mich. 315, 81 N.W. 98 (1899). See text acccmpanying notes 286-351 supra. 
406. See text accompanying notes 227-85 supra. 
407. Corning v. City of Saginaw, 116 Mich. 74, 74 N.W. 807 (1898). See text accom-
panying notes 185-86 supra. 
408. Wardlow v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 291, Ill N.W.2d 44 (1961); Tzatzken v. 
City of Detroit, 226 Mich. 608, 198 N.W. 214 (1924); Brink v. City of Detroit, 144 Mich, 
472, 108 N.W. 430 (1906). See text accompanying notes 210-12, 346-48 8: 850 supra. 
409. McDonnell v. Brozo, 285 Mich. 38, 280 N.W. 100 (1988). See text accompanying 
notes 311-13 supra. 
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claimant's encounter on government premises with a condition dan-
gerous only to visitors to those premises. The defense was first clearly 
articulated in Nicholson v. City of Detroit,410 wherein the claim was 
for negligent exposure of plaintiff's decedent to government prem-
ises infected by smallpox. The instances in this category included 
those involving a defective scaffold used by plaintiff on school prem-
ises,411 a dangerous stairway in a school building,412 a defective plat-
form on a water tower on county premises,413 a swimming pool in a 
public park (the case also involved charges of negligent supervi-
sion),414 a defective swing in a public park,415 defective elevator 
mechanisms in public buildings,416 a dangerous ramp in a school 
parking lot,417 and collapsing bleachers on school and park 
premises.418 
Since cases of this kind, including Williams itself, which was 
another dangerous elevator problem, were the source of the court's 
nascent dissatisfaction with the governmental-function defense, one 
wonders how subsequent developments might have differed if, in-
stead of challenging the entire position, the court had quietly· con-
cluded that the time had come to recognize a community respon-
sibility (generally corresponding to the responsibilities of private 
occupiers) toward persons entering public premises in circumstances 
that would entitle them to be characterized as "public invitees."419 
Such an opening in the governmental-function barrier might have 
been developed cautiously, ·with initial recognition of responsibility 
410. 129 Mich. 246, 88 N.W. 695 (1902). See text accompanying notes 190-99 supra. 
411. Whitehead v. Board of Educ., 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905). See text 
accompanying notes 206-07 &: 299 supra. 
412. Daniels v. Board of Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23 (1916). See text accom-
panying notes 208-09 &: 300 supra. 
413. Kilts v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Mich. 646, 127 N.W. 821 (1910). See text 
accompanying notes 235, 301 &: 303 supra. 
414. Heino v. City of Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 363, 168 N.W. !H2 (1918). See text 
accompanying notes 236-39 supra. 
415. Royston v. City of Charlotte, 278 Mich. 255, 270 N.W. 288 (1936). See text 
accompanying notes 302-05 supra. 
416. Martinson v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d 148 (1950); Daskiewicz 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 301 Mich. 212, 3 N.W .2d 71 (1942). See note 254 and text 
accompanying notes 252-54 supra. 
417. Watson v. School Dist., 324 Mich. 1, 36 N.W.2d 195 (1949). See text accom-
panying notes 255-57 supra. 
418. Penix v. City of St. Johns, 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958); Richards v. 
Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W .2d 643 (1957). See text accompanying 
notes 258-66 supra. 
419. A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a 
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public. 
llEsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF Ton.TS § 332(2) (1965). 
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for such unreasonable dangers as defective elevators, collapsing 
bleachers, and pitfalls in unlighted parking lots, without raising the 
specter of unlimited and unpredictable liability for injuries that 
might arise in remote corners of publicly owned land or that might 
be attributed to failures of public services or to high-risk activities, 
such as those of the police and fire departments. 
But the conservative approach was not the style of the time. In-
stead of deciding the case before it, the court plunged into a legis-
lative thicket from which it has not yet emerged. The plurality 
opinion in Williams, accepted by four of the eight members of the 
court, purported to hold that "[f]rom this date forward the judicial 
doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts no longer 
exists in Michigan."420 The intent of these justices was that the rul-
ing should apply to all governmental entities, including the state, 
and should govern the Williams case itself, although not other cases 
arising from incidents that had occurred prior to the date of the 
decision; but the ruling gained whatever precedential effect it was 
ultimately to be accorded only from the additional support it re-
ceived from Justice Black, who limited his concurrence to the wholly 
prospective abolition of the defense and that only in so far as it ap-
plied to claims against municipal corporations.421 Since he did not 
support the application of the new ruling to the instant case, the trial 
court's dismissal of the claim was affirmed. 
Justice Black's limitation on the scope of the ruling was nailed 
down three months later in McDowell v. State Highway Commis-
sioner,422 an action against the commissioner, the highway depart-
ment, and the state, for injuries that arose from an automobile 
accident allegedly caused by defects in a state highway. A majority 
of the court distinguished between the immunity rule applicable to 
municipal corporations, which, it said, had been overruled by Wil-
liams, and the rule of sovereign immunity applicable to the state, 
which, it was held, continued to exist by virtue of the legislature's 
1945 decision to repeal the general waiver of immunity that had 
been incorporated in 1943 in the Court of Claims Act.428 The major-
ity thought it had no power to overturn this legislative choice, a 
belief that is rather curious, since the only surviving legislative ex-
pression on the subject was a law that deprived the state of its gov-
ernmental-function defense in actions arising from the negligent 
420. 364 Mich. at 250, Ill N.W.2d at 20. 
421. 364 Mich. at 271,111 N.W.2d at 10. 
422. 365 Mich, 268, 112 N.W.2d 491 (1961). 
423. 365 Mich. at 270-71, 112 N.W .2d at 492. 
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operation by state employees of state-owned vehicles and aircraft 
but said nothing about what the rule should be' in other cases. 
While they concurred in the decision on the ground that the acci-
dent in question had occurred prior to the date of the Williams 
decision, Justices Edwards and Souris vigorously rejected the distinc-
tion between municipal corporations and the state.424 That disagree-
ment became a dissent by Justice Souris in Sayers v. School District 
No. 1, Fractional,425 an action arising out of a playground injury, 
wherein a majority of the court upheld the immunity defense. The 
rationale offered by a plurality opinion was that under Michigan 
decisions "the school district as an agency of the State has been 
clothed with the State's immunity from liability."426 Consequently, 
the school district's immunity was, under McDowell reasoning, also 
beyond the court's power of revision. A sense of deja vu at this point 
is understandable. The immunity rationale was identical to the 
theory that produced the governmental-function defense in the first 
place. 
Another step down this slope was taken in Lewis v. Genesee 
Count:y,427 wherein the reasoning was applied to a claim against a 
county and its board of welfare for injuries sustained by a patient 
in a county hospital. The board had been established pursuant to a 
general statute that subjected it to supervision by the state depart-
ment of welfare in the administration of certain programs. The 
court held: "It clearly appearing that the defendants in the perform-
ance of the functions involved in the instant case were acting as 
State agencies, they were entitled to claim immunity from liability 
based-on alleged negligence of employees."428 
At this point it might have appeared that the determination ex-
pressed in Williams was rapidly slipping away, since it had encoun-
tered rebuffs in all subsequent cases. It was, however, reaffirmed in 
so far as cities were concerned in Sherbutte v. City of Marine City.429 
The issue in that case was whether the city might properly be joined 
as defendant in an action against a city policeman for excessive force 
in making an arrest. The answer depended upon the court's inter-
424. 365 Mich. at 271-73, 112 N.W.2d at 493. 
425. 366 Mich. 217,114 N.W.2d 191 (1962). 
426. 366 Mich. at 219, 114 N.W.2d at 192, citing Whitehead v. Board of Educ., 139 
Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905); Daniels v. Board of Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 
23 (1916); Richards v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957) 
(emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 206-09, 258-65 & 299-300 supra. 
427. 370 Mich 110, 121 N.W.2d417 (1963). 
428. 370 Mich. at 114, 121 N.W.2d at 419. 
429. 374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964). 
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pretation, in the light of Williams, of a pre-Williams statute430 that 
permitted the city to indemnify a police officer for any judgment 
recovered against him based on a claim of tort committed in the per-
formance of his duties but barred the joinder of the city as defend-
ant in any such action. A bare majority of the court was able to 
agree that Williams had eliminated any immunity that the city 
would formerly have enjoyed in such a case and that the reason for 
the joinder prohibition had therefore disappeared.431 The case was 
remanded for reinstatement of the city as a defendant. 
Thereafter the court descended into chaos. The question of a 
county's liability on a claim arising from its operation of a hospital 
was raised again in Myers v. Genesee County Auditor.432 A summary 
judgment favorable to the defendant was reversed, and the case was 
remanded for further proceedings, although no more than two jus-
tices were in agreement on any single rationale. Justice O'Hara, 
·with Chief Justice Kavanagh's concurrence, asserted that, until 
Myers, the state and its agencies had been absolutely immune from 
tort liability, with only statutory. exceptions; that subdivisions of 
government other than incorporated cities were immune when per-
forming governmental, but not proprietary, functions; and that 
"municipal corporations" (by which he meant incorporated cities) 
were without immunity.433 He could see no reason, however, in a 
distinction between cities, on the one hand, and counties, townships, 
and villages, on the other. The county might be differentiated his-
torically, but it was a body corporate under the constitution, and 
there was no real difference between a "body corporate" and a 
"municipal corporation."434 He noted also that the legislature had 
recently sought to provide a uniform rule for all governmental en-
tities and concluded that this purpose would be served if the court 
eliminated the distinction benveen cities and other local units even 
before the law went into effect.435 He therefore asserted that the rule 
of Williams was extended to "all political subdivisions of govern-
ment."436 The state and its departments, commissions, boards, insti-
tutions, arms, and agencies remained unaffected. The change would 
430. Act of May 24, 1951, No. 59, [1951] Mich. Pub.&: Loe. Acts 78. 
431. 374 Mich. at 53, 130 N .W .2d at 922. 
432. 375 Mich. I, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965). 
433. 375 Mich. at 8-9, 133 N.W.2d at 192. 
434. 375 Mich. at 9-10, 133 N.W .2d at 193. 
435. 375 Mich. at 10, 133 N.W.2d at 193, citing Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, [1964] 
Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1401-.1415 
(1968), as amended, MICH. Co111P. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1404, .1406, .1407 (Supp. 19'73)). 
436. 375 Mich. at 11, 133 N.'W .2d at 193. 
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be effective for the instant case and for "pending and future cases."437 
Justice Souris, with Justice Adams• concurrence, asserted that the 
effect of the decision was to overrule Lewis and that he assumed that 
Williams had already abrogated the immunity rule for all municipal 
corporations-including incorporated villages, fourth-class cities, 
special charter cities, home rule cities, charter tmvnships, and school 
districts (though school districts should perhaps be stricken from the 
list by reason of Sayers).438 Justices Dethmers and Kelly dissented, 
still maintaining their disagreement with Williams.439 Justice Smith 
did not participate in the decision. Justice Black "concurred in the 
result," i.e., in the reversal and remand for further proceedings.440 
Keenan v. County of Midland,441 which arose out of a drmvning 
at a county beach, was before the court when Myers was decided 
and was therefore within the "pending and future cases" formula 
adopted by the O'Hara opinion. Four justices thought that the im-
munity defense was therefore not applicable, since in Myers a major-
ity of those sitting had, in effect, abrogated the immunity rule as to 
counties, "thus overruling Lewis," and had also held the abrogation 
applicable to pending cases.442 Justice Souris concurred in the plural-
ity's action, but disagreed with its reasoning to the extent that it 
found a precedent in the concurrence in Myers of less than a major-
ity of the entire court. His view was that Keenan for the first time 
put together a majority in favor of the abrogation of the immunity 
rule where counties were concerned.443 The significance of this fact, 
he thought, was "that, in addition to all pending cases, only those 
claims against counties for negligent injury which arose after the 
commencement of the three-year statutory limitational period pre-
ceding our decision today and prior to July l, 1965, the effective 
date of PA 1964, No. 170, rather than those which arose within the 
three-year period prior to our decision in Myers, in March of 1965, 
will be freed from the common-law defense of county immunity to 
actions for negligent injury, which defense we abrogate today by 
overruling Lewis."444 And the end was not yet. 
437. 375 Mich. at"ll, 133 N.W .2d at 193. 
438, 375 Mich. at 12-13, 133 N .W .2d at 194. 
439. 375 Mich. at 13,133 N.W.2d at 194. 
440. 375 Mich. at 12, 133 N.W .2d at 194. 
441. 377 Mich. 57, 138 N.W.2d 759 (1966). 
442. 377 Mich. at 60, 138 N.W .2d at 759-60. 
443. 377 Mich. at 61-65, 138 N.W.2d at 760-62. 
444. 377 Mich. at 65, 138 N.W .2d at 762. Query this reference to "pending" cases. 
The Keenan opinions carried no such qualification, and if Myers did not establish a 
precedent, presumably its assertion with respect to the cases affected by it was also 
a nullity. 
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Smith v. Ginther,445 a claim against a city and a volunteer fire-
man, arose out of a collision that involved the fireman, who was driv-
ing his own car to the scene of a fire. Four justices held that the case 
was controlled by Williams, Sherbutte, and Myers and that a claim 
was stated.446 Justice Brennan, in dissent, ·wrote a notable critique of 
the decisional techniques used by the court in these cases. He re-
minded the court of the limits upon its function and upon its ability 
to control future decisions, facts that have rarely been demonstrated 
more convincingly than in this sequence of cases. 
Appellate judges make law by creating useful precedents, Appel-
late judges do not have the power to legislate, they do not have the 
power to declare what the law ·will be in the future, nor by resolution 
to decide how various classes of cases will be treated in the future. 
The function of an appellate court, as the function of all courts, is 
to decide cases. When an appellate court has decided a particular 
case in a particular way, that decision constitutes a precedent. The 
judges or justices participating in the decision cannot declare that 
their decision will not be a precedent. Such a declaration would con-
stitute an attempted disavowal of the entire process of common-law 
jurisprudence. The distinction benveen what a court does and what 
it says must be kept clearly in mind if one is to read the reports of 
appellate courts ·with profit. 
The function of the court is to decide cases. It decides cases by 
applying the law to the facts. The rules which the court applies to 
the facts and which result in the decision are the applicable law. 
Rules of law which are not necessary to the decision are mere dicta 
and have no precedential value.447 
His assessment of the precedents was that Williams had made no 
change in the law since Justice Black's vote for affirmance, in effect, 
maintained the immunity rule in that case. The views expressed, 
that the rule should be changed prospectively, were mere dicta. The 
immunity rule, therefore, survived at least until Sherbutte, when 
six justices joined in an opinion that held that the city enjoyed no 
such defense.448 Justice Brennan felt that Sherbutte was wrongly de-
cided and should be overruled because it disregarded the explicit 
provisions of an unrepealed statute.449 He conceded, however, that if 
Williams, had not changed the law, Myers had, since in that case a 
majority of the justices had "applied the same rule of law to the 
445. 379 Mich. 208, 150 N.W .2d 798 (1967). 
446. 379 Mich. at 212, 150 N.W .2d at 799. 
447. 379 Mich. at 214-16, 150 N.W.2d at 800. 
448. 379 Mich. at 216-17, 150 N,W.2d at 801. 
449. 379 Mich. at 218-20, 150 N.W .2d at 802. 
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facts at hand, and the decision therefore constituted a precedent for 
the proposition that a county does not enjoy immunity."450 His con-
clusion was not affected by the differences in the reasons given or by 
Justice Black's limitation of his concurrence to "the result."461 He 
then noted 
that young Sharon Myers was already dead almost 7 months when 
Mr. Justice EnwARDs made his now famous fiat on the subject of 
immunity. It would appear that in September of 1961, not a single 
member of the Court would have granted Sharon's administratrix 
the relief the Court ultimately saw fit to give her. This aside is in-
cluded here to point out what we have already said about the limited 
function of an appellate court. Pronouncements about all future 
cases and pending cases, or all cases arising before or after the date 
of this or that opinion are, in the nature of things, meaningless 
poppycock. Each case will be decided when it gets to Court. It will 
be decided according to the best judgment of the Justices then sitting. 
It ·will be decided according to their view of and respect for the 
precedents which have been set.462 
None of the opinions in the case considered the interesting question 
whether, under normal agency principles, the city should be respon-
sible for the acts of a volunteer fireman driving his own car. 
B. The Legislature's Response 
In the midst of this confusion the legislature, in 1964, adopted 
Public Act No. 170.453 Effective July I, 1965, the Act preserved the 
existing statutory liabilities in highway and motor vehicle cases; 
accepted liability for negligence in regard to dangerous or defective 
conditions of public buildings held open for public use; extended 
these liabilities uniformly to all units, including the state and its 
agencies; accepted liability for the state and its agencies when en-
gaged in the performance of a proprietary function, as defined in 
the statute, and, for the first time, affirmatively claimed the benefit 
of the immunity principle by restoring the governmental-function 
defense in all other cases for all governmental units. The immunity 
provision was set forth in section 7 of the statute: 
Except as in this act othenvise provided, all governmental agencies 
shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein said govern-
ment agency is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a govem-
450. 379 Mich. at 221, 150 N.W .2d at 803. 
451. See 379 Mich. at 217-18, 150 N.W.2d at 801-02. 
452. 379 Mich. at 221, 150 N.W.2d at 803. 
453. Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221 (codified at 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1401-.1415 (1968), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 691.1404, .1406, .1407 (Supp.1973)). 
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mental function. Except as othenvise provided herein, this act shall 
not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the 
state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is 
hereby affirmed.454 
The statute was drafted by a special committee of the Michigan 
Association of Municipal Attorneys and lobbied through the legis-
lature with the strong backing of that association's parent organ-
ization, the Michigan Municipal League. One member of the special 
committee interpreted the legislative appeal of the proposed measure: 
In lobbying for this legislation, its proponents traded heavily on the 
paradoxical state of existing law which found the State and its 
agencies, including school districts, still enjoying the defense of gov-
ernmental immunity, while municipal corporations could no longer 
employ this defense. We sought to achieve legislation that would 
put all government on the same basis .... 
. . . This statute puts all agencies of government on the same footing 
with regard to tort liability. It is the feeling of those who were active 
in securing passage of this legislation that the problems concerning 
governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan have been 
settled for many years to come.455 
The prediction contained in the final sentence proved to be 
overly optimistic, for the assault upon the new statutory immunity 
was not long deferred. In Maki v. City of East Tawas,456 section 7 
was held unconstitutional because, while it purported to establish 
immunity from tort liability, the statute was entitled "An act to 
make uniform the liability of municipal corporations, political sub-
divisions, and the state, its agencies and departments, when engaged in 
a governmental function, for injuries to property and person caused 
by negligence."457 The discrepancy between "negligence" in the title 
and "torts" in the immunity provision led to a conclusion that the 
statute violated the constitutional prohibition that no law shall em-
brace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.4M 
Since the defect had already been corrected by amendment of the 
454. Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, § 7, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 223. With 
minor changes in phrasing the section is now continued in MICH. COMP, LAws ANN, 
§ 691.1407 (Supp.1973). 
455. Communication from City Attorney Allen G. Hertler, of Royal Oak, Mich,, 
reported in 28 NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REv. 463, 464 (1965). Another account of tile same 
effort appears in id. at 592. 
456. 385 Mich. 151, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971), more fully discussed in Cooperrider, 
Torts, 1971 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 503, 519-23 (1972). 
457. Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221 (cmpllasis 
added). · 
458. 385 Mich. at 159, 188 N.W .2d at 596. See MICH. CoNsr. art. 4, § 24. 
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title at the time of Maki's final disposition, the net effect of the deci-
sion seems to have been to suspend the operation of section 7 until 
August I, 1970, the effective date of the amendment.459 
In tvm other recent cases, Grubaugh v. City of St. ]ohns460 and 
Reich v. State Highway Department,461 a majority of the court 
seemed to be positioning itself for a ruling that the statutory im-
munity provision lies beyond the legislature's constitutional power, 
which would indeed be a switch from the dogma of the past. The 
liabilities recognized by the statute for defective highways and 
buildings are both conditioned upon a filing by the claimant, within 
a specified period after the accident, of a notice of the injury and 
defect that constitute the basis of the claim.462 In the case of the 
highway claim provision, this requirement is the descendant of 
similar provisions that appeared first in the special charters of munic-
ipal corporations,463 and later in statutes of more general applica-
tion.464 In 1915, with the expressed intent of establishing uniform 
procedures, the legislature added to the general highway statute a 
provision requiring notice of a claim to be filed within sixty days of 
the accident.465 
Notwithstanding the fact that the notice provision in question, 
which was pleaded by the city in defense to a claim based on the 
highway statute, had been enacted forty-six years before the plaintiff 
suffered his injury and had antecedents of even greater age, an opin-
ion in Grubaugh466 subscribed by three justices asserted that the 
provision was unconstitutional on the strange ground that the statute 
deprived the plaintiff of a "vested right" (the right "vested" on 
March 14, 1961; the statute was enacted in 1915) without due proc-
459. See Act of Aug. 1, 1970, No. 155, [1970] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts 496, amending 
MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 691.1401, .1407 (Supp. 1973); Kriger v. South Oakland 
County Mutual Aid Pact, 49 Mich. App. 7, 211 N.W.2d 228 (1973); Curry v. City of 
Detroit, 49 Mich. App. 240, 211 N.W.2d 559 (1973). 
460. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970). 
461. 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W .2d 700 (1972). 
462. MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 691.1404, .1406 (1968), as amended, MrcH. CoMP. 
LA.wsANN. §§ 691.1404, .1406 (Supp. 1973). 
463. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 454, 455, 69 N.W. 670, 670 
(1897); Springer v. City of Detroit, 102 Mich. 300, 302, 60 N.W. 688, 689 (1894); Dundas 
v. City of Lansing, 75 Mich. 499,500, 42 N.W. 1011, 1011 (1889). 
464. See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1895, No. 215, ch. XXII, [1895] Mich. Pub. Acts 441 
(codified at 1 MICH, COMP. LA.ws § 2775 (1897)) (incorporation of fourth-class cities). 
465. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 301, § 8, [1915) Mich. Pub. Acts 531 (codified at 1 
MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 4591 (1915); 2 MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 242.8 (1948)). 
466. Two other justices "concurred in the result,'' without explaining their concur-
rence. Chief Justice Brennan dissented. Justice Kelly did not participate. This case and 
its immediate background are more fully discussed in Cooperrider, supra note 456, at 
525-28. 
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ess of law.467 The justices cited as authority Minty v. Board of State 
Auditors,468 wherein the question was whether the repeal in 1945 of 
the 1943 waiver of sovereign immunity should be related back to 
destroy a claim that had arisen in the interim. The problem in 
Grubaugh arose from plaintiff's claim that physical and mental in-
capacitation caused by the accident, which he attributed to a defec-
tive street, prevented him from taking the action necessary to com-
ply with the statutory requirement within the term provided. In 
Reich the court extended the Grubaugh reasoning to cover claimants 
under disability by reason of minority, but also went on to hold 
the sixty-day notice provision469 generally invalid as a violation of 
equal protection.470 
The scope of the court's claims in these two cases can only be 
demonstrated by extensive quotation from the opinions. Apparently 
referring to the provision of the general highway statute that im-
posed on municipalities (but never on the state) liability for damage 
caused by unsafe highway conditions,471 Justice T. M. Kavanagh's 
opinion in Grubaugh asserts: 
The statute in question by waiving immunity from liability, puts 
the state and its municipalities upon the same legal footing and sub-
ject to the same substantive rules which are applied to any contro-
versy involving a negligent tortfeasor. 
The substantive right to proceed against the governmental tort-
feasor, as distinguished from merely procedural requirements, must 
arise under the same conditions and undiminished by any special 
exemption as any other comparable cause of action.472 
The opinion then refers to an earlier explication by the court of 
the reasons behind notice provisions of this variety-that they are 
designed " 'to furnish the municipal authorities promptly with 
notice that a claim for damages is made, and advise them of the time, 
place, nature, and result of the alleged accident, and a sufficient 
467. 384 Mich. at 175-76, 180 N.W .2d at 783-84. 
468. 336 Mich. 370, 58 N.W .2d 106 (1953). 
469. By this time the statute that was the subject of the Grubaugh opinion lmd 
been superseded by the provisions of the 1964 statute, so that the attack was now upon 
that statute. 
470. 386 Mich. at 623-24, 194 N.W .2d at 702. 
471. The provision dates from 1879. See Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, [1879] Mich. 
Pub. Acts 223. Neither in words nor in substance was it a "waiver of immunity." 
Rather it was the creation by the legislature of a statutory claim in a situation wherein 
the court had earlier held that none existed, not because of "immunity," but because 
the court thought no duty was owed by the municipality to individuals in regard to 
the condition of the public ways, either at common law or by statute. See text accom• 
panying notes 90-105 supra. 
472. 384 Mich. at 173-74, 180 N.W .2d at 783. 
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statement of the main facts, together with names of witnesses, to 
direct them to the sources of information so that they may con-
veniently make an investigation' "473-and proceeds to the following 
evaluation: 
Even if we assume the above original policy considerations were 
once valid, today they have lost their validity and ceased to exist due 
to changed circumstances. In recent years most governmental units 
and agencies have purchased liability insurance as authorized by 
statute. MCLA § 691.1409 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 3.996 [109]). In 
addition to insurance investigators, they have police departments and 
full-time attorneys at their disposal to promptly investigate the 
causes and effects of accidents occurring on streets and highways. As 
a result these units and agencies are better prepared to investigate 
and defend negligence suits than are most private tortfeasors to whom 
no special notice privileges have been granted by the legislature.474 
In Reich the important language in Justice Adams' opinion, this 
time subscribed by a majority of the court, is the following: 
The object of the legislation under consideration is to waive the 
immunity of governmental units and agencies from liability for in-
juries caused by their negligent conduct, thus putting them on an 
equal footing with private tortfeasors. However, the notice provisions 
of the statute arbitrarily split the natural class, i.e., all tort-feasors, 
into two differently treated subclasses: private tort-feasors to whom 
no notice of claim is owed and governmental tort-feasors to whom 
notice is owed. 
This diverse treatment of members of a class along the lines of 
governmental or private tort-feasors bears no reasonable relationship 
under today's circumstances to the recognized purpose of the act. It 
constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable variance in the treatment 
of both portions of one natural class and is, therefore, barred by the 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection. 
Just as the notice requirement by its operation divides the natural 
class of negligent tort-feasors, so too the natural class of victims of 
negligent conduct is also arbitrarily split into two subclasses: victims 
of governmental negligence who must meet the requirement, and 
victims of private negligence who are subject to no such require-
ment. Contrary to the legislature's intention to place victims of 
negligent conduct on equal footing, the notice requirement acts as 
a special statute of limitations which arbitrarily bars the actions of 
the victims of governmental negligence after only 60 days. The vic-
tims of private negligence are granted three years in which to bring 
their actions. See MCLA § 600.5805; (MSA 27A.5805). Such ar-
bitrary treatment clearly violates the equal protection guarantees of 
473. 384 Mich. at 175, 180 N.W.2d at 784. 
474. 384 Mich. at 176,180 N.W.2d at 784. 
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our state and Federal Constitutions. The notice provision is void and 
of no effect.475 
I find the argument advanced in these two cases astounding. It 
must be clear that the legislature had no intention whatever to "put 
governmental units on an equal footing with private tortfeasors"; 
such an intention is irreconcilable with the specific definition and 
circumscription of the liabilities recognized by the statute. More-
over, there are real and vital differences between the situations of 
governmental units and of private parties as potential tort defend-
ants. The legislature's appreciation of one such difference is evi-
denced by the fact that it did not incorporate a notice-of-claim re-
quirement such as that contained in the highway and building 
claims sections in that section of the statute relating to motor vehicle 
claims.476 There the governmental defendant is on a substantial par 
with other vehicle owners and operators, but no private party has a 
tort responsibility comparable to the governmental unit's respon-
sibility for injuries allegedly caused by defective or unsafe conditions 
of highways. The confidence expressed in the ability of the modern 
municipality to protect its own litigational interests may be justifi-
able so long as the municipality becomes aware in some fashion of 
the potential claim, or of the condition from which it arises, in time 
for an effective investigation, but if there is no requirement of 
notification at any time prior to the filing of suit, the unit's efforts 
to uncover the facts relating to that condition as of the time of the 
accident may be fruitless. Taking into account the extent of the 
governmental unit's liability exposure where public ways and public 
buildings are concerned, and of the difficulties of keeping in current 
touch with all those conditions that might become a source of lia-
bility, surely there is nothing constitutionally unreasonable about a 
notice requirement that is not applicable to other tortfeasors and 
other claimants. It may be conceded that the notice provisions as 
enacted-those originally contained in Public Act No. 170, as well as 
those that antedated it-were too simplistic and therefore unduly 
harsh in their application to some situations. This harshness may in 
some part be attributed, in turn, to the rigorous construction that 
the court gave them prior to its sudden conversion to the view that 
they are wholly unconstitutional. That rigor was perhaps not in-
eluctable; at least Justice Souris was able to suggest an alternative 
construction that would have avoided the harshness of the situation 
475. 386 Mich. at 623-24, 194 N.W .2d at 702. 
476. See MICH, COMP. LAws ANN,§ 691.1405 (1968), 
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to which Grubaugh was addressed.477 If, because the court from time 
to time is transfixed by the plain-meaning rule, construction could 
not be used to smooth do·wn the rough edges, a determination that 
the notice provision is unreasonable when strictly applied to persons 
under disability in a situation where the defendant has suffered no 
prejudice would have been a tolerable outcome.478 But the ruling 
that the legislature is constitutionally deprived of power to enact, 
for cases involving governmental liabilities in the area subsumed 
under the rubric "tort," substantive rules different from those that 
apply to other tortfeasors is a startling curb on the lawmaking 
powers of the legislature. Moreover, if maintained, it is likely to 
make the entire problem of governmental tort responsibility un-
manageable, for it is a problem that does require special rules.479 
The only question is whether it will be the legislature or the court 
that makes those rules. 
Justice Adams concluded his opinion in Reich with a pause-
giving footnote that may be a clue to the source of his reasoning: 
"For a recent case in which the entire doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was overruled as in violation of the equal protection provi-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, see Krause v. Ohio (1971), 28 Ohio App 2d I; 274 NE2d 321 
(1971)."48° Krause was a wrongful death action arising out of the 
Kent State incident. The intermediate appellate court, in the 
opinion cited by Justice Adams, rejected the state's sovereign im-
munity defense and stated one of the issues as follows: "The under-
lying contention in the appellant's proposition of law has two 
branches; first the doctrine of sovereign immunity violates equal 
protection of law because it establishes nvo categories of claimants, 
those offended by state action and those offended by private action, 
with different protections but ·without a foundation in reasonable-
477. See Trbovich v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 79, 95-109, 142 N.W .2d 696, '101-08 
(1966) (Souris, J., dissenting). 
478. Moreover, the legislature was not unresponsive to these problems. Before 
Grubaugh was finally disposed of, the statute had already been amended to extend 
to 120 days (180 days in the case of minors) the period during which notice could be 
filed in highway claims, and to provide a grace period of 180 days after termination 
of the disability for persons physically or mentally incapable of giving notice. Act of 
Aug. 1, 1970, No. 155, [19'10] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts 496, amending MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN.§ 691.1404 (Supp. 19'13). 
479. Indeed, the exhaustive study made by the California Law Revision Commission 
in 1963 is in large part an effort to spell out the differences between the problems of 
governmental and private tort liability, and to develop intelligent solutions to the 
questions that those differences pose. See 5 CAL. LAW REvlsION COMMN., REPORTS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 267-332 (1963), 
480. 386 Mich. at 624 n.3, 194 N .W .2d at 702 n.3. 
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ness."481 That decision, however, was reversed by the Ohio supreme 
court, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was 
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.482 
It is interesting in this connection to recall that in his opinion in 
Williams even Justice Edwards said: 
There is, of course, no doubt of legislative authority to act in this 
area. The Michigan legislature may, if it sees fit to do so, reinstitute 
governmental tort immunity by statute. Or, as it has already done in 
some instances, it may specify the terms and conditions of suit, Our 
holding in this case does not affect any existing statute in the field 
concerned, or imply any limitation on legislative power to act where 
to date it has not acted.483 
It may also be recalled that in McDowell,484 Attorney General 
(later Justice) Adams' brief was quoted for the following proposition 
in the opinion that excluded the state's sovereign immunity defense 
from the fate suffered by the city's governmental-function defense 
in Williams: 
"[I]he doctrine of sovereign immunity which presently exists in 
Michigan is not the archaic, obsolete, "king can do ·wrong" edition of 
1066, but consists of a pattern of deliberate legislative choices which 
achieved its present form, so far as the State itself is concerned, by 
the enactment of PA 1945, No 87, and the amendment thereof by 
PA 1960, No 33. Since PA 1960, No 33, took effect after the events 
which gave rise to these actions, that act cannot serve to establish or 
abolish rights with respect to appellants herein. However, the fact 
that the legislature amends a statute in 1960 does show that the legis-
lature is giving continuing consideration to, and acting with respect 
to, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. I£ the express reestablish-
ments [sic] of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by the legislature in 
1945 is obsolete, illogical, harsh, cruel, et cetera, then the legislature 
should be called upon to modify or abolish the doctrine. 
So far as the State itself is concerned, the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity as it presently exists in Michigan is a creature of the 
legislature."485 
In that opinion Justice Black, for the court, after quoting the above 
passage from the Attorney General's brief, added that "[t]he 
judiciary has no right or power to repeal statutes. As said by the 
481. 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 2-3, 274 N.E.2d 321, 322 (1971), revd., 31 Ohio St. 2d 32, 
285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). 
482. Kraus v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 32, 285 N.E,2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 
1052 (1972). 
483. 364 Mich. at 260-61, Ill N.W .2d at 25. 
484. See text accompanying notes 422-24 supra. 
485. 365 Mich. at 270-71, 112 N.W .2d at 492, quoting Brief for Defendants. 
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attorney general, the legislature has willed that the present defend-
ants be and remain immune from liability for torts such as these 
plaintiffs have alleged. There they must stand, legally, until the 
legislature wills to the contrary."486 
The contrast between these expressions in 1961 and the positions 
asserted in Grubaugh and Reich is some measure, not only of the 
court's current trespass upon the legislature's domain, but also of 
the low estate to which its own pronouncements of even the recent 
past have fallen. 
C. Further Evolution of Categorical Liabilities 
Pending the resolution of any questions that may remain con-
cerning the validity of the 1964 statute, the scope of the govern-
mental-function defense continues to be contracted through a cor-
responding expansion of the liabilities recognized by the statute, an 
expansion to some extent along lines foreshadowed by earlier cases. 
It was established as early as 1889487 that the municipality's respon-
sibility under the highway statute was not limited to repair and 
maintenance of the road surface but extended also to negligent 
failure to remove obstructions and other hazardous road conditions 
created by others. In Rufner v. City of Traverse City488 and Cabana 
v. City of Hart,489 liability was recognized for deaths of persons in 
the street caused, respectively, by the fall of a rotten street light pole 
and by electrocution through contact with a metal street lamp post 
that was not properly grounded. Then, in Mechay v. City of 
Detroit,490 it was held that a painter, working under contract with 
the city, was entitled to recover under the statute for injuries re-
ceived when the street light pole on which he was working broke 
and threw him to the ground. The city argued that its statutory duty 
"to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe 
and convenient for public travel, all public highways, streets, etc." 
extended only to travelers and was therefore of no avail to a person 
in the plaintiff's position,491 but the court held that this provision 
related to the standard of care and did not delimit the persons to 
whom the duty was owed.492 The cause of action was created by 
486. 365 Mich. at 271, 112 N .W .2d at 492-93. 
487. Joslyn v. City of Detroit, 74 Mich. 458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889), discussed in text 
accompanying notes 130-34 supra. 
488. 296 Mich. 204,295 N.W. 620 (1941). 
489. 327 Mich. 287, 42 N.W .2d 97 (1950). 
490. 364 Mich. 576, 111 N.W .2d 820 (1961). 
491. 364 Mich. at 578, 111 N.W.2d at 821. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 242.3 (1948). 
492. 364 Mich. at 578-79, 111 N.W.2d at 821-22. 
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other language that provided that "[a]ny person or persons sus-
taining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets of 
this state by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or 
streets •.• in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe for 
travel" is entitled to recover damages from the responsible unit.498 
Since the defective pole made the street unsafe for travel, plaintiff 
was entitled to recover even though he was not using the street for 
travel at the time of the injury. 
In Miller v. Oakland County Road Commission,404 the court of 
appeals recently reversed a summary judgment dismissing a claim 
against the county for injury suffered by plaintiff when a dead elm 
tree fell on the truck that she was driving on a county road. The 
complaint alleged that the road commission had been warned that 
trees were a hazard to the road in question and had negligently 
failed in its statutory duty to protect the safety of the highway. The 
defense was based on a clause in the statute that provided that "[t]he 
duty of .•• the county road commissions to ... maintain highways, 
and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the portion of the high-
way designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, 
crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion 
of the highway designed for vehicular travel"490 and on the observa-
tion that the complaint did not identify the location of the tree 
prior to its fall. The court thought this omission irrelevant: "Plain-
tiff alleged that the tree was alongside Andersonville Road, that de-
fendants were advised that it constituted a potential hazard, and 
that the tree ultimately fell on plaintiff and her truck as she was 
traveling on Andersonville Road. These facts are sufficient to allege 
a cause of action in negligence. "496 
As presently interpreted, therefore, the statute provides a basis 
of liability toward persons on the highway at the time of injury, 
which may arise not only from travel risks as such, buf also from 
collateral hazards. In other words, it may not be too much to say that 
the governmental unit's highway liability has become a species of 
premises liability. 
There are also signs that the statutory liability for defective 
public buildings will be maximized. By a per curiam opinion in 
Green v. Department of Corrections491 that provision was applied to 
493, MICH, COMP. LAWS§ 242.1 (1948), 
494. 43 Mich. App. 215, 204 N.W .2d 141 (1972). 
495. MICH, COMP, LAws ANN. § 691.1402 (1968). 
496. 43 Mich. App. at 219, 204 N.W .2d at 144. 
497. 386 Mich. 459,192 N.W.2d 491 (1971). 
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permit recovery against the state by an inmate of the Detroit House 
of Correction for the loss of a finger attributed to the absence of 
proper safety devices on a planing machine in the prison shop. The 
court's theory was that, since the machine was permanently attached, 
it was a fixture and therefore a part of the building.498 The rele-
vant statutory language is "[g]overnmental agencies have the obliga-
tion to repair and maintain public buildings under their control 
when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies 
are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a 
dangerous or defective condition of a public building ..• ,"499 The 
attorney general's contention that the situation was not within the 
intent of the statute because the prison was not a building held open 
to the public at large was rejected. Thus, an area of liability that 
had been excluded even by the short-lived general waiver of immu-
nity adopted in 1943500 was opened. If, as the reasoning adopted by 
the supreme court has it, the statutory term "public building" means 
any "building owned by a public body," and the clause "open for 
use by members of the public" includes prison buildings occupied 
by prisoners because they too are "member[ s] of the public com-
munity, whether in or out of jail,''501 it is difficult to conclude that 
any publicly owned building, no matter how restricted the entry 
may be, will be excluded. 
The future application of the proprietary-function category was 
made somewhat uncertain by the 1964 statute. Drafted under the 
apparent assumption that the state and its agencies enjoyed a total 
sovereign immunity from tort liability and were never subject, as 
were municipalities, to the proprietary-function exception, section 
13 of the statute waived the state's immunity from liability for dam-
age "arising out of the performance of a proprietary function."502 
That term was given an explicit definition applicable to the state 
(including the state's "agencies, departments, and commissions ... 
and every public university and college of the state")503 but not to 
other governmental agencies. That definition-"any activity which 
498, Cf. Cody v. Southfield-Lathrup School Dist., 25 Mich. App. 33, 181 N.W.2d 81 
(1970), wherein the court of appeals rejected a claim for injury to a school child on a 
trampoline in the school gymnasium, because the trampoline was not attached. 
499. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1406 (1968), as amended, M1CH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 691.1406 (Supp. 1973). 
500. Among three specific exclusions in that statute was "any claim for injury to or 
death of a prisoner." Act of April 21, 1943, No. 237, [1943] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts 
392. See text accompanying note 398 supra. 
501. 386 Mich. at 464, 192 N.W .2d at 493. 
502. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1413 (1968). 
503, MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1401 (1968). 
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is conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary 
profit for the state, excluding, however, any activity normally sup-
ported by taxes or fees"504-with its emphasis on a profit-making 
primary purpose, appears to have been drafted with the intent of 
confining the state's exposure narrowly. Whether it will have that 
effect seems doubtful; indeed, it may turn out to have two edges. 
Bofysil v. Department of State Highways505 was a claim £or injury 
suffered by a teenager who struck his head on an undenvater ob-
struction when he dived into a lake created by the accumulation of 
water in an excavation that had been made by the highway depart-
ment for the purpose of obtaining sand and gravel for a highway 
construction project. The lake was an intended consequence of the 
excavation, so that the parcel on which it was located would be more 
salable after it had served its highway purpose, and the parcel was 
in fact sold at a profit subsequent to the accident. The department 
had been aware that the bottom of the excavation was irregular, and 
that people had been swimming in the lake, but it had failed to post 
warnings or take other precautions. The accident occurred prior to 
the enactment of the 1964 statute, but the court of appeals held that 
the state was subject to liability for negligence in the performance 
of a proprietary function according to the law in existence prior to 
the statute.606 This was a question that had never been settled, and 
the court's position was supported only by dicta, particularly from 
cases that discussed the liabilities of school districts, which have, of 
course, repeatedly been described as "state agencies" and therefore 
identified with the state's immunity. It was necessary £or the court 
to disregard dicta in some of the post-Williams opinions that had 
described the state's sovereign immunity as total, subject only to 
statutory exception.607 Nevertheless, these latter expressions were 
not themselves well-reasoned, and the snub they received was per-
haps deserved. 
There remained the question of whether the highway depart-
ment's activity in Bofysil was, in fact, proprietary. The court's an-
swer was that, although highway construction is clearly governmen-
tal, "it is equally clear that a state agency may be engaged in a pro-
prietary function at the same time it is engaged in a governmental 
504. M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1413 (1968). 
505. 44 Mich, App. 118, 205 N.W .2d 222 (1972), leave to appeal denied, 389 Mich. 
768 (1973). 
506. 44 Mich. App. at 128-29, 205 N.W.2d at 229, 
507. See, e.g., Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, discusssed in text accompanying 
notes 432-40 supra. 
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function. When such a dual use of property is in evidence, the pro-
prietary function must be separated from the governmental func-
tion and the governmental agency loses its immunity as to the 
proprietary use."608 When it created the lake to make the land salable 
and then sold it at a profit, the highway department was engaged 
in an activity not different from that of any business improving land 
to make a profit. It would seem that the statutory definition of pro-
prietary function would in no way interfere with this conclusion, 
since it does not preclude the analysis of governmental operations 
for the purpose of finding among the fragments a profit-making 
activity. Carried as far as it will go, this technique may change many 
of the answers that were reached in the past. For instance, would 
not the school football games in Watson and Richards clearly fall 
within the proprietary category today?509 If so, the statutory reincar-
nation of the governmental function is less robust than its case law 
progenitor. 
The 1964 statute does not mention the nuisance-trespass theory 
of liability and that silence is a source of some difficulty. The first 
sentence of section 7 of the statute51O negates tort liability on the 
part of any governmental agency engaged in the exercise or discharge 
of a governmental function, unless the statute itself provides other-
wise. As the statute contains no language preserving the nuisance-
trespass basis of claim, a literal reading would lead to the conclusion 
that it had been abolished. In historical context, however, the exist-
ence of such a legislative intent seems scarcely credible. The Michi-
gan court has recognized this head of liability from the very begin-
ning. It seemed so obvious to the nineteenth-century court that it 
was practically taken for granted, and it antedates the governmental-
function defense by decades. It reflects one of the strongest claims 
for relief that can be asserted, for it is built around the paradigm of 
damage that is the direct and intentional consequence of the munic-
508, 44 Mich. App. at 130,205 N.W.2d at 229, citing Carlisi v. Marysville, 373 Mich. 
198, 128 N.W.2d 477 (1964); Munson v. Menominee County, 371 Mich. 504, 124 N.W.2d 
246 (1963); Dohm v. Acme Twp., 354 Mich. 447, 93 N.W.2d 323 (1958). See text accom-
panying notes 277-85 supra. 
509. See Richards v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957); 
Watson v. School Dist., 324 Mich. I, 36 N.W.2d 195 (1949); text accompanying notes 
255-65 supra. But see Smith v. Board of Commrs., 49 Mich. App. 280, 212 N.W .2d 32 
(1973), holding a metropolitan park authority immune from liability for injury arising 
from its operation of the "Island Queen," a sightseeing boat, on a lake within the park, 
on the ground that, although a nominal fee was charged for excursion rides, the 
"Queen" had not turned a profit in the four years preceding the accident. Cf. Matthews 
v. City of Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939), discussed in text accompanying 
notes 246-48 supra. 
510. See text accompanying note 454 supra. 
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ipality's act, with principles of unjust enrichment also frequently 
relevant. There is nothing in their public expressions to indicate 
that those who drafted the statute had any such change in mind; 
indeed, one of them summed the statute up in these terms: "The net 
effect of Act 170, 1964, is to largely return to municipal corpora-
tions the position they enjoyed prior to the decision of the Williams 
case."511 This is surely a situation where the legislature should be 
expected to express an intent to make an important change in the 
law in words incapable of being misunderstood, rather than relying 
upon implication. On this basis the sentence can justifiably be con-
strued to avoid the consequence that the words, in the abstract, seem 
to suggest. The term governmental function has no clear and indis-
putable core of meaning. It is a term of art, definable only by refer-
ence to the instances to which it has been applied. It has never been 
applied by the Michigan court to protect any governmental agency 
against liability in a situation recognized to be within the nuisance-
trespass category. This sentence, I submit, should be seen as a restora-
tion of the governmental-function defense as it existed in the case 
law, alongside the nuisance-trespass head of liability. 
But what then of the second sentence in section 7, which pro-
hibits any construction of the statute that would reduce the immu-
nity from tort liability enjoyed by the state, except as provided in 
the statute itself? No Michigan case prior to the enactment of the 
statute had directly held the state subject to liability under the 
nuisance-trespass heading. Such a holding may have been intended 
in Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. State,612 which was decided 
in 1970 but related to an occurrence prior to the enactment, but the 
obscurity of the reasoning in that case and the apparent felt neces-
sity to redescribe the fire-hazard nuisance as a "taking of private 
property for public use" leaves its significance uncertain. As has been 
noted,513 dicta in post-Williams opinions have asserted that the 
state's sovereign immunity has no exceptions other than those 
created by statute. On the other hand, there is evidence that the 
nineteenth-century court assumed that the nuisance-trespass situation 
was an appropriate basis of claim against the state, 614 although no 
511. 28 NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REv. 464 (1965). See also discussion in text accom-
panying note 455 supra. 
512. 383 Mich. 630, 178 N.W.2d 476 (1970). See text accompanying notes 340-45 
supra. 
513. See text accompanying notes 433 8: 507 supra. 
514. See text accompanying note 59 supra, quoting Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo, 
24 Mich. 383, 385-86 (1872). See also Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 301 (1877); 
Herro v. Chippewa County Rd. Commrs., 368 Mich. 263, 272, 118 N.W.2d 271, 275 
(1962). 
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judicial jurisdiction existed ·within which such a claim could be 
entertained.515 For the latter reason, the question could not be raised 
in court until after the adoption of the Court of Claims Act in 1939. 
As the court of appeals points out in Bofysil, the cases decided im-
mediately thereafter, which denied to that legislation the effect of a 
waiver of the state's sovereign immunity to tort liability, assumed 
that immunity existed "when the sovereign is engaged in a govern-
mental function."516 If the analysis that in Michigan the nuisance-
trespass claim is older than and not subject to the governmental-
function defense is valid, nothing in Michigan law would require 
a decision that the state was not subject to such claims prior to the 
effective date of the 1964 statute. This conclusion is bolstered by the 
fact that it has been clear ever since 1899 that the claim is good 
against boards of education, 517 notwithstanding the contemporaneous 
identification of such units, as "agencies of the state," with the state's 
immunity.518 Finally, the apparent legislative intent in 1964 to create 
uniformity of liability and immunity among all governmental units 
argues in favor of a construction of section 7 that would bring the 
state's liabilities into line with those of other units, if this objective 
can be achieved ·without violence to the language of the statute. I 
am persuaded that such a construction is possible and historically 
valid, and that it would preserve the traditional nuisance-trespass 
category as a viable basis of claim against all governmental units. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The system described above leaves something to be desired, but 
it is a reasonable base from which to work. Given its consolidation 
in statutory form, the time may be ripe for an attempt to sharpen 
some of the terms, for there is no doubt that indefinition has been 
an impediment to progress. Since the turn of the century the court 
has viewed the scene always in its negative rather than its positive 
515. See text accompanying notes 353-65 supra. 
516. 44 Mich. App. at 125-26, 205 N.W.2d at 227, quoting Manion v. State Highway 
Commr., 303 Mich. 1, 19, 5 N.W.2d 527, 528 (1942) (emphasis added). See also Mead v. 
Public Serv. Comm., 303 Mich. 168, 171, 5 N.W.2d 740, 740-41 (1942). 
517. See, e.g., Ferris v. Board of Educ., 122 Mich. 315, 81 N.W. 98 (1899); Whitehead 
v. Board of Educ., 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905) (dicta); Daniels v. Board of 
Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 230 (1916) (dicta); McDonnell v. Brozo, 285 Mich. 38, 
280 N.W. 100 (1938) (dicta); Pound v. School Dist., 372 Mich. 499, 127 N.W.2d 390 
(1964). 
518. Attorney General, ex rel. Kies, v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289 (1902); 
Sayers v. School Dist. No. 1, Fractional, discussed in text accompanying note 425 supra; 
Bofysil v. Dept. of State Hwys., discussed in text accompanying notes 505-08 supra; 
authorities cited in note 517 supra. 
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aspect, choosing invariably to discuss the government's immunity 
rather than its responsibility. That habit was the product of a con-
ceptualism that posited immunity as an attribute of sovereignty, 
part of the nature of things and the norm to which responsibility 
was always an exception. Accuracy of perception would be advanced 
if the habit were now abandoned, for the conceptualism has been 
destroyed by intervening criticism, and, in reality, immunity no 
longer dominates the scene. Rather, in respect to harmful activities 
of its officers and employees, government has a liability equivalent 
to that of nongovernmental entities for harms that are proximate 
consequences of motor vehicle operation, of proprietary activities 
generally, and of intrusions that are intended or highly probable 
consequences of government action; toward outsiders, for injury 
causally related to conditions of premises, government has sub-
stantially the liability of a nongovernmental occupier in respect to 
public buildings, premises devoted primarily to a proprietary use, 
and secondary proprietary uses of premises devoted primarily to a 
governmental function; and toward persons using the public ways, 
not necessarily for travel, government also has a species of premises 
liability. 
While the 1964 statute retains the term "immunity" in respect to 
"all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise 
or discharge of a governmental function," those terms are of judicial 
origin and presumably subject to judicial refinement, for the statute 
makes no attempt at definition. "Immunity," no longer a logical 
necessity, has become a policy question, and "governmental func-
tion" may properly be understood as a designation for situations 
where the government should be able to act or to remain passive 
without compensating citizens adversely affected by the decision-
a species of privilege extending to those instances where there are 
sound policy reasons for nonliability despite the existence of cir-
cumstances that would subject a nongovernmental defendant to 
liability. 
The word "function" has been used in a departmental sense: 
The "function" that is characterized as "governmental" usually en-
compasses all the activities of the police and fire departments, road-
building, parks, and schools, except to the extent that a department 
has involved itself in an isolated profit-making action. Moreover, it 
has been assumed that if the function is not "proprietary," it must 
necessarily be "governmental." Neither usage appears necessary. The 
search now is for reasons why a particular act or omission that would 
cast liability upon another entity should not have that effect if a 
governmental unit is the defendant. It would seem that the answer 
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should be found in the nature of the act or omission, rather than in 
the over-all public or governmental objectives of the department by 
which the actor is employed, for, as Justice Edwards pointed out in 
Richards v. Birmingham School District,519 in one sense all func-
tions performed by governmental units are "governmental." He 
went on to say that some are more proprietary than others. He might 
have said that some are more governmental than others, for this 
today is the characterization that needs justification. It would seem 
appropriate, then, to focus upon the particular employment rather 
than upon the departmental purpose and, within that focus, to 
reverse the traditional presumption that a function is governmental 
unless some excuse can be found for calling it proprietary, adopting 
in its place the approach that a function is not governmental for the 
purpose of the privilege unless the activities that it entails are unique-
ly associated with governmental enterprise and circumstantially 
different from those carried on by nongovernmental actors, or un-
less liability would be an unacceptable interference with govern-
ment's ability to govern. 
The principal argument against the immunity doctrine is that 
government, like enterprise, should pay its way; that the special 
burdens created by the miscarriage of governmental activities should 
be borne by the community rather than by the unfortunate individ-
uals upon whom those burdens fall. That principle argues most 
strongly for liability in situations where harm is caused by the 
affirmative actions of government officers and employees. Such lia-
bility exists where the act in question is the operation of a govern-
ment vehicle, a "direct trespass," part of a proprietary enterprise, or 
when it creates a dangerous and injurious condition in a public way 
or building. On the other hand, the governn;iental-function defense 
negates liability for harms caused by law enforcement and by pro-
tective actions of employees such as policemen, firemen, inspectors, 
and custodial employees, who are by law compelled to act directly 
upon persons and property, overcoming resistance if necessary. Mis-
takes are an inevitable consequence of such activity, and it may he 
that resultant losses should, to some extent, be absorbed by the com-
munity, but the problems of separating instances where compensa-
tion would be appropriate from those in which it would not is com-
plex, and it is difficult to see how, with any fidelity to language, it 
could be held that these employments are anything but govern-
mental. I would suppose, therefore, that if there is to be liability in 
this area it should come through legislation, wherein the criteria and 
the limits can be specified, and the basic policy questions resolved 
519. 348 Mich. 490,521, 83 N.W.2d 643,659 (1957) (dissenting opinion). 
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in the appropriate forum. The defense, as presently understood, also 
covers the acts of such employees as construction, maintenance, and 
sanitation workers and medical and administrative personnel, the 
nature and circumstances of whose activities are not materially 
affected by the fact that they work for a governmental employer. 
Here the argument for nonliability of the unit is at its weakest. 
There is nothing peculiarly governmental about the activities of a 
doctor employed on the staff of a public, rather than a private, hos-
pital, nor about the activities of a worker employed on a street proj-
ect, rather than on building a private driveway for a private em-
ployer. Employments such as these might well be deemed not to be 
governmental in character for the purpose of determining the ap-
plicability of the defense. 
The defense, by exempting the governmental occupier of pre-
mises from liability in cases of injury causally relatable to conditions 
of premises not devoted to a proprietary use (other than public ways 
and buildings), covers a wide range of situations. On one hand, 
premises, such as playgrounds, compact urban parks, and premises 
surrounding school and government buildings, may be developed in 
contemplation of intensive public use. In respect to such premises 
the governmental occupier is in much the same position as nongov-
ernmental occupiers: The public is actively encouraged, or perhaps 
even required, to enter. Remembrance of some of the past cases in-
volving school premises and parks520 suggests the need for a liability 
principle. Problems of inspection and maintenance seem manage-
able, considerably more so, indeed, than in the case of public ways, 
for which responsibility already exists. The decisions that must be 
made by judge and jury in order to determine whether reasonable 
procedures have been followed in this respect do not excessively in-
trude into the area of policy-making that belongs to other officials. 
I would suggest that the "function" here is the provision of facilities 
for frequent and intensive use by the public and that there is noth-
ing uniquely governmental about it. The relationship between the 
occupier, the premises, and the public is in no essential respect dif-
ferent from the same relationship where nongovernmental occupiers 
are concerned. 
On the other hand, the defense also covers injuries causally re-
latable to conditions of publicly mmed premises that, while left 
open for entry by the public, are not developed for intensive use. 
This would include areas such as large rustic parks, forest and other 
520. See Penix v. City of St, Johns, 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958); Richards 
v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W .2d 643 (1957); Watson v. School 
Dist., 324 Mich. 1, 36 N.W .2d 195 (1946); Royston v. City of Charlotte, 278 Mich. 255, 
270 N.W. 288 (1936); text accompanying notes 255·66 &: preceding note 305 supra. 
December 1973] Governmental Tort Liability 285 
lands left substantially in their natural condition, and public waters 
other than supervised beach areas. The private sector offers no anal~ 
ogy here, for no private party is the occupier521 of premises remotely 
comparable in extent. Moreover, a private occupier of similar prem-
ises would rarely invite the public to enter and would therefore 
normally enjoy the limitations on responsibility that the law pro.: 
vides in respect to visitors who are at best licensees. In opening such 
areas for use and enjoyment by the public, the governmental unit 
does not hold out that measures have been taken to make them safe 
for entry. They are offered and enjoyed as and because they are 
approximations of nature in the raw, and nature in the raw is fre-
quently unsafe. 
To assume applicability to this situation of conventional prem-
ises-liability principles based on knowledge or constructive notice 
of the existence of dangerous conditions and a jury judgment upon 
the measures taken in response to that knowledge would be to create 
an unpredictable liability exposure, to imply an unmanageable oper-
ational duty, and to introduce a major negative factor into the deci-
sion-making process by which such areas are opened for public use. 
It may be argued that a jury can take such factors into account in 
deciding whether the usual reasonableness standard has been 
breached, but I would maintain that here the unit should not be 
subject to a jury risk. Such an area is offered for use without war-
ranty, the user may fairly be said to have assumed the risk, and the 
applicable general principle should be one of nonliability. The func-
tion of providing public access to such areas, I would contend, is 
uniquely governmental. 
The governmental-function defense also serves at the present 
time to exclude a miscellany of claims relating, not to what govern-
ment did to the claimant, but rather to what it did not do for him, 
to losses it failed to prevent. Within this general class involving as-
sertions of failure to perform an affirmative duty there is, of course, 
liability for failure to perform a duty arising in the exercise of a 
proprietary function and for failure to repair or make reasonably 
safe public ways and buildings; and, of course, a negligent omission 
may be the culpable factor in the context of actions for which the unit 
is otherwise subject to liability. But aside from these instances, were 
there no such defense, there would be an essentially unpredictable 
exposure to miscellaneous accusations of nonfeasance. Government's 
ubiquity in modern life makes it vulnerable, in a legal milieu 
wherein the search for a plausible loss-bearer is candidly recognized, 
521. The term itself seems out of place in this context. Is the state the "occupier" 
of the woods, fields, lakes, and streams under its ownership? 
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to blame for individual misfortunes that are in no real sense the 
product of its enterprise. The principle that government should pay 
its way could shade imperceptibly into a principle that it should pay 
our way. Such a principle may well be appropriate in given circum-
stances. Perhaps modern government should absorb, to a greater 
degree than it does, the burdens of personal misfortune arising from 
its failure to shield individual citizens from harmful occurrences, 
such as crime and flood, that citizens are in a poor position to 
avoid or to lay off in other ways, but that type of decision belongs 
to the political rather than to the judicial process. 
There is again a range of possibilities. It would include, on the 
one hand, the failures of public services already in place-such as 
the sewer or drain that becomes clogged, the fire department that 
is slow or ineffective in its response or that appears on the scene with 
defective or inadequate equipment, and the police department that 
fails to take steps deemed reasonably adequate to protect against 
crime or negligently permits a felon to escape. On the other hand, 
given the applicability of contemporary attitudes in regard to fault, 
causation, and damages, legally plausible claims might be constructed 
for harms causally relatable to the asserted failure of the authorities 
to provide services of a quality or quantity that a jury might reason-
ably believe should have been provided-such as the absence of 
sufficient sewerage or drainage or of an adequate police or fire estab-
lishment. Still further down the scale might be assertions of harms 
causally relatable to a failure to adopt or to enforce laws or regula-
tions that a jury might reasonably conclude ought to have been 
adopted or enforced and that might have prevented the loss from 
occurring. If the governmental-function defense did not foreclose 
these questions, the remaining control would lie in judicial manipu-
lation of the duty question, which would mean that in those in-
stances in which he permitted the claim to go to the jury, the judge 
would frequently be permitting the jury to substitute its judgment 
concerning the extent of public services and their deployment for 
that of the political and administrative authorities to whom such 
judgments belong. 
Similar considerations apply to another type of claim that is 
presently blocked by the governmental-function defense. Were it not 
for that principle, damage claims might be advanced for economic 
disadvantages asserted to have been caused by miscellaneous gov-
ernmental decisions, such as those relating to street grades, location 
of public facilities, zoning, building regulations, licensing and the 
regulation of licensed activities, dissemination of information, and 
decisions made in individual cases by educational authorities. In-
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dividual rights are safeguarded in this area by liabilities for nuisance, 
trespass, and the taking of private property for public use, and by 
normal review processes and preventive relief obtainable where the 
political and administrative authorities seek to exceed their author-
ity. To open such decisions further to challenge in damage actions 
would reduce government to a bargaining process, if not to sub-
stantial immobility. Such decisions, along with the decisions of 
"whether" and "how much" noted above, are of the essence of gov-
ernment, and the function of making them is surely governmental. 
Justices Campbell and Cooley were feeling their way toward accept-
able principles for dealing with claims of this kind during their 
tenure on the court. They phrased those principles in terms of non-
liability for "mere neglect" to perform a statutory duty, absent in-
dication of contrary legislative intent, and nonliability for "legisla-
tive" or "discretionary" decisions of authorities to whom the making 
of such decisions is entrusted. Unfortunately, the growth of these 
ideas was stunted at an early stage when they were overshadowed by 
the rank growth of the "governmental-function" cliche. 
In sum, the purpose of these conclusory paragraphs is to suggest 
that the statutory "governmental-function" reservation, in contem-
porary context, may appropriately be interpreted as a limited priv-
ilege serving as a defense in a class of cases, miscellaneous in nature 
and difficult to define, wherein it is important to preserve the elbow-
room that must be available for political decision-making, wherein 
tort liability would imply duties of care that would be impossible or 
impracticable to perform or would require government to absorb 
losses that are not the product of its intervention, and wherein the 
acts that governmental agents must perform within the scope of their 
normal duties have no common analogy in the private sector be-
cause they reflect the imperative element in government, the imple-
mentation of its right and duty to govern. A return to considerations 
such as these would make the term "governmental" functionally in-
telligible and give it a core of meaning as a term the purpose of 
which is to facilitate the drawing of distinctions between the activi-
ties of governmental and nongovernmental actors that say something 
rational about the conditions of tort liability. Such an interpreta-
tion would, I believe, not be unfaithful to Michigan legal tradition 
in historical depth. It would correct for an aberration that occurred 
when the professional stopped thinking about these problems and 
resorted instead to a facile but mindless formula. 
This suggestion for modification of existing doctrine will not be 
taken, I trust, as a proposal for another revolution. The court's 
adventures in this area since 1961 are to me persuasive evidence 
288 Michigan Law Review 
that legislative techniques are better left to legislatures. The com-
munity will be no better served by the assumption that govern-
mental activity, for tort liability purposes, is no different from non-
governmental activity than it was by the opposite assumption. What 
is jurisprudentially sound when General Motors is the defendant 
is not necessarily so if the defendant is the state of Michigan, the 
city of Detroit, or the township of Leoni. What is needed at this 
point is not a broad brush technique, but careful consideration of 
the factors that differentiate injury and liability problems in this 
context from those that occur in other spheres. 
After the most extensive and careful study of these problems 
that has yet been made, the California Law Revision Commission 
made the following point in its report to the California legislature: 
The problems involved in drawing standards for governmental 
liability and governmental immunity are of immense difficulty. Gov-
ernment cannot merely be made liable as private persons are for 
public entities are fundamentally different from private persons. 
Private persons do not make laws. Private persons do not issue and 
revoke licenses to engage in various professions and occupations. 
Private persons do not quarantine sick persons and do not commit 
mentally disturbed persons to involuntary confinement. Private per-
sons do not prosecute and incarcerate violators of the law or admin-
ister prison systems. Only public entities are required to build and 
maintain thousands of miles of streets, sidewalks and highways. Un-
like many private persons, a public entity often cannot reduce its 
risk of potential liability by refusing to engage in a particular ac-
tivity, for government must continue to govern and is required to 
furnish services that cannot be adequately provided by any other 
agency. Moreover, in our system of government, decision-making has 
been allocated among three branches of government-legislative, 
executive and judicial-and in many cases decisions made by the 
legislative and executive branches should not be subject to review in 
tort suits for damages, for this would take the ultimate decision-
making authority away from those who are responsible politically 
for making the decisions. 622 
In the study that backs up that report there is a detailed considera-
tion of the various kinds of situations from which questions of gov-
ernmental tort liability may arise, and of the policy factors relevant 
to their appropriate solution. Further consideration of these prob-
lems in Michigan might well start there. 
522. 4 CAL. LAW REVISION CoMMN,, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 810 
(1963). The study on which the Commission's recommendations were based is contained 
in 5 id. 
